Desmond v. Administrative Director of the Courts

Citations: 982 P.2d 346; 91 Haw. 212; 1998 Haw. App. LEXIS 102Docket: 19966

Court: Hawaii Intermediate Court of Appeals; May 22, 1998; Hawaii; State Appellate Court

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Cavin C. Desmond appeals the May 31, 1996 Decision and Order from the district court, which affirmed the administrative revocation of his driver's license following a DUI arrest. The Intermediate Court of Appeals of Hawai'i vacated the district court's decision and remanded the case for a new administrative hearing with a different hearing officer. The appeal involved the interpretation of Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) 286-251 to 286-266, specifically addressing the procedural rules for administrative hearings under HRS 286-259. 

The facts indicate that on January 18, 1996, Maui Police Officer Anselm Yazaki observed Desmond make an illegal U-turn. Upon stopping him, Officer Yazaki noted signs of impairment, including a strong odor of alcohol, red and watery eyes, and slurred speech. Subsequent officers corroborated these observations, and Desmond admitted to consuming multiple drinks shortly before the stop. Desmond was arrested for DUI after refusing breath or blood tests. An administrative review and hearing subsequently upheld the revocation of his driver's license, which led to Desmond's appeal after the district court's affirmation of the revocation.

The relevant statute, HRS 286-252, states that a notice of administrative revocation effectively terminates driving privileges 30 days post-arrest unless otherwise specified. The court emphasized the necessity for the ADLRO to consider Desmond's request for a subpoena for witness testimony at the administrative hearing.

Sworn statements from law enforcement officials are crucial in DUI cases. When a person is arrested for violating section 291-4 and has a blood alcohol concentration of .08 or higher, several documents must be sent to the director immediately: the arrest report, a sworn statement detailing reasonable suspicion for the stop and probable cause for believing the arrestee was driving under the influence, a notice of administrative revocation, any driver's license taken, and a record of previous alcohol-related contacts involving the arrestee.

The director automatically reviews the administrative revocation notice and must provide a written decision within eight days. The arrestee can contest this revocation by submitting written arguments within three days. During the review, the director considers all evidence, including sworn statements from law enforcement.

If the director upholds the revocation, they must inform the arrestee of their decision and the five-day window to request an administrative hearing. Failure to request a hearing within this period results in no extension of the temporary permit.

Should the arrestee request a hearing, it must occur within 25 days of the revocation notice. The director has the authority to conduct the hearing, administer oaths, examine witnesses, and regulate proceedings. The revocation is affirmed if it is determined there was reasonable suspicion for the vehicle stop, probable cause for DUI, and sufficient evidence showing the arrestee operated the vehicle under the influence or refused testing after being informed of the consequences.

Prior alcohol enforcement contacts of the arrestee will be included as evidence, along with sworn statements as per section 286-257. If the arrestee requests to cross-examine a law enforcement official who provided a sworn statement, they must notify the director at least five days before the hearing, prompting the issuance of a subpoena for the official's appearance. Should the arrestee request a continuance, the temporary permit’s validity will not be extended. If the arrestee fails to attend the hearing, administrative revocation will commence as dictated by the director's earlier administrative review decision.

In the judicial review process under section 286-260, the court will assess whether the director acted beyond their authority, misinterpreted the law, was arbitrary or capricious, abused discretion, or made unsupported determinations. Desmond alleges that the district court incorrectly upheld the administrative revocation due to procedural failures by the Hearing Officer, including not adhering to established procedures, failing to rule on objections, and lack of impartiality. Desmond proposed a structured approach for the hearing, emphasizing the importance of receiving only relevant evidence and making findings based on the three-prong test from Kernan v. Tanaka.

During the hearing, the Hearing Officer admitted the entire case file into evidence without ruling on specific objections immediately, leading to confusion and further objections from Desmond's counsel regarding the admission process. The Hearing Officer indicated that objections would be considered in the final decision rather than immediately, which prompted disputes about procedural fairness.

The admissible evidence at the hearing is limited to the arrestee's prior alcohol enforcement contacts and sworn statements as outlined in HRS Section 286-257. The arrest report and field sobriety test results are inadmissible under HRS Section 286-259 (f) and (g), which distinguishes between the arrest report and sworn statements. Unsworn parts of the police report are not admissible due to lack of personal knowledge, and violator history records are deemed inadmissible as there are no prior alcohol contacts. Additionally, the sworn statement from the arresting officer fails to comply with HRS 286-257 (a)(1)(c) since the arrestee was only informed of the consequences of refusal, not the sanctions. A statement in the officer's sworn report regarding required treatment is inaccurate, contradicting a ruling from the Supreme Court in Torimura. Desmond's counsel raised objections, seeking rulings rather than mere notations, but the Hearing Officer indicated that objections were under submission, allowing the case to proceed. Following testimonies from Officers Yazaki and Rodriguez, Desmond's counsel asserted non-compliance with statutory requirements. The Hearing Officer noted that all presented documents and arguments would be considered, with a decision to be mailed within five days. Desmond's complaint regarding procedural adherence was countered by referencing HRS 286-263, which states that administrative hearings are not bound by the contested case requirements of the Hawai'i Administrative Procedure Act, allowing for a different procedural framework as affirmed by the Hawai'i Supreme Court in Kernan v. Tanaka.

The police bear the initial burden of demonstrating three key points: 1) reasonable suspicion for the vehicle stop, 2) probable cause to believe the arrestee was driving under the influence, and 3) that the arrestee drove under the influence by a preponderance of the evidence. Only after these burdens are met does the arrestee have any burden of proof. The Hearing Officer in Desmond's case adhered to this procedure and properly informed the parties of the process at the hearing's start, rejecting Desmond's proposed alternative without error.

Desmond's claims that the Hearing Officer improperly denied his objections and violated his due process rights regarding witness examination are unfounded. The Hearing Officer explicitly denied the objections while retaining the option to reconsider. The relevant statute does not grant the arrestee the right to dictate the order of witness testimony, and the Hearing Officer is empowered to manage the hearing's conduct. The discretion of the trial court regarding the order of testimony is generally upheld unless specific exceptions apply, which do not pertain to Desmond's case.

Desmond also alleged that the Hearing Officer lacked impartiality, but the record does not support this assertion. Furthermore, he contended that incompetent, irrelevant, and inadmissible evidence was admitted; however, Hawaii's legal framework allows for the correction of errors and challenges to evidence, providing a reasonable basis for fact-finding during the administrative review process. Relevant statutes outline the procedural requirements for DUI arrests and administrative hearings, ensuring a structured approach to these matters.

Two types of evidence must be entered into the record: sworn statements as per HRS 286-257 and an arrestee's previous alcohol enforcement contacts. HRS 286-259(d)(3) grants the Hearing Officer discretion regarding the relevance and admissibility of additional evidence. Unlike judicial proceedings, agency proceedings are not strictly bound by technical evidence rules, provided that the application of evidentiary rules does not arbitrarily deprive a party of a fair hearing. An agency may accept all competent, relevant, and material evidence, and failure to do so could violate due process.

In this case, the Hearing Officer admitted the complete case file into evidence. Desmond objected to certain documents, claiming they were irrelevant to the evaluation of reasonable suspicion for the stop, probable cause for DUI, and whether the evidence met the preponderance standard for proving DUI. Desmond argued that the Hearing Officer lacked authority to include non-statutory or irrelevant evidence, which was disputed. It was determined that the Hearing Officer must exclude only unsworn law enforcement statements from non-testifying officials and evidence that is both irrelevant and prejudicial.

Desmond objected to various documents, including requests for subpoenas and unsworn police reports. The Hearing Officer erred in admitting Officer Aoki's unsworn statement due to Aoki's non-appearance but deemed the error harmless, as no substantive information was added. Officer Yazaki's unsworn statement was correctly admitted since he testified. Other documents admitted were not deemed prejudicial, affirming the Hearing Officer's decisions.

Desmond further contended that the district court erred in upholding the Hearing Officer's finding that he was informed of the sanctions under HRS Chapter 286, Part XIV, asserting that contrary evidence was not considered. He argued that the arresting officer's testimony indicated he was only informed of the consequences specified in the sworn statement.

Officer Rodriguez' sworn statement and testimony confirm that Desmond was informed about the potential criminal charges and consequences for refusing a blood alcohol concentration test under HRS 286-257 (b)(1)(C). Desmond argues that he should have received additional information regarding the criteria and restrictions of a conditional permit (HRS 286-264(d)) and the relicensing requirements (HRS 286-265). However, it is asserted that HRS 286-257 (b)(1)(C) does not mandate a comprehensive explanation of all potential effects of refusing the test. The Hearing Officer found no evidence indicating Desmond's misunderstanding of the sanctions. 

The document references Miller v. Tanaka, clarifying that the director has discretion in issuing subpoenas beyond those required by HRS 286-259 (d) and (g). The Biscoe case emphasizes that all relevant subpoenas should be issued unless there is insufficient evidence or a deficiency in the request; failing to issue a proper subpoena would be an abuse of discretion. 

Desmond's request for subpoenas for Officers Rodriguez and Yazaki was granted, but Officer Aoki's was denied. Desmond claims this denial was erroneous, arguing that the administrative process's policy, which restricts subpoena requests to only those officers who provided sworn statements, contradicts legislative intent and hinders the arrestee's ability to present a full defense. The policy necessitates that the arrestee appear at the hearing for the subpoena to be served on the witness, increasing litigation costs and prolonging the process while limiting the arrestee's rights.

The State argues that Desmond's subpoena request for Officer Aoki is inadequate because it fails to demonstrate that Aoki possessed relevant evidence. Nonetheless, during the administrative hearing, Desmond established a basis for the subpoena by having Officer Rodriguez testify that Aoki witnessed the field sobriety test. Despite this, Desmond did not renew his subpoena request for Aoki, resulting in a waiver of any objection to its denial.

Desmond's request specifically identified Officer Rodriguez as the "Arresting Officer" and Aoki as the "Assisting Officer." The record included Aoki’s "Incident Report," supporting Desmond’s claim of Aoki's relevance. The ADLRO's practice requires subpoenas for relevant witnesses to be issued before the first hearing, with continuances typically occurring if such requests are made. Desmond emphasized that the Administrative Driver's License Revocation law aims for efficiency, asserting that timely requests for subpoenas that demonstrate a witness's relevance must be honored prior to the first hearing. The Hearing Officer's failure to issue the subpoena for Aoki constituted an abuse of discretion.

If a hearing officer delays the decision on subpoenas until the hearing starts, leading to routine continuances, such continuances lack good cause and are therefore invalid. This renders any continued hearings non-compliant with mandatory timelines, rendering them illegal and void as referenced by Simmons v. The Administrative Director of the Courts.

Desmond also argues that the supreme court's ruling in Biscoe v. Tanaka did not necessitate placing the ADLRO within the executive branch, but upon analysis, it is concluded that under Article V. 6 and Article VI. 1 of the Hawai'i Constitution, the ADLRO must be classified as an executive agency, specifically under the Department of Transportation, rather than a judicial entity. Article VI. 1 delineates the structure of the state's judicial power, confirming that the ADLRO does not qualify as a court.

Article VI.1 and Article V.6 do not prohibit the establishment of the Administrative Driver's License Revocation Office (ADLRO) within the Judiciary, as established in Biscoe v. Tanaka. In Miller v. Tanaka, the court affirmed that an appellate court can remand cases where there is an abuse of discretion at administrative hearings, instructing the district court to vacate the hearing officer's decision. Act 230, effective July 1, 1996, added a provision to HRS 286-260 stating that when certain conditions are met, the court must rule in favor of the appellant without remanding to the director. However, this Act does not affect matters that were initiated before its effective date. Since Desmond's arrest and the revocation of his driver’s license occurred on January 18, 1996, before the enactment of Act 230, HRS 286-260(d) is inapplicable to his case. Consequently, the court vacates the May 31, 1996 Decision and Order Affirming Administrative Revocation and remands the case for a new administrative hearing by a different hearing officer. The arresting officer's report fulfills statutory requirements, and sworn statements are deemed sufficient without additional notarization. The court interprets that administrative revocation proceedings begin at the time of physical license revocation following an arrest, aligning with the ruling in Kernan v. Tanaka.