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State v. Hagin

Citations: 691 S.E.2d 429; 203 N.C. App. 561; 2010 N.C. App. LEXIS 642Docket: COA09-1092

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; April 20, 2010; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of North Carolina upheld the trial court's denial of Timothy Brian Hagin's motion to suppress evidence obtained from a search of an outbuilding on his property, following his consent for a search. On November 26, 2007, law enforcement found materials linked to methamphetamine production near Hagin's residence, leading them to conduct a 'knock and talk' at his home. Hagin and his wife provided written consent for the search of their property at 19 Doc Wyatt Road, which included a mobile home. During the search, Detective Tice noticed an outbuilding nearby and, without any withdrawal of consent from Hagin, found materials indicating methamphetamine manufacture inside. Hagin subsequently confessed to operating a meth lab. After being indicted for manufacturing methamphetamine, he filed a motion to suppress the evidence found in the outbuilding, which was denied. Hagin pled guilty while preserving his right to appeal the suppression ruling. The court emphasized that the trial judge's factual findings are conclusive if supported by competent evidence, and Hagin did not contest the sufficiency of the findings in his appeal. He was sentenced to 58-79 months in prison.

The defendant argues that the trial court should have accepted his interpretation regarding the scope of consent to search. Without contesting the trial court's factual findings based on competent evidence, the defendant's claims of error are considered abandoned. The review focuses on whether these findings support the legal conclusions drawn by the trial court. The defendant contends that the court erred in concluding that his consent to search included an outbuilding, claiming that such a search exceeded the consent's scope and that search warrant precedents do not apply to consent cases. The Fourth Amendment and North Carolina Constitution generally require a warrant for searches, but consent searches are recognized as an exception. The scope of a consent search is limited to the parameters of the consent given and is assessed by what a reasonable person would understand from the interaction between the officer and the suspect. Searches conducted under a valid warrant can include areas within the curtilage of a dwelling. The court found that the search of the outbuilding, located within the curtilage, fell within the consent given by the defendant. The principles defining search warrant scopes are applicable to consent searches. The defendant had explicitly consented to a search of all property at a specified address, and he did not dispute that the outbuilding was part of the curtilage, affirming that the search was permissible under the granted consent. Previous cases have established the parameters of consent in similar contexts.

The search of the defendant's vehicle occurred after it was relocated to the police department's impound yard. The court determined that the consent form's reference to the vehicle's location described the subject of the search rather than limiting it to a specific place, concluding that the search remained within the consent's scope. The consent form specified the area for the search as the property at 19 Doc Wyatt Road, where Detective Tice informed the defendant that they were searching for evidence of methamphetamine production, without limiting the search to just the mobile home. A reasonable person would have understood that the search extended to the entire property, including outbuildings within the curtilage. The defendant did not object to the search of these outbuildings, suggesting he believed they fell within the consent's scope. The court found that the defendant's claims regarding a violation of consent arose only after his arrest, and therefore upheld the trial court's ruling that the search by the Anson County Sheriff's Department was within the consent's parameters. The motion to suppress was denied and the ruling was affirmed with Judges Bryant and Beasley concurring.