Ravin v. Gambrell, by and Through Eddy

Citations: 788 P.2d 817; 14 Brief Times Rptr. 378; 1990 Colo. LEXIS 208; 1990 WL 28215Docket: 88SC309

Court: Supreme Court of Colorado; March 18, 1990; Colorado; State Supreme Court

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In the case of Gambrell v. Ravin, the Colorado Supreme Court reviewed the Court of Appeals' decision to grant a new trial for Daniel Gambrell and his mother, Linda Gambrell Eddy, due to improper jury communications and the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on res ipsa loquitur. The case originated from Linda Gambrell Eddy's pregnancy in 1978, during which she chose the LaBoyer method of natural childbirth. Dr. David R. McKee was her primary physician, but during his absence for National Guard duties, he referred her to Dr. Sheldon J. Ravin. On July 13, 1979, after reporting labor pains to Ravin, she was admitted to Eisenhower Hospital, where she expressed her desire for a natural childbirth without anesthesia or an episiotomy. Despite her refusal, Ravin recommended an episiotomy due to the large size of the baby. Complications arose during delivery, specifically shoulder dystocia, requiring urgent maneuvers to prevent potential harm to the child. The delivery was ultimately successful but resulted in the child suffering from paralysis in his left arm. The respondents filed a negligence claim against Ravin, later joining McKee as a co-defendant, leading to the trial that commenced in May 1985. The Supreme Court affirmed the lower court's ruling and remanded the case with specific instructions.

At the end of the trial's evidentiary phase, the trial court denied the respondents' request for a jury instruction on res ipsa loquitur and refused to direct a verdict for the petitioners. After deliberating for two days, the jury rendered a verdict favoring the petitioners. The respondents filed a motion for a new trial, claiming improper communications occurred between a bailiff and the jury during deliberations and that the court erred in denying the res ipsa loquitur instruction. During the hearing on the motion, affidavits revealed that a juror expressed feeling unwell and was the only one favoring the respondents, questioning the requirement for a unanimous verdict and the duration of deliberations. The bailiff confirmed a unanimous verdict was necessary and indicated deliberations could last up to two weeks, a conversation overheard by other jurors.

The trial court denied the motion for a new trial, acknowledging the bailiff's improper comments but concluding they did not pertain directly to the case. It also found the evidence did not justify a res ipsa loquitur instruction. However, the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision, stating that the bailiff's communication warranted a new trial and directed that the res ipsa loquitur issue should be submitted to the jury upon retrial if supported by evidence.

The Court of Appeals established that to assess whether jury misconduct necessitates a new trial, the trial court should apply an objective test to determine if there was a reasonable possibility the misconduct affected the jury's verdict. The court adopted the rationale from Wiser v. People, which involved a criminal case. The petitioners argued against the applicability of the Wiser test to civil cases and contended the facts did not meet its criteria, but these arguments were rejected. A party seeking to nullify a verdict based on extraneous jury influence must demonstrate both the occurrence of improper communication and resultant prejudice, adhering to policies promoting finality in judgments and minimizing retrial costs and delays. The discussion emphasized the limitations on juror testimony regarding deliberation processes as outlined in CRE 606(b), which permits juror testimony only on extraneous prejudicial information or outside influences.

CRE 606(b) prohibits inquiry into jurors' deliberative processes, as established in multiple Colorado cases. However, parties can present evidence of external influences that may have affected jury decisions. In this instance, the trial court and Court of Appeals rightly excluded juror affidavits discussing deliberative processes. The rule aims to uphold the finality of verdicts, protect jury deliberations, and maintain juror privacy, while also safeguarding jurors from potential harassment by losing parties. Courts must balance these protections with ensuring fair outcomes, particularly when fundamental flaws in deliberations arise. The Colorado Supreme Court, in Wiser v. People, adopted a "reasonable possibility of prejudice" standard over an "actual prejudice" standard for assessing extraneous influences on jury deliberations. Petitioners claim that a different standard applies to civil cases, citing Butters v. Dee Wann, where a juror's independent investigation violated court rules. The court emphasized that the test hinges on whether the irregularity could influence the outcome, not whether it did. This objective approach was reaffirmed in Canton Oil v. District Court, where juror misconduct was found to potentially impact the verdict.

The test for setting aside jury verdicts in civil cases remains consistent with the standards established in previous cases, with no need for different criteria between civil and criminal contexts. The Court of Appeals determined that comments made by a bailiff likely influenced the jury's verdict, a conclusion supported by the presence of a juror who expressed discomfort and questioned the implications of a non-unanimous verdict. The bailiff's remarks, overheard by other jurors, were deemed improper by the trial court, establishing a reasonable possibility that they affected the jury's decision. 

Additionally, the Court of Appeals noted that the trial court erred by not providing the jury with instructions on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although the petitioners contested the evidence's sufficiency for such an instruction. The necessity of an instruction depends on whether the plaintiff can present sufficient evidence to establish a presumption of negligence under this doctrine, which requires showing that (1) the event typically does not occur without negligence, (2) other potential causes are sufficiently excluded, and (3) the presumed negligence falls within the defendant's duty to the plaintiff. The court emphasized that a plaintiff does not need to eliminate every alternative cause to make a prima facie case for res ipsa loquitur.

Due to the bailiff's improper conduct, a new trial has been granted, with the trial court expected to consider the appropriateness of the res ipsa loquitur instruction based on the evidence presented at that time. The Court of Appeals' judgment is affirmed, and the case is remanded for a new trial. Justices Erickson and Vollack express partial concurrence and dissent.

Justice Erickson's concurring and dissenting opinion addresses a malpractice lawsuit brought by Linda Gambrell Eddy against Dr. Sheldon J. Ravin and Dr. David R. McKee for alleged negligence resulting in injuries to her son, Daniel, during birth. A jury ruled in favor of the doctors, but the court of appeals overturned this decision due to juror misconduct, mandating a new trial. While agreeing with the majority's decision for a new trial, Erickson emphasizes that this is primarily due to the jury not being instructed on res ipsa loquitur. He references the Wiser v. People case, where the court established that a defendant must prove actual prejudice from juror misconduct to warrant a new trial. Erickson argues that this standard, derived from criminal cases, should not be applied to civil cases, where the established standard focuses on whether juror misconduct had the potential to influence the verdict. He critiques the majority for extending the criminal standard to civil trials, asserting it undermines the finality of jury verdicts and blurs the distinctions between civil and criminal proceedings. Ultimately, he believes the existing civil standard would not necessitate a new trial in this case.

Dissent is expressed regarding the adoption of the 'reasonable possibility standard' for evaluating juror misconduct, while agreement is stated that a new trial is warranted due to the lack of instruction on res ipsa loquitur. Justice VOLLACK supports this concurrence and dissent. Additional notes clarify details related to the LaBoyer childbirth method, the design of the birthing room at Eisenhower Hospital, the definition of an episiotomy, the postponement of the trial initially set for 1983 due to Daniel's recovery, and a ruling from the Court of Appeals regarding the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on the standard of care for specialists, which has not been appealed.