Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; February 3, 1981; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of North Carolina addressed a summary judgment appeal in the case of Rebecca B. Renfro d/b/a Renfro Brokerage v. Frank B. Meacham. The key issue was whether the trial court erred in granting summary judgment for the defendant. Under G.S. 1A-1, Rule 56(c), a summary judgment is warranted if there are no genuine issues of material fact and a party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The burden is on the moving party to demonstrate no triable issue exists, and the evidence must be viewed in favor of the opposing party.
The plaintiff argued that a material issue existed regarding the intent of the defendant concerning the listing agreement dated May 20, 1978. The plaintiff's deposition suggested that the defendant provided specific instructions about the property's acreage and pricing, indicating different values for cultivated versus woodland areas. The defendant's testimony, however, claimed that the property was intended to be sold only as a complete unit, creating a potential factual dispute.
The court rejected the plaintiff's argument, stating that when a contract's language is clear and unambiguous, it must be interpreted as written. The listing agreement explicitly stated that the total sales price was $1,250,000, with specified amounts for the cultivated and woodland portions. The court ruled that the clear terms of the agreement negated any differing intentions regarding the sale of the property, concluding that no genuine issue of material fact existed concerning the sale structure. Consequently, the court found no merit in the plaintiff's argument regarding her authority to secure a purchaser based on conflicting statements about the sale of the property.
A genuine issue of material fact regarding the defendant's cooperation in selling the property, as outlined in paragraph five of the listing agreement, has not been established by the plaintiff. The plaintiff claims the defendant did not provide reasons for rejecting offers from Canal Industries, Inc. and was hard to contact. However, the court found no evidence of the defendant hindering the plaintiff's efforts, nor did the plaintiff's complaint allege a lack of cooperation. The defendant's refusals were deemed justified since both the written and oral offers from Canal significantly deviated from the terms of the listing agreement. The written offer proposed a sales price contingent on a survey and included a different payment structure than the listing agreement, which required full cash payment at closing. The oral offer constituted a counteroffer, seeking an option for Canal to purchase, which was not stipulated in the listing agreement. As the record shows no factual dispute about the defendant's alleged lack of cooperation, the court concluded there was no triable issue and affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendant.
