Poindexter v. Commonwealth

Citations: 218 Va. 314; 237 S.E.2d 139; 1977 Va. LEXIS 194Docket: Record 761270

Court: Supreme Court of Virginia; September 1, 1977; Virginia; State Supreme Court

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Curtis Darnell Poindexter was convicted of first-degree murder for killing Judge Stewart A. Cunningham and faced additional charges, including malicious wounding and attempted murder. His defense was based on insanity. Following a mistrial in Louisa County, where the jury deadlocked, the Commonwealth sought a change of venue due to extensive media coverage and public sentiment against Poindexter. The trial court granted this motion, transferring the case to Augusta County, after the Commonwealth presented affidavits from 13 local citizens asserting that a fair trial could not be conducted in Louisa County. Poindexter did not counter these affidavits. On appeal, he argued that the change of venue violated Article I, Section 8 of the 1971 Virginia Constitution, which guarantees an impartial jury from the accused's vicinage. The Supreme Court of Virginia upheld the trial court's decision, affirming that the constitutional provision does not prevent a change of venue when an impartial jury cannot be secured. The court noted that the trial court acted within its discretion, as the Commonwealth's unchallenged evidence indicated that a fair trial was impossible in Louisa County. Poindexter was sentenced to life imprisonment for murder, along with additional prison terms for other offenses. The appeal was limited to the venue change question, which was deemed appropriate by the court.

The defendant shot and wounded Sheriff Henry A. Kennon in the Clerk's office of the court and subsequently fled. He was later apprehended after attempting to ambush police while wounded. Prior to his first trial in Louisa County, the Commonwealth sought a change of venire, citing the difficulty of assembling an impartial jury due to extensive media coverage and community bias. The defendant opposed this motion, but the trial court denied it, and the case proceeded to trial. The trial, which began on December 9, 1975, ended in a mistrial due to jury deadlock. The Commonwealth presented uncontested evidence identifying the defendant as the perpetrator. The defendant's defense relied on claims of insanity. On January 2, 1976, the Commonwealth filed alternative motions for a change of venue or venire, supported by affidavits from 13 citizens indicating widespread community bias and polarized opinions regarding the defendant's guilt or sanity, influenced by the media and familial connections. The Commonwealth also submitted an extensive scrapbook documenting media coverage, including a juror's post-trial statement about the split verdict. The defendant did not produce any evidence or counter affidavits at the hearing on the Commonwealth's motions.

The trial court determined that a fair trial in Louisa County was impossible due to the case's notoriety and its community impact, leading to a change of venue to Augusta County. The defendant challenges this decision on two grounds: first, claiming that Code 19.2-251, which allows for a change of venue, is unconstitutional as it infringes upon the right to a speedy and public trial by an impartial jury, as stipulated in Article I, Section 8 of the Virginia Constitution. He argues that this provision prohibits a venue change unless initiated by the accused or waived by them. However, the Attorney General contends that Articles IV, Section 14(2) and 15 empower the General Assembly to legislate venue changes. The court previously rejected a similar argument in Newberry Commonwealth (1951), affirming that the constitutional provision does not prevent statutory changes of venue initiated by the Commonwealth. 

Additionally, the defendant argues that even if Code 19.2-251 is constitutional, the Commonwealth did not provide sufficient evidence to justify the venue change. He critiques the affidavits submitted as conclusory and lacking probative value, noting they represented a small fraction of the county's population. The defendant also points to a venire of 100, from which only 46 were selected for the jury, suggesting that an impartial jury could still be obtained in Louisa County. The standard for reviewing a trial court's decision on venue changes emphasizes the court's discretion, with the appellate court only reversing such decisions if there is clear evidence of misuse of that discretion, as established in previous cases like Looney Commonwealth (1913) and Evans Commonwealth (1933).

The affidavits submitted by the Commonwealth are unchallenged, establishing their validity as evidence. They assert that a fair trial in Louisa County is impossible, citing extensive media coverage of conflicting evidence regarding the defendant's mental capacity, public discourse on the insanity plea leading to fixed opinions among citizens, and significant local bias influenced by community sentiments towards the deceased judge and the prominent Poindexter family. Given these uncontested facts, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determining that a fair trial could not occur in Louisa County and thus granted a change of venue. Consequently, the trial court's judgments are affirmed. Additionally, it is noted that two other felony indictments against the defendant were previously dismissed.