State v. Entz

Citations: 791 P.2d 269; 58 Wash. App. 112; 1990 Wash. App. LEXIS 204Docket: 23103-1-I

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; May 29, 1990; Washington; State Appellate Court

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Sandra J. Entz appeals her conviction for aggravated first degree murder in the death of her husband, Marvin Entz. Key issues raised include the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on manslaughter, the instruction on the definition of 'knowledge,' and alleged violations of her rights under the privileges and immunities clause of the Washington State Constitution, particularly regarding the differing charges against her and her co-defendant, Rena Skilton. Additionally, Entz contests the trial court's failure to instruct the jury on immunized witness testimony.

The background of the case reveals significant marital discord between Sandra and Marvin, with Sandra expressing desires for Marvin's death. Following a romantic involvement with Stephen Forbis, who stayed at their home while Marvin was away, Marvin was shot twice upon leaving for work on November 17, 1987. Witness Robert Cummings heard the gunshots but initially dismissed them as firecrackers. After discovering Marvin's body, he reported to Entz, who exhibited a seemingly inappropriate demeanor.

Investigation revealed Forbis's presence at the Entz home on the morning of the shooting, leading to his arrest. Both Entz and Skilton were charged as accomplices to first degree murder, but Entz was later specifically charged with aggravated first degree murder. Witnesses testified that Entz had conspired with Forbis, agreeing to pay him using proceeds from life insurance policies on Marvin. Neither Entz nor Skilton testified in their defense, with Entz's counsel portraying her as a manipulated victim. Ultimately, Skilton was convicted of first degree murder, while Entz was found guilty of aggravated first degree murder. The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction.

Entz argued that the trial court erred by not providing her proposed jury instructions on first-degree manslaughter, the definition of 'recklessness,' and 'proximate cause.' The State asserted that Entz acted as an accomplice to Forbis, the individual who directly caused her husband's death. In contrast, Entz claimed she did not intend for Forbis to take her expression of wanting her husband dead seriously, suggesting that Forbis and others exploited her to secure insurance money. Entz's defense maintained that her actions were at most reckless, not constituting first-degree murder, which led her to propose specific jury instructions. The trial court rejected these instructions, reasoning that if Entz was not acting as an accomplice, there was insufficient proximate cause to submit the case to the jury. 

Under RCW 9A.32.060, first-degree manslaughter involves recklessly causing another person's death, defined under RCW 9A.08.010(1)(c) as knowing and disregarding a substantial risk of wrongful acts. A defendant is entitled to lesser offense instructions if the lesser offense's elements are necessary to the charged offense and if evidence supports inferring only the lesser crime. The State conceded the legal requirement was met, so the focus was on whether evidence supported a manslaughter inference. 

Citing State v. Robinson, where the defendant was acquitted of murder but convicted of manslaughter, the court found insufficient evidence to support a manslaughter conviction in Entz's case. The only evidence of recklessness was her prior statement wishing her husband dead, which occurred before the murder and did not indicate substantial risk of death. Therefore, the court upheld the trial court's decision to deny the manslaughter instructions. 

Additionally, Entz contested the trial court's instruction on 'knowledge,' arguing it allowed the jury to apply an objective standard regarding her solicitation of her husband's murder, claiming this violated her due process rights. The instruction defined knowledge as awareness of facts or circumstances constituting a crime.

A person may be found to have acted knowingly if they possess information that would lead a reasonable person to believe a crime has occurred. Knowledge can also be inferred from intentional actions. However, mere recklessness, defined as knowing and disregarding a substantial risk of wrongdoing, does not equate to knowledge or intent. This instruction is based on revised WPIC 10.02, aligned with the precedent set in State v. Shipp, which has been upheld constitutionally in subsequent cases. 

Entz argues that the State violated her constitutional rights by charging her with aggravated first-degree murder while her co-defendant faced a lesser charge. She also claims the trial court erred in denying her motion to reduce the charge based on the prosecutor's discretion in deciding to prosecute. Prosecutors have broad authority to determine charges, and selecting to charge one individual over another does not violate equal protection or privileges and immunities clauses, provided the decision is not based on arbitrary criteria. Although Entz acknowledges she cannot prove selective prosecution under federal law, she contends that Washington’s privileges and immunities clause should offer her greater protection. Nonetheless, the Washington Supreme Court has indicated that the state and federal equal protection provisions are essentially equivalent and have been treated as a single issue.

In Olsen v. Delmore, the court determined that Entz could not establish a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, which precluded her from claiming a violation of the privileges and immunities clause under the Washington State Constitution. Entz contended that the trial court erred by not providing cautionary instructions regarding the testimony of immunized witnesses, arguing that such instructions were necessary since some witnesses were not accomplices. However, the court noted that no Washington court mandates such instructions for immunized witnesses and deemed it a matter of trial court discretion. The court reviewed the involvement of four immunized witnesses—Lori Sands, Deborah and Ensley Rob. Robertson, and Guy Phillips—concluding that all had roles as accomplices in the murder plot. Sands was aware of the plot, assisted with an alibi, and helped the perpetrator escape. The Robertsons participated in modifying the murder weapon and sought financial gain post-murder. Although Phillips did not shoot the victim, he was involved in a prior murder attempt and was aware of the current plot. The court found that the jury likely viewed these witnesses as accomplices, which justified the cautionary instruction on accomplice testimony, allowing the defense to argue that their testimonies were motivated by self-preservation. Consequently, the court concluded there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court and affirmed the ruling. The notes clarify that Entz's references to other cases were misplaced since those involved defendants who directly committed murders, contrasting with Entz's non-participation in the killing. Additionally, the decision to charge Entz with aggravated first-degree murder, as opposed to Skilton's first-degree murder charge, was based on the stronger evidence against Entz, which included her motive and actions related to the crime.