Gladowski v. Department of Family & Children Services

Citations: 635 S.E.2d 886; 281 Ga. App. 299; 2006 Fulton County D. Rep. 2769; 2006 Ga. App. LEXIS 1082Docket: A06A1706

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; August 25, 2006; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Sylvia Gladowski appeals a Fulton County Superior Court decision that upheld a final administrative ruling by the Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Community Health, which denied her Medicaid benefits. Gladowski argues that her petition for judicial review was timely filed according to OCGA § 49-4-153(c). The Court of Appeals of Georgia affirmed the superior court's ruling, finding no error in its conclusion that Gladowski's petition was untimely. 

Gladowski had initially qualified for Medicaid in April 2004, but her benefits were delayed until September 2006 due to allegations of improper asset transfer. After an administrative law judge upheld the Department's decision, the final administrative decision was mailed to Gladowski on December 14, 2004. Under OCGA § 49-4-153(c), she was required to file a petition for judicial review within 30 days of the final decision's service date, interpreted as the mailing date. Thus, her petition needed to be filed by January 13, 2005. However, she filed on January 18, 2005, which was outside the required timeframe.

The court also considered whether the Civil Practice Act's three-day rule (OCGA § 9-11-6(e)) applied to extend the filing deadline due to a three-day weekend, but it ultimately had to determine if Gladowski's filing was still timely based on the interpretation of "service." The differing terms of "service" and "receipt" in related statutes were clarified, affirming the interpretation that "service" refers to the mailing date, thereby concluding that Gladowski's petition was filed late.

The provision OCGA 9-11-6(e) stipulates that when a party must act within a prescribed period after receiving a notice by mail, an additional three days is granted. However, the statute governing appeals from the Department of Community Health does not clarify if the Civil Practice Act applies to judicial review petitions and states that such review follows the standards applicable to contested cases under OCGA 50-13-19. Georgia courts have ruled that the Civil Practice Act does not apply to superior court reviews of administrative appeals. In Miller v. Ga. Real Estate Comm., it was established that judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act is not governed by the Civil Practice Act, preventing appellants from using OCGA 9-11-6(b) for extensions after deadlines. The appellate process, as clarified in cases like Ga. Public Svc. Comm. v. Southern Bell, is distinct from trial procedures outlined in the Civil Practice Act. 

Although Gladowski claimed her petition was received by certified mail on January 12, 2005, it was not officially filed until January 18, 2005, which was past the deadline. She argued that OCGA 50-13-23, which states that certified mail is considered filed as of the postmark date, made her petition timely. However, OCGA 49-4-153(c) explicitly states that OCGA 50-13-23 does not apply in this context, confirming that Gladowski's petition was untimely. Consequently, the superior court lacked jurisdiction to act on an appeal filed beyond the legal timeframe, necessitating dismissal.

Judgment is affirmed without error, with Judges Mikell and Adams concurring. Relevant case law includes North Atlanta Scan Assoc. v. Dept. of Community Health, which confirms procedural adherence. The statute OCGA § 1-3-1(d)(3) excludes weekends and holidays from time calculations. Additional precedents cited include Miller v. Ga. Real Estate Comm., Ga. Public Svc. Comm. v. Southern Bell, Hewes v. Cooler, Akin v. Sanders, and Favors v. Travelers Ins. Co., all supporting the procedural standards outlined in the Civil Practice Act. The Civil Practice Act governs all civil actions, defined by the filing of a complaint per OCGA § 9-11-1 and § 9-11-3, while OCGA § 50-13-19 outlines a separate process for superior court jurisdiction. Further support comes from Riddle-Bradley, Inc. v. Riddle and Dept. of Human Resources v. Lewis.