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Town of Vinton v. Falcun Corp.
Citations: 306 S.E.2d 867; 226 Va. 62Docket: Record 810335
Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; September 9, 1983; Virginia; State Supreme Court
The Supreme Court of Virginia addressed an appeal from the Town of Vinton, which sought to overturn a trial court ruling that invalidated an emergency ordinance amending local zoning laws. The central issue was whether the municipality had the legal authority to enact the ordinance without public notice, hearings, or planning commission referral. F. W. (Fralin, Waldron, Inc.) held an option on a 130-acre tract zoned R-2 for multi-family housing. In March 1979, F. W. proposed a low-income housing project in response to HUD's solicitation, which was approved following an environmental impact study. Despite initial support, public opposition emerged, leading the Town Council to defer a decision on the project. Ultimately, the Council voted to disapprove the project and requested an ordinance to restrict permits for developments of ten or more units without Council approval. The ordinance, enacted on February 5, 1980, claimed an emergency status and was passed without the required procedures. F. W. subsequently applied for a building permit, which was denied based on the new ordinance. F. W. then filed a complaint seeking to invalidate the ordinance and compel permit processing through normal channels. The trial court found that the ordinance violated necessary procedural requirements and ruled it null and void, mandating that the Town process F. W.'s permit application according to standard administrative procedures. The Town contends that an emergency ordinance adopting a zoning policy is valid even without adhering to the notice, hearing, and referral requirements set forth in the zoning statutes. This argument is rejected, as Code § 15.1-491 and § 15.1-493 outline specific procedural steps for enacting or amending zoning ordinances, which include: initiating the proposal with a written resolution, referral to the local planning commission for review, public notice and hearing by the commission, and subsequent notice and hearing by the governing body. The Town acknowledges that it enacted Ordinance No. 400 without following these required procedures, arguing instead that its charter permits such action. The charter grants the Council the power to enact emergency measures, which can take effect immediately, but it does not exempt these measures from the procedural requirements of the zoning statutes. The court finds no conflict between the charter and the zoning statutes, asserting that they were both established by the General Assembly, which did not intend to exempt the Town from procedural safeguards. The court concludes that Ordinance No. 400 was not lawfully adopted and affirms the judgment against the Town.