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Broomfield v. Lundell

Citations: 767 P.2d 697; 159 Ariz. 349; 14 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 33; 1988 Ariz. App. LEXIS 267; 58 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 735Docket: 1 CA-CIV 9470

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; August 9, 1988; Arizona; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

This case involves an appeal by a registered nurse who challenged a summary judgment in favor of a medical practice and a doctor, concerning claims of wrongful discharge and discrimination under the Arizona Civil Rights Act. The nurse, employed through an employee leasing arrangement, was terminated following her pregnancy announcement and claimed her dismissal violated public policy against sex discrimination. The court evaluated whether the doctor was an 'employer' under the Act, given his role as an agent of the staffing company, despite the company's management of employment responsibilities. The court upheld the trial court's ruling that the doctor was not an 'employer' under the Act due to insufficient employee numbers and affirmed the judgment against the nurse's breach of contract claims, citing the absence of an implied contract or third-party beneficiary rights. However, the court reversed the summary judgment on the wrongful discharge claim, recognizing that the Arizona Civil Rights Act does not preempt state tort claims, allowing the nurse's public policy claim to proceed. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with attorney's fees awarded to the nurse under the ACRA.

Legal Issues Addressed

Employer Definition under Arizona Civil Rights Act

Application: The court examined whether Dr. Lundell qualified as an 'agent' of CSA under the Arizona Civil Rights Act (A.R.S. 41-1461), determining that an 'agent' does not require a formal employer-employee relationship.

Reasoning: The court determined that CSA did not need to exert control over Dr. Lundell's actions for him to be considered an agent.

Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing in At-Will Employment

Application: The court concluded that while an implied covenant exists in at-will employment, it does not guarantee job security or protection against termination without cause.

Reasoning: Citing Wagenseller v. Scottsdale Memorial Hospital, the court notes that while an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing exists in at-will employment, it does not guarantee job security or protection against termination without cause.

Preemption of State Tort Claims by Arizona Civil Rights Act

Application: The court determined that the ACRA does not preempt Broomfield's tort action for wrongful discharge, allowing for simultaneous state and federal claims.

Reasoning: The court concluded that the ACRA does not preempt Broomfield's tort action for wrongful discharge, supported by the lack of express preemption in the Act and prior rulings in Wagenseller, Ford, and Bernstein.

Public Policy Exception to At-Will Employment

Application: Broomfield's wrongful discharge claim was examined under the public policy exception, which allows for tort claims if an employee is terminated for reasons violating public policy.

Reasoning: Broomfield's wrongful discharge claim, based on the public policy against employment discrimination due to sex, was also examined.

Third-Party Beneficiary Rights in Employment Contracts

Application: The court addressed whether Broomfield could claim third-party beneficiary rights under the contract between Dr. Lundell and CSA, ultimately finding no such rights existed.

Reasoning: Conversely, Dr. Lundell asserts that the clear language of the 'Staffing Contract' and 'Employment Agreement' negates any implied contract or third-party beneficiary rights for Broomfield.