Crump v. McDonald

Citations: 520 S.E.2d 283; 239 Ga. App. 647; 99 Fulton County D. Rep. 2832; 1999 Ga. App. LEXIS 958Docket: A99A0630

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; July 6, 1999; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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The case involves the probate of Gussie Butler's will following her death in May 1993, with her siblings H.P. Butler and Eloise McDonald as beneficiaries and co-executors. After H.P. Butler renounced his inheritance, his daughter, Penny Butler Crump, sought to remove both H.P. and McDonald as co-executors due to alleged mismanagement. Before her petition was adjudicated, H.P. passed away, leaving McDonald as the sole executor. The probate court denied Crump's petition, leading to her appeal to the Superior Court, where a jury trial resulted in a special verdict favoring McDonald.

Crump challenged the trial court's decisions, asserting errors in denying her motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.), along with the refusal to give a requested jury charge. The appellate court noted that such motions can only be granted when the evidence compels a specific verdict, and upon review, it found that there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's finding against Crump. Consequently, the appellate court affirmed the lower court's judgment.

McDonald failed to perform multiple duties as executor of the estate, including not inventorying or appraising estate personal property, filing estate income tax returns late which incurred penalties, and withholding necessary information from the estate's accountant for five years. He transferred property to his incapacitated mother while using estate funds for personal renovations and maintenance. Additionally, he kept estate cash in low-interest accounts at a bank where he held a position of authority and did not maintain basic records of his actions as executor. Despite these allegations, McDonald admitted to some misconduct but provided explanations that the jury found credible, suggesting that he believed the estate’s value was below the threshold for tax returns and that he misunderstood his obligation to account to beneficiaries. The probate court, under former OCGA § 53-7-148 and its successor OCGA § 53-7-55, has discretion to revoke an executor's letters upon investigation of their actions. The jury, upon appeal, exercises this discretion, and while it can remove an executor for conflicts of interest, courts are generally hesitant to do so without compelling evidence. The court acknowledges McDonald’s explanations and the jury's belief in them, indicating some evidence supports the jury's verdict despite potential breaches of fiduciary duty.

The superior court emphasized to the jury that while they were authorized to remove the administrator, it was ultimately within their discretion to decide whether to do so, regardless of any proven acts against him. This discretion aligns with the precedent established under the predecessor statute to former OCGA § 53-7-148. The court denied Crump's motions for directed verdict and judgment notwithstanding the verdict (j.n.o.v.) because the removal of McDonald was not mandated by the evidence. Crump argued that the trial court erred by not including her requested jury charge, which would have stated that an executor's failure to make an inventory constitutes an omission of duty and shifts the burden to prove fidelity to the jury. However, the court correctly instructed the jury that the will relieved the executors from certain accounting responsibilities, but did not exempt them from filing an inventory unless explicitly stated. The court maintained that giving the requested charge would mislead the jury regarding the executor's obligations. Crump also contended that the verdict was against the weight of evidence; however, as long as there is any supporting evidence, the jury's decision must stand, and the trial judge's approval of the verdict holds significant weight. Since there was sufficient evidence to support the jury's verdict, the trial court's denial of Crump's motion for a new trial was not an abuse of discretion, leading to the affirmation of the judgment.