Langdon v. Langdon

Citations: 644 S.E.2d 600; 183 N.C. App. 471; 2007 N.C. App. LEXIS 1106Docket: COA06-466

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; June 5, 2007; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Stacey L. Langdon (plaintiff) appeals a 2005 order from Judge Michael G. Knox regarding alimony payments from her former husband, Leonard S. Langdon, Jr. (defendant). The couple married in 1990 and had one child in 1991. After the defendant left the marital home in 1999, they divorced, leading to a 2000 consent order for post-separation support of $1,356 per month, recognizing the plaintiff as a dependent spouse. In 2004, the defendant sought to modify this support due to a change in circumstances, but his request was denied.

During an August 2004 hearing on plaintiff's claim for permanent alimony, Judge Knox ordered that the alimony amount would be $1,356 until June 2005, reducing to $600 through December 2005, and further to $250 until its termination in June 2006. The judge provided no findings of fact, prompting the plaintiff to request such findings. After nine months, Judge Knox issued a formal order detailing his findings and conclusions regarding permanent alimony.

The plaintiff testified about her modest lifestyle post-separation, stating she had not sought employment due to a mutual agreement with the defendant for her to stay home and raise their child. The defendant did not contest her testimony but provided evidence of potential employment opportunities for her as a nurse. The plaintiff had previously worked as a licensed practical nurse before the marriage and had not pursued employment after the birth of their daughter. The case is under appeal based on the trial court's order.

The nurse recruiter indicated that the plaintiff could obtain a Licensed Practical Nurse (LPN) license in North Carolina within four to six months after completing a refresher course, allowing for employment at a starting wage of $11.58 per hour. The plaintiff contested the trial court's Finding of Fact No. 23, arguing insufficient evidence supported it and claiming reliance for alimony determinations. The plaintiff contended that to modify alimony in the future, a substantial change in circumstances must be demonstrated, referencing relevant case law. However, the modification rule was deemed inapplicable due to the nature of the trial court's order, which was for temporary post-separation support rather than a definitive alimony award. The statute defines post-separation support as temporary and ceasing upon a final alimony decision, and courts have ruled that findings related to post-separation support do not bind future alimony determinations. The consent order provided only temporary support until the alimony claim was resolved. The trial court's July 2005 order awarded alimony but did not modify any prior order; it replaced the temporary support. The standard for a substantial change in circumstances was therefore not relevant. Additionally, the plaintiff argued the trial court failed to make necessary findings regarding statutory factors for alimony, asserting a violation of statutory requirements. The court, however, noted that specific findings are only required if evidence was presented on those factors, indicating disagreement with the plaintiff's assertion about the lack of reasoning in the alimony award.

Plaintiff asserts that the court did not properly consider the statutory factors from N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-16.3A(b), claiming a lack of findings of fact. However, the court made twenty-three findings that addressed most of these factors. Since the plaintiff did not challenge any of these findings, they are deemed binding on appeal, as established in Koufman v. Koufman. For factors not specifically addressed, the plaintiff failed to provide evidence to support a finding, preventing her from proving that the court's findings were inadequate under N.C. Gen. Stat. 50-16.3A(c). Additionally, the plaintiff argues that the findings were insufficient to terminate alimony on July 1, 2006; however, as there was no prior order of alimony, the trial court was actually granting permanent alimony rather than terminating it. The order is thus affirmed. Judges TYSON and GEER concur.