State v. Row

Citations: 955 P.2d 1082; 131 Idaho 303; 1998 Ida. LEXIS 32Docket: 21018, 22918

Court: Idaho Supreme Court; March 18, 1998; Idaho; State Supreme Court

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Robin Lee Row was convicted of three counts of first-degree murder and one count of aggravated arson, leading to a death sentence, which she appealed. The case arose from a fire on February 10, 1992, at Row's apartment, resulting in the deaths of her husband and two children due to carbon monoxide poisoning. At the time, Row was staying with a friend due to marital issues. Investigators found evidence of arson, including a disabled smoke detector and the use of a flammable liquid. Notably, police discovered six life insurance policies on the deceased, totaling $276,500, with Row as the beneficiary, the last of which was obtained shortly before the fire. Additionally, Row was arrested for theft related to her employment at the YWCA shortly after the fire. A recorded phone call between Row and her friend, McHugh, further implicated her, as she made inconsistent statements regarding her whereabouts during the fire. Row's appeal and the mandatory review under Idaho law affirmed the district court's decision.

Row's counsel filed pretrial motions to suppress statements made by Row to McHugh during her incarceration on theft charges, which the district court denied. Following a jury trial that concluded on March 5, 1993, Row was found guilty of murder and arson, leading to a death sentence imposed on December 16, 1993. Row's appeal began on January 26, 1994, alongside an application for post-conviction relief filed on March 17, 1994. She challenged her trial counsel's effectiveness regarding pretrial motions and mitigation evidence at sentencing and requested a 'money judge' for expert assistance. Additionally, Row sought a continuance to gather more evidence for her post-conviction claim, which was denied as the proceedings continued. The district court dismissed her post-conviction application on March 11, 1996, prompting a consolidated appeal addressing several issues.

Key issues on appeal include whether the district court erred in determining the statutory aggravating circumstances for the death penalty, the weighing of mitigating circumstances, the jury instruction on reasonable doubt, the denial of an ex parte procedure for expert assistance, the refusal of a continuance for additional evidence, and the adequacy of Row's trial counsel in suppressing statements and presenting mitigation evidence. The court upheld the district court's finding of the 'multiple murders' statutory aggravator, as Row's three first-degree murder convictions fulfilled the criteria under Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(2), confirming the legal basis for the death sentence. The court also noted the connection of Row's arson conviction to another statutory aggravator under Idaho Code 19-2515(g)(7).

The district court determined that two statutory aggravating circumstances were proven beyond a reasonable doubt: Row's expectation of insurance proceeds indicated that the murders were committed for remuneration (I.C. 19-2515 (g)(4)), and the nature of the murders demonstrated Row's utter disregard for human life (I.C. 19-2515 (g)(6)). Row contested these findings and argued that the court erred by not weighing the mitigating circumstances against each aggravating factor. Idaho law requires a death sentence only if at least one aggravating circumstance is established, and the court must then consider whether mitigating factors are compelling enough to warrant a lesser sentence. The district court was not obligated to weigh each aggravator against the mitigators but chose to focus on the most significant aggravator, the commitment of three premeditated murders (I.C. 19-2515 (g)(2)). It concluded that the mitigating factors did not outweigh this aggravator. Row claimed the court failed to follow the precedent set in State v. Charboneau, which mandates that all mitigating circumstances must be weighed against each aggravating circumstance separately. However, the district court adhered to this requirement by weighing all mitigating factors against the 'multiple murders' aggravator specifically and did not find error in its approach.

The district court was not obligated to address every aggravating circumstance once it determined that the 'multiple murders' circumstance justified the death penalty. Row claimed the court failed to consider all mitigating circumstances by not discussing each one individually. However, precedent from State v. Creech clarified that Idaho law does not require a detailed enumeration of mitigating factors, but rather a consideration of evidence deemed valid and relevant to the death penalty decision. The record indicates that the district court's approach aligned with this standard.

Row also contested the court's characterization of her relationship with the victims, as it sometimes referred to her as a mother. However, her defense had portrayed her as a 'good mother,' which the court acknowledged as a mitigating factor. Thus, the court’s references were appropriate and did not indicate bias.

Furthermore, as mandated by Idaho Code 19-2827(c), the court reviewed the case to ensure the death penalty was not imposed due to passion, prejudice, or arbitrary factors, and confirmed that the evidence supported the aggravating circumstance of multiple murders.

Lastly, Row argued that the district court's instruction on reasonable doubt was erroneous and violated her due process rights. She contended that the jury should have been given an instruction consistent with State v. Holm, which she believed was required by Idaho law. The court found no reversible error in the instruction provided, affirming it under the precedent established in State v. Hoffman.

Instruction No. 103 from the Idaho Criminal Jury Instructions incorporates guidance from the Holm case. When reviewing jury instructions, the focus is on whether the instruction provided misrepresented the law or misled the jury, rather than solely on the absence of an approved instruction. The Constitution does not mandate specific wording for burden of proof instructions, as long as the overall instructions convey the reasonable doubt standard accurately. The appellate court reviews legal questions regarding jury instructions freely, considering the collective accuracy of the instructions rather than individual components. An instruction is deemed reversible error only if it misled the jury or prejudiced the defendant. 

In this case, the district court used a reasonable doubt instruction verbatim from State v. Hoffman, which was sanctioned by the court just prior to Row's trial. The Hoffman ruling indicated that the instruction was similar to those previously approved and did not infringe upon due process rights. Consequently, the instruction given to the jury was considered accurate and compliant with due process as per the Idaho Constitution.

Regarding post-conviction issues, the district court correctly denied Row's request for an ex parte procedure for expert assistance. Row argued that such a procedure was crucial to maintain attorney-client confidentiality and avoid self-incrimination risks. The court determined that granting expert assistance at public expense is not automatic and should be based on the specific needs of the defendant as assessed in each case. It is the responsibility of the trial court to evaluate these needs and determine if a sufficient defense can be achieved without the requested expert assistance.

A defendant's request for expert or investigative assistance will only be overturned if there is clear evidence of an abuse of discretion by the trial court. In Row's post-conviction proceedings, the district court denied her sealed request for additional expert assistance, stating she did not meet the required showing that such assistance was necessary given her counsel's expertise. Row was allowed to file her motion confidentially, and the State remained unaware of the specific details beyond the request for funds. The court concluded that Row's rights were adequately protected without additional expert assistance, noting she had two appointed counsel who effectively presented her mitigating circumstances.

Regarding Row's request for a continuance, she claimed her counsel was unprepared and needed more time for investigations. The district court, however, has discretion over granting continuances, and Row bore the burden of proving an abuse of this discretion. A mere assertion that more investigation could have been conducted does not suffice to show unfair prejudice. The district court denied the continuance, taking into account Row's previous delays and the speculative nature of her claims for additional evidence. With nearly two years having passed since Row filed for post-conviction relief and multiple extensions already granted, the court found no abuse of discretion in denying the continuance.

Trial counsel's performance in the motion to suppress statements made by Row to Joan McHugh was deemed not deficient. On March 20, 1992, while Row was held in the Ada County Jail on a theft charge, a murder investigation was ongoing. Detective Raney suggested that McHugh record any phone conversations with Row. On that same day, a warrant for Row's arrest for three counts of first-degree murder was issued, and a press conference was held announcing the charges. Row called McHugh, stating she was not present during the fire but outside speaking with her psychiatrist. After being formally arrested on March 23, Row appealed, claiming her counsel failed to properly challenge the admissibility of her statements due to delays in charging and arraigning her. However, the district court found no deficiency in counsel's actions, concluding that the motion would have been denied regardless. The court cited the standards from Strickland v. Washington, requiring proof of both deficient performance and resulting prejudice. It ruled that Row's statements did not warrant suppression under relevant case law and that there was no constitutional delay in charging her, as the State did not intentionally delay to elicit incriminating statements. Additionally, Row's initial appearance was timely under Idaho Criminal Rules, which mandate that a defendant be brought before a magistrate within twenty-four hours of arrest, excluding weekends and holidays.

Row was arrested for murder on March 23 at 10:00 a.m. and appeared before a magistrate the same day at 1:00 p.m., complying with applicable rules. Her prior knowledge of impending charges on March 20 did not violate Rule 5, as the twenty-four-hour period began with her arrest. The district court found no delay in her initial appearance and ruled against suppressing her statements to McHugh, concluding Row did not satisfy the second prong of the Strickland test for ineffective assistance of counsel.

Row claimed her counsel was deficient in preparing and presenting mitigation evidence, arguing an inadequate background investigation, insufficient presentation of her mental health evaluation, and failure to allow her allocution statement. The district court held that Row's counsel undertook reasonable discovery efforts and that merely being able to do more does not equate to a deficiency. Counsel presented substantial evidence from various sources, including friends, Health and Welfare records, and Veteran's Administration records regarding Row's husband's injuries.

The court emphasized that strategic decisions by counsel are not subject to second-guessing unless proven objectively unreasonable. Row failed to demonstrate any additional evidence that could have influenced the court's decision and did not show how counsel's actions prejudiced her case. After thorough review, the court affirmed the convictions and the death sentence imposed on Row.