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Rosenbaum v. SMS 32
Citations: 427 S.E.2d 897; 311 S.C. 140; 1993 S.C. LEXIS 53Docket: 23820
Court: Supreme Court of South Carolina; March 14, 1993; South Carolina; State Supreme Court
In the case of Barbara H. Rosenbaum v. S-M-S 32, the Supreme Court of South Carolina affirmed the circuit court's decision to strike S-M-S 32's counterclaim for trespass to try title and denied its request for a jury trial. Rosenbaum acquired a condominium at a Beaufort County tax sale in October 1989 and sought a declaration of clear title in December 1990 under South Carolina Code Ann. § 12-61-10 et seq. S-M-S 32 counterclaimed, arguing that improper tax sale procedures invalidated Rosenbaum's deed, and sought damages and a jury trial. The circuit court held that a defendant cannot claim a jury trial by asserting a counterclaim in a tax deed action, which is equitable in nature. S-M-S 32 appealed, citing prior case law (Johnson v. South Carolina National Bank) that allows a jury trial on a compulsory legal counterclaim in an equity action. However, the court distinguished between actions to clear title (equitable) and actions for trespass (legal), ultimately reaffirming that Rosenbaum's action was governed by specific statutory procedures for tax title claims, which do not permit a jury trial. The court clarified that the statute allows a person who has acquired property through a tax sale to seek to bar claims against it, thus reinforcing the legislative framework for such actions. Courts must determine and implement the legislature's actual intent when interpreting statutes, as established in Horn v. Davis Electrical Constructors, Inc. The entire statute should be interpreted in a practical and fair manner, aligned with the lawmakers' purpose. The intent behind S.C.Code Ann. Chapter 61 (1976) is to provide tax sale property purchasers in South Carolina an efficient way to clear titles. The statute explicitly states it should be liberally construed to ensure a complete remedy for property claims due to forfeiture. Given the specific circumstances of tax forfeiture and relevant statutory guidelines, the appellant cannot bypass legislative intent to claim a jury trial through a counterclaim that undermines Chapter 61's objectives. Thus, the circuit court's decision to deny the appellant's motion to transfer the case to a jury and to strike the counterclaim's allegations of trespass and damages is upheld. The ruling is affirmed with concurrence from Justices Harwell, Chandler, Toal, and Moore.