Johnson v. Central Valley School District No. 356

Citations: 645 P.2d 1088; 97 Wash. 2d 419; 1982 Wash. LEXIS 1440; 30 Empl. Prac. Dec. (CCH) 33Docket: 48293-4

Court: Washington Supreme Court; June 3, 1982; Washington; State Supreme Court

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William S. Johnson, a certified teacher of Native American heritage, sued Central Valley School District for damages and mandatory reinstatement as a tutor-counselor under a federal grant from the Indian Education Act. The district, serving approximately 11,000 students, had received this grant to benefit Indian children and was required to utilize talents from the Indian community. Johnson was initially employed as a half-time tutor-counselor for the 1977-78 school year and was rehired for a 3/4-time position in 1978-79, both times with the approval of an advisory committee of Indian parents.

Johnson held a teacher's certificate but lacked a counselor's certificate. He was encouraged to obtain this certification, and by the end of his second year, the State Superintendent informed the district that he needed a counselor's certificate to continue employment. Due to funding uncertainties, the district notified Johnson on May 11, 1979, of nonrenewal for financial reasons. After completing his graduate studies and fulfilling the requirements for a counseling certificate, Johnson submitted a request for consideration for a full-time tutor-counselor position for the 1979-80 school year, which the district advertised with "Indian preference." The selection process involved multiple evaluators, and Johnson was among three candidates selected for interviews.

An advisory committee's executive committee interviewed applicants for a position on August 21, 1979, ultimately favoring Peter Covella, who received four votes, while one vote was cast for the plaintiff and the chairman abstained. Recommendations from the grant administrator and personnel manager supported Covella's appointment, which the board approved. Following the interviews, the plaintiff applied for certification and received a counselor's certificate on October 1, 1979. The plaintiff's claims included improper delegation of authority, violation of the Peters precedent, breach of a collective bargaining agreement, infringement of the Indian Self-Determination Act, and violation of the state Law Against Discrimination. The court dismissed all claims except for the federal statute violation, ordering the plaintiff's reinstatement for the 1980-81 year and awarding him $17,162.41 in special damages. However, the court denied general damages under the federal act due to lack of evidence. The plaintiff appealed all adverse rulings except for the improper delegation claim, while the school district cross-appealed regarding the federal relief. The case raises questions about whether the district violated the Indian Self-Determination Act (25 U.S.C. 450e(b)) or state discrimination laws in its hiring process, where the plaintiff argues that, despite Covella's superior qualifications, his status as the only Indian applicant entitled him to preferential treatment based on historical directives. The constitutionality of such preferences was previously examined in Morton v. Mancari, which addressed similar employment preference issues within the Bureau of Indian Affairs.

Enforcement of a new policy was argued to disadvantage non-Indian employees in competition for promotions and training, leading to claims of discrimination and unequal employment opportunities. The Court of Appeals initially ruled that the 1972 act impliedly repealed the Indian preference statutes, but the United States Supreme Court reversed this decision. The Court emphasized that the federal policy granting preference to Indians in Indian service has historical roots dating back to 1834, aimed at enhancing Indian self-governance, fulfilling the government's trust obligations to tribes, and mitigating the adverse effects of non-Indians managing tribal matters. 

The Court identified the 1934 act's primary goal as establishing mechanisms for Indian tribes to achieve greater self-government, necessitating some preference and exemptions from standard civil service requirements. It stated that Congress intended to gradually replace non-Indians with Indians in Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) operations, with displacement of non-Indians being an expected outcome. The Court affirmed that this legislative policy survived the 1972 Equal Employment Opportunity Act, highlighting that Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act excluded "an Indian Tribe" from its definition of an employer and allowed preferential treatment for Indians in reservation-related employment.

The Court interpreted these exemptions as a recognition of the unique legal status of tribal activities, clarifying that Indian preferences within this context do not equate to racial discrimination. It noted that the 1972 amendments to the antidiscrimination framework did not alter the existing employment preferences for Indians established in 1964, and subsequent legislation reinforced the importance of such preferences in government programs for training Indian teachers. The Court concluded that the Indian preference statute is compatible with antidiscrimination laws, addressing the due process claims by invoking Congress’s plenary power to legislate for federally recognized Indian tribes, derived from the Constitution. This power allows Congress to regulate commerce with tribes and make treaties, ensuring that tribal Indians receive special legislative treatment.

The Court clarified that the employment preference for Indians was not based on race but was an employment criterion aimed at promoting Indian self-government and enhancing the Bureau of Indian Affairs' (BIA) responsiveness to the needs of tribal entities. This preference is not extended to any other government agency and is specifically applicable to employment within the Indian service. The Court determined that this preference was rationally linked to a legitimate, nonracial goal, distinguishing it from forms of racial discrimination. The ruling in Morton v. Mancari serves as a significant guide for understanding Indian preference and racial discrimination issues. Other cited cases, such as Freeman v. Morton and Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Hickel, addressed Indian preference in promotions and layoffs but did not define the term "Indian preference" explicitly. The BIA's prior policies showed flexibility regarding Indian preference during layoffs, contingent on tenure. It was noted that the Supreme Court's approval of Indian preference was limited to the context of the BIA and Indian activities near reservations, suggesting that broader application could raise racial discrimination concerns. Additionally, the distinction between statutes 25 U.S.C. 472 and 25 U.S.C. 450e(b) was emphasized, with the latter allowing some discretion in granting preferences based on grant conditions aimed at utilizing the best resources to improve educational opportunities for Indian children.

Congress did not indicate that services under the grant should be provided specifically by individuals of Indian heritage, regardless of their qualifications. The preference in the Indian Self-Determination Act applies to grants benefiting Indians generally, but applying this to favor one group over another—such as Indian teachers over better-qualified non-Indian applicants—would undermine the grant's goal of utilizing the best available talents and resources. The preference provision is a general law, while the specific law governing the grant (20 U.S.C. 241aa-ff) does not mandate such a preference. The grant lacks any explicit requirement for the school district to prioritize Indian applicants over better-qualified candidates. The Supreme Court has ruled that grants function as contracts, prohibiting the imposition of unambiguous conditions not stated within. The school district aimed to respect Indian preference while ensuring it employed the best candidates by limiting preference to cases where qualifications were equal. This approach helps avoid potential racial discrimination issues identified by the Supreme Court when extending Indian preference beyond its intended context. Consequently, the trial court erred in ruling that the plaintiff was entitled to preference over a more qualified candidate.

State law governs the hiring of certificated personnel in schools, requiring valid teacher certifications for employment under RCW 28A.67.070. The state board of education is tasked with establishing certification rules and regulations under RCW 28A.70.005, which may require multiple certificates for certain positions. Counselors are categorized as educational staff associates under WAC 180-79-125, which outlines specific educational certification requirements. Additional certification requirements are detailed in WAC 180-79-130(1), 180-79-170(1), and 180-79-180.

In Kimball v. School Dist. 122, the court reversed a jury verdict favoring a plaintiff who claimed breach of contract for a teaching position. At the time of her application, the plaintiff held an expired 1-year teaching certificate and failed to renew it, obtaining only a temporary certificate valid for 2 months. The court ruled that she needed to prove she was licensed for the full 9-month term when she offered her services. It noted that if she had begun teaching with the temporary certificate and later failed to obtain a new one, she could have sought recovery for that period based on an implied contract. In Kester v. School Dist. 34, the court similarly found a plaintiff unqualified to teach due to lacking a valid certificate at the time of application, despite having a letter indicating he could obtain a temporary certificate. The court emphasized that a promise to grant a certificate does not fulfill legal requirements if the certificate is not held at the time of employment. Cases cited suggest a split in authority regarding whether obtaining a certificate after a contract's execution affects enforceability, with some courts maintaining that a new contract is necessary for validity. The trial court acknowledged the plaintiff's lack of certification but ruled that the school district was estopped from asserting this due to their consideration of his application.

The plaintiff acknowledged awareness of the requirement to obtain a certification from the Superintendent of Public Instruction to be eligible for employment for the 1979-80 school year. Despite this, he was informed by the grant administrator that a recommendation from Eastern Washington University would suffice for his application. The plaintiff did not claim that any district official promised him a job, only that they were seeking the best-qualified candidate. To establish estoppel, three elements must be demonstrated: a defendant's inconsistent admission, the plaintiff's reliance on that admission, and potential injury to the plaintiff if the defendant contradicts that admission. While the estoppel doctrine may apply to a school district, it cannot negate statutory hiring requirements, specifically the necessity of holding a valid certificate for certificated positions. The trial court's ruling suggested that the district, by allowing his application, was precluded from claiming he was unqualified when the school year began. The plaintiff could have obtained the necessary certificate shortly after applying, and it was assumed that he would have done so if hired. However, even with the assumption that he would have been certified by the start of the school year, he did not qualify for the benefits outlined in Peters v. South Kitsap School District, which requires a teacher to be fully certified and in good standing at the time of nonrenewal. The plaintiff did not meet these criteria, as his contract stipulated employment for one school year, defined from September 1 to August 31.

The school district asserts that the school year concludes when a teacher completes 180.5 days of service, as outlined in the collective bargaining agreement, but this issue does not need resolution in the current case. The plaintiff lacked the required counselor's certificate at the time of nonrenewal and on August 31, 1979, rendering him unqualified for the position. Consequently, he is not entitled to the Peters doctrine benefits. The assertion that the plaintiff's waiver of continuing contract rights is significant is unnecessary, as is the question of whether the Peters doctrine applies to federally financed contracts. The collective bargaining agreement mandates hiring certificated employees who meet state and regulatory requirements. Article 5, section F stipulates a procedure for staff reductions, allowing nonrenewed employees to enter an "employment pool" for reemployment only if they hold the proper certificate. The plaintiff's lack of certification at the time of nonrenewal precludes him from relief under this provision. Furthermore, section F applies only in cases of multiple staff reductions, not isolated nonrenewals. Regarding the claim of violation of RCW 49.60.180, which prohibits hiring discrimination based on race or national origin, no evidence supports that the plaintiff was denied the position due to race; the district selected the most qualified candidate with approval from the Central Valley Native American Advisory Committee. The Superior Court's dismissal of this claim was correct. Therefore, the judgment in favor of the plaintiff is reversed, while the portions rejecting his claims are affirmed. Reconsideration was denied on August 17, 1982.