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Henderson v. Allied Signal, Inc.

Citations: 644 S.E.2d 724; 373 S.C. 179; 2007 S.C. LEXIS 191Docket: 26322

Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; April 30, 2007; South Carolina; State Supreme Court

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James W. Henderson, Jr. and Betty Lee Henderson, the Appellants, appealed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of multiple Respondents, including Allied Signal, Inc., Daimler Chrysler, and Ford Motor Company, among others. The Appellants, North Carolina residents, filed a complaint in 1997 related to Mr. Henderson's exposure to asbestos while working in various industrial capacities in South Carolina, which led to his diagnosis of mesothelioma. Mrs. Henderson claimed loss of consortium. 

The complaint alleged that the Respondents were involved in the mining, manufacturing, and distribution of asbestos products that were used in South Carolina, causing Mr. Henderson’s exposure. In a 2001 ruling, the trial court excluded certain affidavits from the Appellants and dismissed several defendants based on the Door Closing Statute, finding no evidence that Mr. Henderson was exposed to asbestos products in South Carolina. The court granted summary judgment to Rayloc and Covil due to insufficient evidence their products contained asbestos. 

However, it found genuine issues of material fact regarding Mr. Henderson's exposure to asbestos from Allied Signal and McCord Corporation, leading to a trial against these parties. During the trial, McCord and Dana settled, but the jury ruled in favor of Allied. The Appellants subsequently appealed, and the case was certified for review from the Court of Appeals.

The trial court's decision to grant summary judgment was challenged on two main issues: (I) whether the court erred in ruling on product exposure and (II) whether it improperly limited the evidence presented by the Appellants solely to mesothelioma cases. The appellate court applies the same standard as the trial court under Rule 56(c), SCRCP, examining whether there are genuine issues of material fact and if the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law, considering all evidence in favor of the nonmoving party.

Regarding product exposure, the Appellants contended the trial court made an error by granting summary judgment against them for claims involving Uniroyal, Ford, General Motors, Chrysler, Abex, and Rayloc, asserting that there was a jury question about exposure related to Kenworth, Freightliner, Paccar, and International Truck. The trial court ruled that Mr. Henderson had no exposure to the Respondents’ asbestos-containing products in South Carolina, leading to a jurisdictional issue under the Door Closing Statute, S.C.Code Ann. 15-5-150. The statute allows for lawsuits against foreign corporations under specific circumstances. The trial court's reliance on prior case law was scrutinized, particularly whether a cause of action arose in South Carolina when the injury was diagnosed.

The appellate court clarified that the Door Closing Statute concerns the capacity to sue rather than subject matter jurisdiction. It referenced the Murphy case, which determined that the connection to South Carolina is sufficient if the exposure occurred within the state, even if the injury manifesting as a diagnosis happened later. The Appellants failed to meet the standards set in Murphy by not demonstrating that the Respondents’ products contained asbestos or showing any actionable exposure in South Carolina. The court adopted the "frequency, regularity, and proximity test" from Lohrmann to assess the validity of the exposure claims.

Substantial causation from circumstantial evidence requires proof of consistent exposure to a specific product over an extended period near the plaintiff's workplace. The trial court correctly ruled that mere presence near static asbestos does not equate to actual exposure, and the Appellants did not provide sufficient evidence of regular exposure to asbestos-containing products related to Mr. Henderson's work. Therefore, the trial court's decision was upheld. 

The Appellants contended that the trial court improperly restricted their evidence to mesothelioma; however, this restriction was justified as their claims were tied specifically to Mr. Henderson's work with brake products from Allied. Evidence regarding other asbestos-related diseases was appropriately excluded as it was merely cumulative and did not introduce any new relevant information. The trial court's exclusion of this evidence was not prejudicial, and the judge's discretion in evaluating the relevance and potential prejudice of evidence was respected, aligning with Rule 403 of the South Carolina Rules of Evidence.

The court concluded that the Appellants failed to establish actionable exposure to the Respondents' asbestos products and affirmed the trial court's summary judgment in favor of the Respondents, as well as the exclusion of cumulative affidavits. The decision was unanimously supported by the justices involved. Notably, during the litigation, several defendants filed for bankruptcy and are no longer part of the case, and a settlement was reached with Pneumo-Abex prior to oral arguments. Following the trial, Mr. Henderson passed away, and his estate, represented by Ms. Henderson, continued with the appeal.