Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; October 17, 1969; Georgia; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Georgia addressed two cases involving the appeal of a judgment against defendants Joseph B. Franklin, Lehman Franklin, and E. A. Allen, stemming from a suit by Sea Island Bank. The appellee's motion to dismiss the appeal due to an improperly styled notice was denied, as the notice clearly identified the judgment being appealed, in accordance with Code Ann. 6-809 (d). Previously, a jury ruled in favor of Sea Island Bank, leading to an affirmed judgment and execution against the defendants. The defendants sought an amendment to the judgment based on Code 110-306, which mandates that the plaintiff identify the parties' relationships in judgments against sureties or endorsers. The court noted prior findings that the defendants were accommodation endorsers on a note. Given the failure to specify their status in the judgment, the court determined that the judgment should be amended under Code 110-311, allowing corrections even post-execution. The appellee's argument regarding laches due to the time elapsed (1965 to 1969) was countered by precedents allowing corrections after significant delays. The court emphasized that judicial corrections of clerical errors could be made at any time, reinforcing the need for accurate representation of parties in judgments.
The trial judge had the authority to correct a judgment under Code 110-311 and Code Ann. 81A-160 (g), and erred by denying the appellant's motion for amendment. The assertion that the ruling in *Franklin v. Sea Island Bank* was res judicata is unfounded, as it only established that the defendants were accommodation indorsers and did not pertain to the judgment's form. The issue regarding the judgment's form was not appropriate for a motion for a new trial, and therefore not subject to this court's consideration.
The appellants argued that, following the filing of a notice of appeal, the trial court lost jurisdiction, rendering its order vacating a previous order null and void. However, the April 11 order was not a final judgment but rather left issues open for further determination, and thus the court would not consider it without a certificate of immediate review. The court did not resolve the finality of the judgment on the substitution of parties, noting that there was no compliance with the necessary statutory provisions.
The judgment in Case 44576 was reversed, while the appeal in Case 44599 was dismissed. The Court of Appeals reaffirmed that the defendants' status as accommodation indorsers did not provide a defense against the plaintiff's claim. The movant, as assignee of the judgment, could be affected by modifications but would not be prejudiced by the amendment since she had not been a party at trial. The court concluded that the amendment of the judgment was proper and would not harm the rights of the movant, either individually or in her representative capacity. The judgment was thus adhered to by the concurring judges.
