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Georgia Power Co. v. Monroe County
Citations: 644 S.E.2d 882; 284 Ga. App. 707; 2007 Fulton County D. Rep. 1201; 2007 Ga. App. LEXIS 399Docket: A06A1951
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 30, 2007; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Georgia Power Company filed a 2003 ad valorem tax return estimating its operating property's fair market value at nearly $8.8 billion, which the State Board of Equalization approved and apportioned among the counties, including Monroe County, with a certified assessed value of $83 million. However, the Monroe County Board of Tax Assessors increased the fair market value from $229 million to $701 million and raised the assessment ratio to 40%, resulting in an assessed value of $280 million and tax bills totaling $5.98 million. Georgia Power contested this, arguing that while counties may raise assessment ratios, they cannot alter the State Commissioner’s determination of fair market value, as this undermines the state-level assessment practice for utility properties. Georgia Power sought equitable relief to prevent the Monroe Board from changing the State Commissioner's valuation. The trial court granted summary judgment to the Monroe Board. On appeal, the court reversed the decision, concluding that "final assessment" does not permit a county board to reevaluate a public utility's property value. The Monroe Board claims authority to adjust both the assessment ratio and the fair market value of Georgia Power's property in Monroe County, referencing OCGA 48-2-18(d), which mandates that the county board of tax assessors finalize property assessments within 30 days of receiving the State Commissioner’s proposed digest. However, this is disputed. The taxation process for public utilities initiates with the utility filing a sworn property value statement with the State Board. Under OCGA 48-2-18(b), the State Board must evaluate the proposed assessments to ensure they are fairly distributed among tax jurisdictions and consistent with other property valuations in the state. OCGA 48-5-511(c) instructs the State Commissioner to consider various factors for equitable property apportionment during the regulations' development for public utility taxation. The Supreme Court previously noted in Telecom*USA v. Collins that the authority of counties to modify the Commissioner’s proposed assessments was not addressed. The current issue is whether the Monroe Board overstepped its authority by substituting its own assessment ratio and fair market value for those determined by the State Commissioner. The analysis begins with the principle of statutory interpretation, which dictates adherence to the statute's literal wording unless it leads to absurd results. Should a literal interpretation yield absurdity, the court must interpret the statute in a manner that reflects legislative intent, considering the statute's purpose and its historical context. Additionally, any ambiguity in a taxing statute should be interpreted in favor of the taxpayer. Monroe County argues that if the General Assembly intended to limit county boards to adjusting only assessment ratios, it would have explicitly stated so, as seen in the 1988 amendments regarding county tax digests. The term "assessment" is not defined in the Revenue Code but typically refers to property valuation and tax assessment. Therefore, the court will examine related statutes to ascertain legislative intent. County boards possess the authority to appraise property values and assess taxes, as stipulated by OCGA 48-5-305(b). This statute grants them the full power to determine the fair market value of all property within the county, allowing them to utilize various methods, such as “blue book” values or depreciated values, as established in Rogers v. DeKalb County. However, a county board is not obligated to conduct independent valuations of public utility properties, as per Burt, Burt, Rentz Retirement Pension Trust v. Dougherty County Tax Assessors. The Monroe Board's reliance on OCGA 48-5-341(3) is questionable since this statute defines the "assessment ratio" as the relationship between assessed value and fair market value, indicating that assessment is a process applied to a pre-determined fair market value. OCGA 48-5-263(b) highlights that appraising fair market value is just the initial step in a comprehensive assessment process, which involves staff appraisals, preparing annual assessments for board approval, and attending county board hearings. Importantly, OCGA 48-5-313 states that its provisions do not apply to those required to make returns to the State Commissioner, which was emphasized in Pullman Co. v. Suttles regarding the due process rights of railroads. The conclusion drawn is that a county board's "final assessment" cannot include a reappraisal of fair market value for taxpayers, including public utilities, that file returns with the State. Therefore, the trial court's denial of Georgia Power's summary judgment motion was erroneous. The judgment is reversed, directing an injunction against the Monroe Board from taxing Georgia Power's property based on its reappraisal of the fair market value. Judge Adams concurs, noting that OCGA 48-2-18(d) establishes a new role for counties in utility taxation, permitting them to either accept or modify the Tax Commissioner’s proposed assessments before finalizing their own assessments. The excerpt addresses the ambiguity surrounding the county's authority to modify the Commissioner's proposed property assessment under OCGA 48-2-18(d). It highlights the lack of definition in both the Telecom*USA opinion and the statute regarding this power, indicating a need for legislative clarification. The review of the statutory framework suggests that property valuations for utilities are intended to be conducted at the state level, as evidenced by various provisions (OCGA 48-5-263(b), 48-5-305, and 48-5-313) that exclude utility property from county appraiser duties and the jurisdiction of county tax assessors. Chief Judge Barnes dissents, arguing that the court lacks the authority to interpret OCGA 48-2-18(d) in a manner that contradicts its explicit terms. The statute establishes the State Board of Equalization, composed of the commissioner and other state officials, which reviews the proposed assessments for uniformity and equity across tax jurisdictions. Following the Board's adjustments, taxpayers are notified of their assessments and have the right to dispute them, with the option to appeal to the Superior Court of Fulton County. Taxpayers have the right to discovery during appeals under the Georgia Civil Practice Act. Upon appeal conclusion, any additional owed taxes must be remitted to the counties, along with interest from the original due date until payment. The county board of tax assessors must finalize property assessments and notify the taxpayer within 30 days of receiving the proposed digest. Appeals follow the procedures outlined in specific Code Sections. The department will provide technical assistance to local boards at no charge during appeals. Assessments made will be added to the county digest when transmitted to the commissioner. The outlined notice and appeal procedures do not apply to motor vehicle property assessments or appeals under the Ad Valorem Assessment Review Commission's jurisdiction. The interpretation of the Code section is critical; it emphasizes the distinction between "proposed" and "final" assessments and maintains the necessity for the county board to issue a final assessment. Past court rulings have reinforced these distinctions and the responsibilities related to public utility assessments, which were revised in 1988 to clarify assessment procedures while retaining certain older provisions. The essential change involves the timeline for final assessments following the proposed digest receipt. No statutory provisions existed prior to the 1988 amendments regarding the county's authority to issue a "final assessment." The legislature characterized the assessment by the Commissioner as a "proposed assessment" and that by the county board as a "final assessment," indicating a shift in the counties' role in utility taxation. Counties were granted the authority to issue assessments distinct from the Commissioner's and to handle appeals from these final assessments. The legislative history reinforces this interpretation, as the original House Bill lacked provisions for appeals from the Board's proposed assessments but included them for final assessments. A fiscal note further clarified that utilities would be assessed by local jurisdictions rather than the Department of Revenue, which would still develop proposed assessments. The Supreme Court concluded that county boards could adopt or modify the Commissioner's proposed assessment before issuing a final assessment. The court did not definitively rule on whether counties could only modify the assessment ratio, but legislative history suggests broader modification authority. The dissent argues that the majority's conclusion limiting modifications contradicts the statute's plain language and legislative intent, emphasizing that local assessors are not confined to the appraised value determined by the Commissioner. The dissent maintains that the legislature intended for counties to have a significant role in utility taxation, allowing for assessments that differ from the Commissioner's.