Whatcom County v. City of Bellingham

Citations: 909 P.2d 1303; 128 Wash. 2d 537Docket: 63199-9

Court: Washington Supreme Court; February 1, 1996; Washington; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Washington ruled on the appeal of the City of Bellingham regarding a partial summary judgment that mandated the City to arbitrate reimbursement costs to Whatcom County after the City repealed most of Title 10 of its Municipal Code in 1980. Under RCW 3.50.800, cities are prohibited from completely repealing their municipal criminal codes before July 1, 1984, to avoid shifting criminal justice costs to counties. The court found that the City’s actions amounted to a de facto repeal of its crime definitions under the statute. 

Key issues included whether a de facto repeal fulfills the requirements of RCW 3.50.800 and whether the City presented enough evidence to dispute the claim of such a repeal. Background facts revealed that in August 1980, Bellingham's Mayor proposed transferring the jail and court system to the County due to financial constraints. Subsequently, ordinances were drafted and passed to repeal nearly all offenses carrying jail penalties effective January 1, 1981, significantly reducing the City's enforcement of criminal laws. The ordinances eliminated most jailable offenses in the municipal code, including various crimes related to theft, public safety, and public order.

Prior to July 1, 1984, the Bellingham Municipal Code included a limited number of offenses such as shoplifting and marijuana possession. The City decided to avoid duplicating state criminal enforcement efforts, leading to the closure of its jail in January 1981 and directing law enforcement to charge offenders under state law. The County sought to collect fees for incarcerating these individuals, which the City contested, resulting in a lawsuit that concluded with an agreement exempting the City from paying for processing state law charges unless future state laws required otherwise. The 1984 Court Improvement Act mandated that municipalities must address fiscal impacts with counties when repealing municipal code definitions of crimes or terminating municipal courts. Although this Act applied retroactively, it only required reimbursement for costs incurred after January 1, 1985. In 1992, the City reinstated jail time as a penalty for misdemeanors, prompting the County to seek a declaratory judgment to compel arbitration regarding the fiscal effects of the City's previous actions. The City argued that RCW 3.50.800 necessitated a complete repeal of its criminal code to incur cost-sharing obligations, while the County contended that offenses without jail penalties were not technically crimes and that the City had effectively repealed its code. The trial court favored the County, emphasizing that the City’s inaction regarding prosecutions amounted to a de facto repeal, and ordered arbitration, rejecting the City’s motion for reconsideration based on its claims of ongoing prosecutions.

The City presented evidence of payments made to the County from 1984 to 1994 for jailing prisoners it referred. The County argued that these incarcerations were solely for civil infractions, not crimes under the City's municipal code. The trial court denied a motion for reconsideration and issued a partial summary judgment with CR 54(b) findings. The City appealed, and the case was certified to the court under RCW 2.06.030.

The analysis cites RCW 3.50.800, stating counties are generally responsible for administering criminal laws, but cities also bear responsibilities by establishing municipal codes and courts. If cities relinquished their roles in criminal justice, counties would incur significant costs. The 1984 Court Improvement Act addressed conflicts over criminal justice cost responsibilities. According to RCW 3.50.800, if a municipality fully repealed its crime definitions before July 1, 1984, it must enter into an agreement with the county to cover reasonable costs incurred after that date related to criminal cases. This agreement should include terms for periodic review and arbitration if the parties cannot agree on renewals.

The legislature enacted similar restrictions for cities attempting to repeal their municipal codes post-July 1, 1984. RCW 3.50.805 imposes obligations on municipalities that terminate their courts before that date. The legislative intent in 1984 was to prevent cities from shifting criminal justice costs to counties without agreement, emphasizing the need for a fiscal impact agreement between city and county governments when cities withdraw from criminal justice roles.

Statutory interpretation begins with the premise that unambiguous statutes are not subject to construction, while ambiguous statutes require courts to discern legislative intent, avoiding interpretations that lead to absurd or strained outcomes. Courts prioritize the purpose of the legislation over poorly worded provisions and must interpret statutes in a way that gives effect to all language used, ensuring no part is rendered meaningless. The interpretation of specific words must consider the statute's overall intent. In the case of RCW 3.50.800, the City argues it is unambiguous and that its retention of certain crimes signifies a non-repeal of its criminal laws, while the County contends it is ambiguous and suggests a functional repeal of criminal justice costs shifting to the county. The County's position is supported by interpretations that emphasize the broader legislative intent rather than a strict literal interpretation, citing examples where courts have favored understanding over literal meanings. The court recognizes the need for construction of RCW 3.50.800, suggesting that the phrase "repeal in its entirety" could imply a deliberate shift in the handling of criminal justice costs. Legislative inaction on certain bills is viewed by the City as indicative of a policy against shifting costs to cities; however, the court finds the City's cited legislative actions unconvincing, noting that the proposed changes do not support its position and that the general legislative purpose must guide interpretation.

RCW 3.50.800 maintains that counties bear responsibility for criminal justice services, but when a city opts to provide these services, it cannot abruptly cease without addressing the financial implications with the county. The City’s interpretation of this statute could lead to unintended consequences, allowing it to evade significant financial responsibilities by minimally retaining certain crimes in its code. Such a strategy could effectively shift the burden of criminal justice costs to the county, violating the statute's intent to prevent local governments from financially undermining one another. The court held that a city's de facto repeal of its crime-defining municipal code falls under RCW 3.50.800. The trial court determined that the City had indeed enacted a de facto repeal prior to July 1, 1984, and the summary judgment process requires the moving party to show no genuine factual disputes exist. The City’s repeal of a significant portion of its crime definitions in Ordinance 8920, while still handling traffic infractions, is established, leaving open only the question of how many crimes were prosecuted thereafter. RCW 3.50.800 mandates arbitration if a city repeals its crime definitions and does not reach a financial agreement with the county by January 1, 1985, which is uncontested in this case.

The County claimed that after 1980, the City retained only a few offenses in its municipal code punishable by jail time, which it did not enforce, leading to no incarcerations since 1981. The City admitted in court that it had not prosecuted any offenders under those remaining offenses that resulted in jail sentences. Despite the City’s acknowledgment of some imprisonment cases, it lacked evidence of any misdemeanor sentences in the county jail. The County argued that a de facto repeal of these offenses occurred, focusing on whether the City prosecuted or penalized violations between 1981 and 1984. The City submitted budget documents showing payments to the County for jail services, but those did not indicate any incarcerations related to the remaining offenses. The City provided no evidence of prosecutions or penalties for the offenses in question during that period, which undermined its position. The trial court concluded that the City effectively repealed the relevant portions of its municipal code without addressing the fiscal implications with the County, violating RCW 3.50.800. Consequently, the court granted partial summary judgment favoring the County and ordered the matter to arbitration to address the fiscal impacts of the City’s actions. Additionally, the City anticipated a substantial increase in cases shifted to the Whatcom County District Court following the repeal.

The County reported a fiscal impact of $766,904 in 1991 due to increased caseloads resulting from the addition of lewd conduct and disorderly conduct as offenses carrying jail penalties under Title 10, enacted in 1983. The City claims it retained 'solid waste' offenses with jail penalties, codified under Title 9, and asserts that these are relevant despite RCW 3.50.800 only addressing the repeal of crime definitions in municipal codes. The City's ongoing third-party claim against the State under RCW 43.135.060 is still pending, while the State did not engage in summary judgment proceedings.

The Attorney General indicated that a county could argue a de facto repeal of municipal code provisions if a municipality’s police completely ceased charging violations. If proven, this could lead to a violation of the 1984 act. The record shows that in 1993 and 1994, some City code violators were incarcerated, with the City covering the costs for housing these prisoners in the County Jail. However, the County argued that most were jailed for failing to appear related to civil traffic infractions, while the City contended these were for criminal offenses. This was deemed irrelevant to the City's actions before July 1, 1984.

The City raised two additional arguments against the County's reimbursement claims, both considered meritless. First, it argued that a 1981 settlement agreement fully compensated the County for the City's actions, but the agreement allowed for changes in state law, such as RCW 3.50.800. Payments made under this agreement are considered offsets in arbitration. Second, the City claimed the County's request for relief under RCW 3.50.800 was barred by laches, but provided no supporting authority or discussion of laches' elements, leading to the issue being dismissed.