Ozaki v. AOAO DISCOVERY BAY

Citation: 954 P.2d 644Docket: 19194

Court: Hawaii Supreme Court; May 4, 1998; Hawaii; State Supreme Court

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The case involves plaintiffs Betty J. Ozaki and Teruko K. Dennis, who are suing the Association of Apartment Owners of Discovery Bay and Timothy W. Walker following the murder of Cynthia J. Dennis by Peter Sataraka in her apartment. The Supreme Court of Hawai'i is reviewing the Intermediate Court of Appeals' (ICA) reversal of a circuit court's judgment that favored Discovery Bay. The central legal issue is whether the intentional tort committed by Sataraka negates the modified comparative negligence rule under Hawai'i Revised Statutes (HRS) 663-31, which Discovery Bay claims was misapplied by the ICA. The background details include Sataraka's actions leading up to the murder, including a confrontation with Dennis and his entry into the condominium complex facilitated by Walker, the security guard. The plaintiffs seek damages for various forms of suffering resulting from Dennis's death, including emotional distress and loss of consortium.

The complaint asserted that Discovery Bay failed to provide adequate security, and that Walker was negligent in allowing Sataraka access through a security door to Dennis's apartment, contributing to her death. A jury determined that Sataraka's intentional conduct accounted for 92% of the fault, while Dennis's and Discovery Bay's negligence were apportioned 5% and 3%, respectively. Discovery Bay sought final judgment, claiming that HRS 663-31 barred recovery since Dennis's negligence surpassed its own. The plaintiffs argued against this, asserting that the presence of intentional conduct from Sataraka prevented comparison of negligence, that the jury's comparisons were erroneous, and that Discovery Bay should be jointly and severally liable with Sataraka for all damages. The circuit court ruled in favor of Discovery Bay, citing the legislative intent behind tort reform and the finding that Dennis's negligence was greater. Consequently, final judgment was entered favoring Discovery Bay against the plaintiffs and in favor of the plaintiffs against Sataraka. The plaintiffs appealed, contending that the jury's apportionment of fault was erroneous, HRS 663-31 did not bar recovery since negligence was not the sole liability theory, and that Sataraka and Discovery Bay should be jointly and severally liable. Discovery Bay countered that apportionment was necessary to determine its contribution from Sataraka and to confirm whether Dennis's negligence prevented recovery from it, asserting that while it was jointly and severally liable for economic damages, this did not extend to noneconomic damages under HRS 663-10.9.

The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) concluded that HRS 663-31 applies only when negligence is the sole basis for liability and did not apply in this case, leading to recovery based on pure comparative negligence principles. It identified Discovery Bay and Sataraka as joint tortfeasors under HRS 663-11. The ICA noted that HRS 663-10.9, which eliminates joint and several liability, excludes both economic and noneconomic damages in cases involving intentional torts, which applied to Sataraka in this matter. Consequently, HRS 663-10.9(3), which limits joint tortfeasor liability based on negligence percentage, did not apply to Discovery Bay due to the intentional tort classification. The ICA ruled that both Discovery Bay and Sataraka were jointly and severally liable for damages, subject to a reduction for Dennis's share of fault. The ICA vacated the circuit court's judgment in favor of Discovery Bay, remanding for a new judgment against both defendants, and vacated certain evidentiary orders related to Dennis's estate claims, ordering a new trial. It affirmed the dismissal of punitive damages claims against Discovery Bay. Additionally, the interpretation of statutes, such as HRS 663-31, is a legal question subject to de novo review, where the legislative intent is primarily derived from the statutory language. HRS 663-31 specifies that contributory negligence does not bar recovery if the claimant's negligence is not greater than that of the defendant(s), with damages reduced according to the claimant's proportion of negligence.

In a nonjury trial under subsection (a), the court must make findings of fact, while in a jury trial, the jury must return a special verdict noting (1) the recoverable damages without contributory negligence, and (2) the negligence degree of each party as a percentage. Following these findings, the court will proportionally reduce the award based on the plaintiff's attributable negligence. If the plaintiff's negligence exceeds that of all defendants, the court will favor the defendants. Historically, a plaintiff's contributory negligence completely barred recovery, but HRS 663-31 modified this by allowing recovery unless the plaintiff's negligence is greater than that of all defendants. HRS 663-31 applies strictly to negligence actions and does not apply where strict products liability is involved, as established by the supreme court. The court concluded that the legislative intent of HRS 663-31 was not to encompass areas beyond negligence, which is further supported by the statutory language directing judgment for defendants when a plaintiff's negligence is greater. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) misinterpreted this statute, incorrectly concluding it applied beyond purely negligence actions.

Hao, Armstrong, and Kaneko are not applicable to the current case because, in those instances, negligence was one of multiple liability theories against the same defendant, whereas here, different theories target different defendants. The Intermediate Court of Appeals (ICA) correctly interpreted HRS 663-31, which stipulates that recovery can only be pursued against defendants whose liability is based on negligence. Discovery Bay is included under this statute as negligence is the sole basis for liability against it. According to HRS 663-31, if the negligence attributed to the injured party exceeds that of the defendant, judgment should favor the defendant. Since the jury found Dennis to be more at fault than Discovery Bay, the circuit court's decision to grant Discovery Bay's motion for final judgment was proper. The public policy rationale for allowing recovery in strict product liability cases does not apply here. Consequently, the ICA's opinion is reversed regarding Discovery Bay, affirming the circuit court's judgment while upholding the ICA's decision in other respects.

The "enterphone" is a communication device that allows visitors to the Discovery Bay complex to contact residents for entry. A resident can then grant access by buzzing the visitor in. The circuit court issued a partial directed verdict against Ozaki's wrongful death claim, ruling she was ineligible due to her status as not being a surviving spouse or dependent of the deceased, in accordance with HRS 663-3 (1993). HRS 663-10.9 abolishes joint and several liability for joint tortfeasors except in specific cases involving economic damages for injury or death, intentional torts, or certain degrees of negligence. Under HRS 663-11 (1993), joint tortfeasors are defined as individuals jointly or severally liable for the same injury, regardless of recovery status. The circuit court correctly ruled that Discovery Bay and Sataraka are not considered joint tortfeasors since they cannot be jointly liable for the injuries related to Dennis's death. The liability basis and relationship among tortfeasors are irrelevant; what matters is their several liability for the same injury. If the jury had assigned varying degrees of fault, recovery against Discovery Bay could still be possible depending on the apportionment of negligence.