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Nino v. Gladys R.
Citations: 464 P.2d 127; 1 Cal. 3d 855; 83 Cal. Rptr. 671; 1970 Cal. LEXIS 355Docket: S. F. 22654
Court: California Supreme Court; January 30, 1970; California; State Supreme Court
Gladys R., a 12-year-old, appeals a judgment declaring her a ward of the court and committing her to the custody of the probation officer for private institutional placement. The Supreme Court of California identifies reversible error in the juvenile court's review of a social study report before the jurisdictional hearing, which violates Welfare and Institutions Code sections 701, 702, and 706. The court emphasizes the necessity of determining jurisdiction based solely on relevant evidence before considering the social study report for disposition. The report, which includes information about the child's history and evaluations, contained irrelevant details that should not influence jurisdictional decisions. Furthermore, the court holds that the juvenile court must assess whether the child understands the wrongfulness of her actions when deciding on wardship under section 602 of the Welfare and Institutions Code. The court concludes that a juvenile can be declared a ward for actions violating Penal Code section 647a, which pertains to the molestation of minors. The decision underscores the legislative intent for a two-step juvenile court process: first establishing jurisdiction and then considering disposition. A prohibition on reviewing the social report prior to a determination of jurisdiction does not impede the juvenile court's ability to fairly assess the juvenile's case. The juvenile court acted in what it deemed the child's best interest, believing the report would provide helpful context. However, Welfare and Institutions Code sections 701, 702, and 706 explicitly prevent judges from reading the social report before the jurisdictional hearing. This interpretation, established in In re Corey, applies to all juvenile proceedings since the 1961 amendments, as affirmed by In re Steven F. The failure of the minor's attorney to object during the hearing does not preclude raising the issue on appeal, as it is unreasonable to expect attorneys to foresee future interpretations of the law. The premature review of the social study constituted prejudicial error, particularly when the jurisdictional facts were disputed. The court's advance review, especially given some negative implications about the appellant's home environment, affected the fairness of the hearing, making the adjudication impermissible under California law. Furthermore, for a child under 14 to be declared a ward of the juvenile court under section 602, there must be clear evidence that the child understood the wrongfulness of their actions, as stipulated by Penal Code section 26, which establishes that children under 14 cannot commit a crime without proof of such understanding. A ruling allowing the commitment of a child to juvenile court under section 602 without clear proof would undermine section 26 or imply its repeal. The Welfare and Institutions Code grants juvenile courts exclusive jurisdiction over minors under 16, preventing them from being tried as adult offenders. For section 26 to be applicable to criminal conduct, it must relate to section 602, which addresses violations by individuals under 21. The presumption against the implied repeal of section 26 is supported by legal precedent; both statutes should coexist unless they are irreconcilably conflicting. The Legislature, when enacting section 602, is presumed to have considered section 26, which is a significant provision regarding juvenile offenders and reflects historical legal principles about the criminal liability of minors. Children under seven are not held criminally responsible, and between seven and fourteen, they are presumed incapable of committing crimes unless proven otherwise. Section 26 underscores that young children cannot be judged by the same standards as adults, requiring juvenile courts to assess a child's age, experience, and understanding in relation to section 602's provisions. This framework highlights the protective measures for minors within the criminal justice system. No changes warrant abandoning the current interpretation of Penal Code section 26 in relation to section 602 proceedings. A Court of Appeal has recognized section 26 as applicable to section 602, which is crucial in protecting children charged under this section. Section 602 differs significantly from sections 600 and 601, as it involves minors who violate laws or court orders, leading to potential commitment to the California Youth Authority. In contrast, sections 600 and 601 pertain to dependent or delinquent children with less severe consequences. If a juvenile court finds insufficient proof that a child under 14 understood the wrongfulness of their actions, they may be classified under sections 600 or 601, which offer less severe repercussions. The Welfare and Institutions Code aims to protect children’s rights and welfare, suggesting strong policy reasons against placing children who do not comprehend their actions in environments where they could encounter seasoned delinquents. Relying solely on juvenile court discretion does not justify deeming section 26 inapplicable to section 602. Misinterpretation of the statute could lead to adverse outcomes for the child and society. Other options exist for establishing wardship under sections 600 and 601 for children incapable of understanding their misconduct. Section 602 should apply primarily to those over 14 or younger children who clearly grasp the wrongfulness of their actions. In this case, a 12-year-old girl with a social and mental age of a 7-year-old is protected by section 26, and only clear proof of her understanding of a criminal act should justify declaring her a ward under section 602. Additionally, section 602 encompasses conduct defined by Penal Code section 647a, which applies to minors as well as adults. A juvenile court can designate a juvenile as a ward of the court under section 602 for actions violating Penal Code section 647a, which is applicable only if the offender is driven by an unnatural or abnormal sexual interest. The term "annoys or molests," as interpreted in case law, implies such abnormal motivation when concerning offenses against children. Courts have consistently upheld this interpretation, emphasizing that the primary aim of section 647a is to protect children from sexual offenders. The legislative history indicates no change to this interpretation despite amendments to the section, suggesting legislative acquiescence to the judicial interpretation. Although the current case does not require a determination of whether sufficient evidence supports a finding of abnormal sexual intent, the court must reverse the previous judgment due to procedural issues. Future proceedings may allow for the introduction of additional evidence regarding the juvenile's motivation and understanding of the wrongfulness of their actions. The juvenile court is prohibited from reviewing the social study report before determining jurisdiction, as using legally incompetent material could lead to prejudice. The court acknowledges that antisocial behavior often arises from psychological factors that do not easily categorize individuals as 'criminal' or 'non-criminal.' It is deemed inappropriate for a juvenile court to label a 12-year-old emotionally disturbed child as guilty of criminal conduct without analyzing the child's understanding of the wrongfulness of their actions. This ruling leads to the reversal of the judgment and remand to the Santa Clara County Superior Court for further proceedings. Justice Burke concurs with the majority apart from the requirement for 'clear proof' that minors under 14 understood the wrongfulness of their actions for jurisdiction under Welfare and Institutions Code section 602. He argues that juvenile court proceedings are designed for minors' protection rather than prosecution. Applying Penal Code section 26, subdivision One, in juvenile cases could unjustly exclude minors in need of care and guidance, particularly those less sophisticated who may not recognize the wrongfulness of their actions. Burke illustrates this with examples of minors who might violate laws without clear proof of understanding their wrongdoing, suggesting that such children could be denied necessary support and guidance. Knowledge of the wrongfulness of an act is not necessary for a minor under 14 to be adjudicated under section 601, particularly if the minor has persistently disobeyed school authorities. The legislature's decision not to require such knowledge for lesser transgressions (under section 601) as opposed to serious crimes (under section 602) is consistent with prioritizing child welfare and societal interests. Although different dispositions exist for minors under sections 601 and 602, both categories can be subject to confinement in a juvenile home. The common law presumption of lack of criminal capacity for children aged 7 to 14 is not applicable in juvenile court, which operates under a non-criminal framework aimed at child welfare rather than punishment. Legislative provisions affirm that juvenile court proceedings are not criminal in nature; however, due process protections established by In re Gault apply to these proceedings, maintaining their unique character. The majority opinion argues that subdivision One of section 26 remains relevant in juvenile court, particularly in cases involving adult defendants charged with sex crimes against minors. They further differentiate section 602 from sections 600 and 601, noting that section 602's application often leads to commitments to the California Youth Authority, indicating more severe consequences. The Welfare and Institutions Code imposes limitations on committing minors to the Youth Authority. While such a commitment is a possible alternative for minors found under section 602, it does not render subdivision One of section 26 applicable in juvenile court proceedings for these cases. Previous cases cited, such as People v. Lara and In re T.R.S., did not definitively address this applicability in the context of section 602. Conversely, subdivision Three of Penal Code section 26, concerning insanity, has been deemed applicable in juvenile court determinations under section 602. However, allowing for an insanity defense does not compromise the minor's need for care, unlike applying subdivision One, which could deprive them of necessary support. Therefore, the Attorney General's position that subdivision One of section 26 does not apply in juvenile court proceedings regarding minors under section 602 is upheld. The document includes references to relevant sections of the Welfare and Institutions Code, detailing the court's jurisdiction and procedural requirements for handling cases involving minors. In 1959, a Special Study Commission on Juvenile Justice was appointed by the Governor of California to evaluate the state’s Juvenile Court Law. The commission criticized juvenile courts for failing to distinguish between jurisdictional facts and social data during hearings, leading to decisions based on incomplete evidence. It advocated for a two-stage hearing procedure to clearly separate legal proof from treatment knowledge, recommending that both hearings occur on the same day if the necessary reports were available, while maintaining their sequence. The commission's recommendations were later codified in Welfare and Institutions Code sections 701, 702, and 706. The commission's report was referenced in the case of In re Corey, which interpreted the Legislature's intent as preventing juvenile courts from reviewing social study reports prior to jurisdictional determinations. Additional criticism from the President's Commission on Law Enforcement suggested that judges should not have access to social investigation reports before adjudication to avoid biasing their decisions. This practice could also hinder the willingness of juveniles and their families to cooperate with probation officers, potentially compromising the quality of social reports crucial for determining the juvenile's disposition and damaging the relationship between the juvenile and the probation officer. The Attorney General contends that the decision in *In re Corey* establishes a 'new rule' that should be applied prospectively due to its potential negative impact on the justice system, specifically by inviting challenges to prior adjudications. A 1965 survey shows that many California judges still review social studies prior to jurisdictional hearings, which suggests a departure from statutory guidelines that recommend keeping such documents separate from probation reports to avoid introducing irrelevant and prejudicial information into jurisdictional determinations. Practical issues arise regarding whether judges may read these studies before hearings and how to manage the introduction of inadmissible evidence if they do. The case *In re Patterson* is cited, where the admission of a probation officer’s report was upheld; however, it did not address the specific issue of pre-hearing social study review. Additionally, Penal Code section 26 states that children under 14 are generally incapable of committing crimes unless they understood the wrongfulness of their actions. This section has been part of California law since 1850, with its last amendment in 1874. The document notes that, even if this provision loses its relevance in defining crime, it could still allow children under 14 to testify against adult offenders without corroboration, particularly in sexual offense cases, as they would not be classified as accomplices under Penal Code section 1111. Various states follow a similar approach regarding the criminal responsibility of minors. When a minor's actions constitute a crime rather than just a tort, more complex legal frameworks apply. Juvenile courts have been established to handle such cases nonpenally, focusing on the minor's protection and rehabilitation. Minors aged 18 and over are typically subject to general criminal court jurisdiction, while those aged 16 and up can be tried as adults for felonies if deemed unfit for juvenile consideration. Minors 14 years or older are considered capable of committing crimes, while those under 14 may be exempt unless it is proven they recognized the wrongfulness of their actions. Punishments for minors over 18 can include imprisonment in adult facilities. The juvenile court may also commit minors who do not receive adequate rehabilitation or violate court orders. Specific statutes define the jurisdiction of juvenile courts, including those for dependent children lacking proper parental care, those in need of basic necessities, and minors deemed physically dangerous due to mental or physical conditions. Additionally, minors who habitually disobey authority figures or are habitual truants fall under the juvenile court's jurisdiction, which can classify them as wards of the court. Section 601's primary function is to place youths not covered by section 602, as noted in various reports and legal cases. The case of In re Dennis M. highlights the shift from the parens patriae theory, questioning its effectiveness and emphasizing the need for courts to consider the actual consequences of juvenile proceedings rather than relying solely on labels like "delinquent." This term carries a stigma akin to "criminal" for adults, potentially hindering a juvenile's future opportunities, such as employment. The euphemistic titles of institutions do not change the reality of confinement conditions. Concerns raised by the Attorney General suggest that section 26 might restrict juvenile court supervision under section 602, possibly preventing necessary proceedings. However, the behavior leading to allegations may indicate deeper issues warranting intervention under different provisions. The discussion references additional legal precedents to support these points. Furthermore, the Attorney General's argument regarding the definition of crimes, particularly related to sexual offenses against children, is examined. It clarifies that the terms "annoy" and "molest" generally imply actions involving abnormal sexual motivations, focusing on the defendant's conduct rather than the child's state of mind, as per established interpretations of the law. The Attorney General highlights the word "ordinarily" in relation to the case Carskaddon, emphasizing that it did not intend to overrule the precedent set by Pallares, which recognizes motivation by an abnormal sexual interest as an element of the offense. Carskaddon did not deny that such motivation is relevant, as it referenced Pallares approvingly. In that case, the court found insufficient evidence of the defendant's actions under section 647a, making it unnecessary to address motivation. Welfare and Institutions Code section 602 establishes the juvenile court's jurisdiction over individuals under 21 who violate state laws, allowing them to be deemed wards of the court. Penal Code section 26 states that individuals below 14 are generally not criminally liable unless they knowingly committed a wrongful act. Section 502 of the Welfare and Institutions Code outlines the objectives of the Arnold Kennick Juvenile Court Law, focusing on providing care and guidance for minors while maintaining family ties, only removing them from their homes when necessary for safety and welfare. Section 600 defines criteria for juveniles to be deemed dependents of the court, including lack of parental care or being in unsafe living conditions. Section 601 addresses persistent disobedience or truancy among minors, placing them under the court's jurisdiction as wards. The conditions for committing section 601 and section 602 wards to the Youth Authority differ. Section 733 prohibits the commitment of certain individuals to the Youth Authority, specifically those under 8 years of age. Section 734 allows for commitment only if the judge is convinced that the minor's mental and physical condition suggests they will benefit from the Youth Authority's educational and treatment programs. If a court determines a minor falls under section 602, it can place the minor on probation without designating them a ward of the court, or it may officially declare them a ward. According to Welfare and Institutions Code 725, a minor cannot be removed from a parent's custody unless the court finds specific criteria met, such as prior unsuccessful probation attempts (Welf. Inst. Code. 726). If such criteria are established, the court may order various treatments for a section 602 ward, including placement with a probation officer, in a suitable family home, or in a juvenile home, or it may commit the minor to the Youth Authority (Welf. Inst. Code. 731) under the aforementioned restrictions. In the case of In re T.R.S., the court noted that the evidence did meet the 'clear proof' standard required by Penal Code section 26 regarding the minor's awareness of the wrongfulness of their actions.