State v. Toothman

Citations: 985 P.2d 701; 267 Kan. 412; 1999 Kan. LEXIS 317Docket: 81,293

Court: Supreme Court of Kansas; May 28, 1999; Kansas; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Kansas reviewed an appeal by the State regarding the suppression of evidence and dismissal of charges against Billy J. Toothman. The case originated on October 7, 1997, when Deputy Jack Jackson responded to a report of vehicles stuck in a ditch but found none. Later, a citizen reported suspicious activity involving a blue Ford Festiva with a damaged ignition, identifying a nervous young male driver. Deputy Jackson, unable to contact the registered owner, issued an "attempt to locate" the vehicle. After locating it at a Motel 6, Deputy Clayton conducted a felony stop. Jackson believed the vehicle might be stolen based on the citizen's report and the driver's behavior.

Upon arrival, Jackson observed Toothman, who matched the description, struggling to comply with orders and exhibiting signs of possible methamphetamine use, including sweating and enlarged pupils. Jackson placed Toothman in handcuffs for safety reasons before questioning him. Toothman claimed he had permission from the registered owner to drive the car, although he did not possess a valid driver's license, and asserted that a new ignition had been installed that day. The vehicle, however, had an expired tag and a damaged ignition. The court ultimately suppressed the evidence and dismissed the case against Toothman based on the circumstances of the stop and the lack of a stolen vehicle report.

Jackson asked Toothman if he owned anything in the vehicle, to which Toothman replied no. Officers then removed items from the vehicle, discovering a Marlboro case with syringes and drug paraphernalia in a blue backpack, which Toothman was not charged with possessing. After handcuffing Toothman, Jackson conducted a search and found a small black bag in Toothman's underwear containing marijuana and a smoking pipe. While securing the scene, Penzenstadler arrived and stated that Toothman had permission to use the vehicle and claimed the backpack belonged to her boyfriend, denying knowledge of the syringes.

On October 8, 1997, the State charged Toothman with possession of a hallucinogenic drug, possession of drug paraphernalia, operating a vehicle without a registered license plate, and driving without a valid license. Toothman filed a motion to suppress evidence obtained during his arrest and search. The district court determined that the initial stop was based solely on a private citizen’s report of suspicious activity without any evidence of a crime. It concluded that nervousness alone does not justify a stop and found the search to be conducted on an unparticularized suspicion, lacking probable cause. As a result, the court granted the motion to suppress and dismissed the case against Toothman.

The court emphasized that specific grounds for a stop must be articulated beyond mere suspicion, referencing legal precedents that support this requirement. It also noted that the State has the burden to prove the lawfulness of the search and seizure during suppression hearings. The appellate standard for reviewing a district court's suppression decision involves evaluating factual underpinnings by a substantial competent evidence standard and legal conclusions de novo.

K.S.A. 22-2402(1) permits law enforcement officers to stop individuals in public whom they reasonably suspect are committing, have committed, or are about to commit a crime, allowing them to demand identification and explanations. The Kansas stop and frisk statute aligns with the Fourth Amendment principles established in Terry v. Ohio. In the case of Hopper, the court examined whether the officer had reasonable suspicion for stopping a vehicle, focusing on specific articulable facts. The officer stopped Toothman, believing he was operating a potentially stolen vehicle based on a report of suspicious activity and observations of the driver’s behavior. The district court found insufficient justification for the stop due to a lack of direct reports of a stolen vehicle. However, the reviewing court disagreed, noting that the officer had a tag number, a vehicle description, and evidence of the driver’s nervousness, along with indications of tampering with the ignition. The vehicle had an expired tag, and Toothman lacked a valid driver's license. The officer’s search of Toothman was justified under both the Terry standard and as a search incident to arrest for vehicle registration and licensing violations. The court emphasized that reasonable suspicion is evaluated based on the totality of circumstances as understood by law enforcement, and that its threshold is lower than proof of wrongdoing.

The Supreme Court defines 'reasonable suspicion' as a specific and objective basis for suspecting criminal activity, requiring more than vague hunches. It can arise from less reliable information than what is needed for probable cause, with both concepts relying on the reliability and quality of the information available to the detaining officer. The evaluation of reasonable suspicion involves a comprehensive assessment of the totality of circumstances. In this case, based on those circumstances, it was concluded that Jackson had a reasonable suspicion justifying a Terry stop to investigate the tampering of a vehicle's ignition and ensure safety.

In dissent, Judge Allegrucci argued against the majority's position, stating that the private citizen's report did not provide enough basis for the stop under K.S.A. 22-2402(1). He noted that the officer failed to inquire about identification or the suspect's actions until after the suspect was restrained and did not have reasonable grounds to suspect the vehicle was stolen. Allegrucci maintained that the majority's approval of the stop violated both state law and the Fourth Amendment, asserting that the district court's findings supporting the motion to suppress evidence should be upheld. Judge Lockett concurred with the dissent.