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Brunner v. Brunner
Citations: 370 S.E.2d 614; 296 S.C. 60; 1988 S.C. App. LEXIS 98
Court: Court of Appeals of South Carolina; June 27, 1988; South Carolina; State Appellate Court
Mary Angela Brunner appeals the family court's decisions regarding attorney fees and alimony following her divorce from Ronald J. Brunner. Key issues include the denial of attorney fees for services related to protecting previously awarded fees in bankruptcy court, the refusal to award expert witness fees, the award of only $750 in attorney fees related to Mr. Brunner's appeal, and the monthly alimony set at $600. The court affirmed the family court's rulings, stating it had no statutory authority to award fees for services rendered in other litigation arising from marital issues. The court also found no error in denying expert witness fees, as the family court has discretion to award such fees and determined the witness was unqualified to testify on bankruptcy matters. Overall, the appeals court upheld the family court's decisions as there was no abuse of discretion. The family court's decision to award Mrs. Brunner $750 in attorney fees related to Mr. Brunner's appeal was deemed appropriate, as it aligns with S.C.S.CT. R. 38(4), which allows for such an award to the prevailing party. However, this case differed from Shaluly v. Shaluly, where additional fees were awarded after a fully prosecuted appeal; here, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal without further action. Additionally, the family court did not err in denying Mrs. Brunner further attorney fees, exercising its discretion based on findings that she could pay her own fees and that Mr. Brunner prevailed on significant issues, including custody and support. The court's ruling on support payments was also upheld, as the reduction from $1,150 to $600 was justified by changed circumstances, including Mr. Brunner's remarriage and the emancipation of their daughter. The court found that Mrs. Brunner, although unemployed, was capable of earning a livelihood and had previously cohabited with an unemployed partner. The family court's discretion in modifying support obligations was affirmed, with no abuse of discretion evident in its decisions. Mrs. Brunner's argument that the hearing judge lacked jurisdiction on November 14, 1986, due to the Administrative Judge's prior order striking the case from the active roster is found to be without merit. The court notes that her argument is conclusory and could be disregarded on that basis. The Administrative Judge's order did not remove the hearing judge's jurisdiction, as the case had been previously 'tried' on July 18, 1986, making it exempt from the Administrative Judge's order. The court reaffirms that a judge retains jurisdiction over a matter until a decision is rendered. Additionally, questions regarding the trial judge's compliance with Rule 27(C) are also deemed meritless, as Mrs. Brunner did not suffer prejudice from any purported failures and may have actually benefited from the delay in the issuance of the order. Errors are only reversible if they result in prejudice to the complaining party. The court concludes that a remand is warranted only if there is insufficient record for appellate review. The decision is affirmed, with Judges Gardner and Cureton concurring.