Pugliese v. Commonwealth

Citations: 428 S.E.2d 16; 16 Va. App. 82; 9 Va. Law Rep. 1057; 1993 Va. App. LEXIS 56Docket: Record No. 0918-91-4

Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; March 9, 1993; Virginia; State Appellate Court

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Mark Allen Pugliese was convicted of murder as a principal in the second degree and robbery following the death of Arthur P. Beckmann, Jr. on May 22, 1990. Beckmann, who had picked up hitchhiker Eugene Davis, was last seen at a bank in Winchester, Virginia, withdrawing $1,200. Later that night, after socializing with Pugliese and others at Davis' friend David Ebert's apartment, the group left in Beckmann's van. The van was later discovered burning, and Beckmann's body was found in a ditch with four gunshot wounds to the head, while his belongings remained intact.

Pugliese was linked to the crime through evidence including a card with his name found in Beckmann's wallet and his possession of $400 to $600 shortly after the murder. He was arrested on September 10, 1990, and after initially invoking his right to remain silent, he waived this right and provided a recorded statement. In this statement, Pugliese admitted to being in the van during the murder, asserting that he was intoxicated and had no expectation that Davis would use a weapon. He described how Davis shot Beckmann and enlisted Pugliese and Ebert to help dispose of the body. Pugliese claimed he did not take Davis's threat seriously when Davis mentioned intending to shoot Beckmann. The evidence presented during the trial led to Pugliese's conviction, which was affirmed on appeal.

Three men returned to Ebert's apartment in Beckmann's van, unloading approximately $1,200 in cash, of which Pugliese received $200. They drove the van to a secluded area, doused it with gasoline, and set it on fire. 

In the judicial determination regarding Pugliese's confession, the trial judge ruled that Pugliese voluntarily and knowingly waived his Fifth Amendment rights. The Commonwealth was required to demonstrate that this waiver was made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently, as established in Goodwin v. Commonwealth and Miranda v. Arizona. If a suspect requests counsel while in custody, police cannot resume questioning until counsel is available or the suspect re-initiates contact and waives the right to counsel, per Edwards v. Arizona. Confessions obtained in violation of this principle are deemed involuntary and inadmissible.

The trial judge, after reviewing conflicting testimonies from Pugliese and police officers, concluded that Pugliese did not request counsel during custody. The officers' inability to recall such a request supported this conclusion, as it is an event they would typically remember. Consequently, the Edwards rule was deemed inapplicable.

Furthermore, police must 'scrupulously honor' a person's right to remain silent, as outlined in Michigan v. Mosley. If they do not, any statements made may be inadmissible. The trial court found that Pugliese had re-initiated conversation with police after asserting his right to remain silent, and he later marked out his earlier assertion on the Miranda form, indicating a knowing and voluntary waiver of his right to remain silent. This finding was upheld as the appeals court is bound by the trial court's factual determinations unless clearly erroneous.

Officers Gregg and Shevokas confirmed that after Pugliese invoked his right to remain silent, they did not question him until he initiated further discussion and changed his waiver. The officers informed Pugliese of his Fifth Amendment rights three times in two hours, resuming interrogation only at his request. Pugliese's confession was not influenced by any promises of leniency, which could render a confession involuntary. Officer Gregg's comments regarding the Commonwealth's attorney's potential perception of cooperation did not constitute a promise but rather a speculation about a decision outside his control. 

Regarding the admissibility of evidence related to lie detector tests, it is generally improper to introduce this type of evidence unless it is prejudicial. The trial court's decision to allow Pugliese’s voluntary mention of his willingness to take a lie detector test did not amount to reversible error. His references were spontaneous and unrelated to the interrogation, and the officer did not solicit this statement to build a case against him. Pugliese's willingness to take the test was exculpatory rather than inculpatory, and the trial court could not feasibly edit the recording to remove these references. Overall, the admission of this evidence did not adversely affect the trial outcome.

References to the lie detector in Pugliese's recorded statement were integral to maintaining the conversation's continuity and the tone of his voice, which were essential for the jury's assessment of the statement's voluntariness. The case law emphasizes that understanding an utterance's true meaning requires consideration of every word, as altering even a single word can change its meaning significantly. Pugliese had the option to provide a written transcript, which could have allowed for the removal of references to the lie detector. However, he chose to present the recording, and the trial court's decision not to redact his willingness to take a lie detector test was not reversible error.

According to Code § 8.01-381, juries can request and access exhibits during deliberations, which includes recorded statements introduced as evidence. Pugliese's argument that allowing the jury to have his recorded statement in the jury room would lead to overemphasis was rejected, as the potential for a jury to focus on certain evidence exists with any exhibit. The law does not require trial judges to supervise juries in reviewing evidence to prevent overemphasis; thus, the court acted correctly in allowing the jury access to the recorded statement.

The admissibility of evidence regarding other crimes is limited; such evidence cannot be used to demonstrate a defendant's propensity to commit crimes but can be relevant to specific issues in the case. It may be admissible to establish motive, intent, or how the crime was committed, among other things. The trial court did not err in allowing witness Brenda Hall to testify about Pugliese purchasing cocaine from her following the robbery and murder of Beckmann, as it was relevant to the case.

Pugliese's spending of money acquired from Beckmann is critical evidence indicating his participation in the crimes and establishing his motive. He confessed to using robbery proceeds to buy cocaine, and he did not dispute this part of his confession. Brenda Hall's testimony regarding Pugliese's motive and criminal involvement was deemed more probative than prejudicial. 

In assessing the sufficiency of the evidence for robbery and murder, the appellate court views the evidence favorably for the Commonwealth, allowing all reasonable inferences. A jury's verdict can only be overturned if it is clearly wrong or unsupported by evidence. The fact finder is not required to accept all aspects of either party's accounts but can choose which parts to believe. 

To convict for robbery, it must be shown beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, alone or with others, took property by force or threats, with intent to steal. For murder, the Commonwealth must demonstrate that Pugliese was present during the crime and aided or encouraged the perpetrator. Pugliese argued he had no intention to rob or kill and claimed he was merely present when Davis committed the crimes. However, the evidence was found sufficient to support the jury's conclusion that Pugliese participated in the robbery and aided Davis in Beckmann's murder. In Virginia, both the perpetrator and a principal in the second degree share equal liability for robbery and first-degree murder. A principal in the second degree assists the perpetrator, remains present, or provides support from a distance.

Individuals present during the commission of a crime who encourage or approve the act, either overtly or implicitly, are considered aiders and abettors, thus liable as principals. The court in Foster v. Commonwealth established that evidence of participation can be inferred from actions taken before and after a crime, even if a person claims to have been uninvolved. In Pugliese's case, the evidence showed he knowingly assisted Davis after Davis murdered Beckmann, including fleeing the scene, destroying evidence, and benefiting from the crime's proceeds. Pugliese was aware of Davis' intent to commit robbery and did not attempt to discourage him or report the planned crime. His presence and actions—accompanying Davis, taking money from the victim, and later helping to dispose of evidence—demonstrated his complicity. The jury could reasonably conclude that Pugliese shared in Davis' criminal intent, thus justifying his convictions for robbery and murder as a principal in the second degree.

A jury instruction on duress is required when credible evidence supporting the defense is presented; however, in Pugliese's case, the evidence did not indicate that he was forced by Davis to participate in the robbery or murder of Beckmann. Pugliese's assertion of duress stemmed from Davis threatening Ebert after Beckmann's murder, but there was no evidence of direct threats made to Pugliese himself. Consequently, the trial judge correctly refused to instruct the jury on duress, as it is a limited defense, generally not applicable to murder charges. The rationale for duress allows individuals to choose a lesser evil to avoid a greater threat, but this does not typically extend to murder. An exception exists in felony murder cases, where a defendant may claim duress if forced to participate in a felony under threat, leading to an unintended killing by a co-defendant. However, Pugliese did not assert that he was coerced into the robbery during which Beckmann was killed; rather, he admitted to acting after the fact when he felt threatened due to Davis's actions towards Ebert.

Additionally, Pugliese's argument regarding inconsistent verdicts between robbery as a principal in the first degree and murder as a principal in the second degree was rejected. The court noted that apparent inconsistencies in jury verdicts do not warrant reversal if the evidence supports each verdict. In this instance, the jury could reasonably conclude that Pugliese aided in the robbery and was culpable for the murder as a principal in the second degree since he was aware of Davis's intent and participated in actions post-crime. Therefore, the jury's verdicts and convictions were affirmed.