Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; September 20, 2005; North Carolina; State Appellate Court
William M. Wilder appeals a superior court order affirming the Employment Security Commission of North Carolina's (ESC) denial of his Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) benefits. Wilder, a former employee of Lucent Technology with extensive education in electrical engineering and computer science, sought TAA benefits after being laid off following facility closures. He applied for retraining to obtain a second master's degree in mathematics, which the ESC Appeals Referee deemed unsuitable, asserting that suitable employment was available to him.
The ESC identified two electrical engineering positions and one computer programming job that met the criteria for suitable employment, offering salaries between $45,000 and $50,000 annually, while Wilder’s previous salary ranged from $80,000 to $100,000. The superior court upheld the ESC's findings, confirming that they were supported by competent evidence.
Wilder contends that the ESC failed to adhere to federal requirements stating that suitable employment must pay at least 80% of former wages. The court analyzed the ESC's decision under the standard of whether the evidence supported its findings and whether those findings sustained its conclusions of law. Ultimately, the court affirmed the ESC's conclusion that suitable employment was available to Wilder, leading to the dismissal of his appeal.
The Employment Security Commission (ESC) found that available jobs did not offer salaries that reached eighty percent of the petitioner's previous average weekly wage, which contradicts the definition of suitable employment under 20 C.F.R. 617.22(a)(1)(i). Consequently, the ESC's legal conclusion that suitable employment was available is erroneous. The court does not address the petitioner's second assignment of error regarding the ESC's rationale for the petitioner's failure to pursue this employment since the ESC's initial conclusion is flawed.
The petitioner also challenges the ESC's determination that obtaining a second master's degree was unsuitable for the program's intent. The applicable statute, 19 U.S.C. 2296(a)(1)(F), requires that training be suitable for the worker and reasonably priced. According to 20 C.F.R. 617.22(a)(6), training is deemed suitable when aligned with the worker’s capabilities, background, and experience. The court references the Minnesota case, Marshall v. Com'r of Jobs, Training, which emphasizes that the statute aims to assist workers whose jobs have been lost to foreign competition, and that acquiring a second professional degree merely for enhanced employability places a significant burden on the applicant to prove its necessity.
Additionally, the U.S. Department of Labor indicates that training should be approved at the lowest reasonable cost and should not require excessively high skill levels compared to the worker's current abilities. The court acknowledges that an agency's interpretation of its regulations is granted substantial deference. After reviewing the relevant statutes and regulations, the court concludes that an individual with a marketable professional degree faces a heavy burden to demonstrate the suitability of pursuing an additional professional degree.
The ESC determined that a second professional degree was not suitable for the petitioner after evaluating his qualifications. The petitioner held a bachelor's degree in electrical engineering from the United States Naval Academy and a master's degree in computer science from California Polytechnical State University, which the ESC deemed a "marketable master's degree." Additionally, the petitioner had twenty-one years of experience in the telecommunications industry. Consequently, the ESC concluded that pursuing a second master's degree in mathematics was not appropriate given the petitioner's existing qualifications and experience. Since approval of TAA training benefits requires a determination of training suitability, the superior court correctly upheld the ESC's denial of the petitioner's application for benefits. The decision was affirmed, with Judges Hudson and Geer concurring.
