Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; December 1, 1969; Virginia; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the case of Galen Randolph Reil (210 Va. 369, 1969) regarding his conviction for embezzling $250 from his employer. The court found several key points:
1. A letter from Reil to his wife was admitted as evidence despite being privileged; the objection was deemed too general and not specific enough to conform to Rule 1:8, resulting in no prejudicial error.
2. Prior to the trial, the court limited the evidence regarding the motives of the complainants. Reil's counsel did not object to this ruling or provide a proffer of the desired evidence, which precluded appellate review of its admissibility.
3. Reil claimed potential juror bias due to a critical broadcast about the jury’s leniency in another case. However, the record did not confirm how many jurors were exposed to the broadcast or any resultant influence. The court noted that the imposed punishment was relatively lenient, countering claims of prejudice. The trial judge personally polled the jurors and had the discretion to assess their credibility regarding potential bias, which the appellate court would not disturb.
Reil was found guilty of embezzlement under Virginia Code § 18.1-109, and the court upheld the imposed fine of $500 and the judgment following the jury's verdict. The case background indicated that Reil was a major stockholder and manager of Galen's Shoes, Inc., which faced financial difficulties, leading to a structured management agreement with Riverside Shopping Center, Inc. Reil wrote and signed several payroll checks, including one to himself for the disputed amount.
Reil did not sign the eighth check, which remained blank in the checkbook, and while check stubs were filled out for payroll, no record was made for a $250.00 check, which he claimed was for two weeks of vacation pay. He asserted a weekly entitlement of $130.00, with arbitrary deductions of $5.00, but failed to inform anyone about taking vacation pay or terminating his employment before cashing the check on September 1. Reil and Mrs. Dalton left for Florida shortly after cashing the check, and upon learning of the embezzlement charges, they returned to Danville. Witnesses testified that Reil had indicated he would not take vacation in 1967 except for a weekend, and the jury seemingly dismissed his claims regarding the check's purpose, favoring the Commonwealth's evidence. During the trial, a letter from Reil to his wife was admitted as evidence despite objections from his counsel, who did not specifically cite the letter's privileged status under Virginia law regarding communications between spouses. The objection made was deemed insufficient under Rule 1:8, which requires clear grounds for objections to be considered by the court. The letter expressed Reil's regrets about leaving, his feelings for his children, and instructions to contact Ronald Williams, but it was contested as a privileged communication under Virginia Code section 8-289.
Rule 1:8 mandates that trial judges be informed of specific objections to facilitate informed rulings and minimize delays and costs associated with appeals. This rule is to be followed unless exceptions apply, which were deemed inapplicable in this case. The court determined that even if an error occurred in admitting a letter into evidence, it constituted harmless error, as the letter's content was largely covered by other evidence, except for the defendant's affection for his sons, which did not prejudice the defendant.
The trial court initially restricted evidence regarding the motives of John W. Daniel and Mrs. Dalton's husband before trial, but later lifted restrictions on Daniel's motives to allow the defense to challenge his credibility. The defendant did not seek to recall Daniel or other witnesses, and any potential initial error regarding evidence admissibility was corrected by the later ruling. The court maintained its refusal to modify the ruling on Mrs. Dalton's husband's motives, and the defense did not object or proffer the desired evidence, precluding further review of its admissibility.
The defendant also argued that pre-trial news broadcasts concerning another trial might have prejudiced jurors in his case. However, after thorough inquiry by the trial judge, including polling jurors about potential bias from the broadcasts, it was established that no juror felt prejudiced, leading the court to reject the defendant's claim.
The record lacks evidence regarding how many Reil jurors heard the broadcasts or discussed them, and it does not indicate any juror was influenced by the broadcasts. The jury's lenient punishment suggests no prejudice against Reil. The defense cites United States v. Milanovich as justification for a new trial, arguing that the Commonwealth must demonstrate juror impartiality. However, both Milanovich and United States v. Marshall involved news releases containing inadmissible information during ongoing cases, making them factually distinct from the current situation, where the broadcasts pertained to a prior trial. The Supreme Court's ruling in Marshall, based on its supervisory powers rather than the due process clause, is not applicable here. Each case on juror competency must be evaluated based on its specific facts. The trial judge, having observed the jurors and conducted inquiries into the potential impact of the broadcasts, had the responsibility to assess their credibility and the need for a new trial. The judge's discretion, as highlighted in previous cases, should not be overturned unless injustice is evident. The record indicates that the judge exercised his discretion carefully, and the defendant was afforded a fair trial. The decision is affirmed.
