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Hawkins v. Coyle
Citations: 547 F.3d 540; 2008 U.S. App. LEXIS 23714; 2008 WL 4911163Docket: 05-4032, 05-4049
Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit; November 18, 2008; Federal Appellate Court
Shawn L. Hawkins, the petitioner-appellee, was granted a writ of habeas corpus by the district court, which determined that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to conduct a mitigation investigation during sentencing. The warden, Ralph Coyle, appealed this decision, while Hawkins cross-appealed the denial of habeas relief on other grounds. The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, led by Judge Alice M. Batchelder, reversed the district court's grant of relief concerning the ineffective assistance of counsel claim and affirmed the denial of relief on all other asserted grounds. The case's background details the events of June 11-12, 1989, involving a drug deal between Hawkins and two victims, Diamond Marteen and Jerome Thomas. After negotiations at Hawkins' residence, the victims were later found dead in a vehicle, having been shot multiple times. Investigators noted that the crime likely occurred elsewhere, and Hawkins was initially contacted as a potential witness. He acknowledged discussing the drug deal but claimed he never completed it and had not seen the victims after 9:00 p.m. on June 11. Evidence linked Hawkins to the case, including a pager number found on one victim. Forensic experts confirmed two fingerprints belonging to Hawkins inside a Hyundai vehicle linked to a double homicide. One print, a thumbprint in blood on a notebook, indicated contact between a bloody thumb and the notebook. The blood type matched that of both victims. The second fingerprint was located on the right rear door of the vehicle. A juvenile witness, Henry Brown, identified Hawkins as the murderer, stating he witnessed Hawkins kill Richard in the rear seat of the Hyundai on June 12, 1989, while Marteen was already deceased in the front seat. Brown noted Hawkins rummaged through the car and fled the scene, describing the murder weapon as a .25 caliber handgun and recalling Hawkins wore a black muscle shirt. Additional witnesses reported hearing four gunshots in the early morning hours of June 12 and observed a suspicious silver-gray sedan nearby. One witness, Kenneth Boehmler, identified a driver matching Hawkins' description exiting the vehicle. In September 1989, Hawkins was indicted for the aggravated murders of Richard and Marteen, facing multiple charges including prior calculation and design, felony murder, and aggravated robbery, with death penalty specifications attached. Hawkins was tried in December 1989, where he denied the charges and presented a defense. Despite his testimony, the jury convicted him on all counts and recommended death sentences for each murder. The trial court sentenced him accordingly. His convictions and sentences were upheld by both the Ohio First District Court of Appeals and the Ohio Supreme Court, which merged the separate murder convictions into one death sentence per homicide. Subsequent motions for rehearing and writs of certiorari to the U.S. Supreme Court were denied. In 1997, Hawkins filed a habeas corpus petition in the Southern District of Ohio with twenty-seven claims for relief. After an evidentiary hearing, the court denied twenty-six claims but granted relief on one claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel, concluding that his counsel failed to investigate mitigation evidence during the sentencing phase. The State of Ohio is appealing a district court's decision that granted Hawkins a Certificate of Appealability (COA) on five grounds for habeas relief. The specific claims before the court include: 1. Ineffective assistance of trial counsel due to inadequate investigation and preparation during the mitigation phase, violating Hawkins' rights under the Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments. 2. The cumulative impact of misconduct by the State concerning Keith Miree, which prejudiced Hawkins and violated his constitutional rights. 3. Misconduct regarding a bloody fingerprint that infringed on Hawkins' constitutional rights. 4. The prosecutor's failure to disclose material and exculpatory evidence, violating Hawkins' rights. 5. The trial court's refusal to grant a mistrial based on prosecutorial misconduct, infringing on Hawkins' rights. 6. The court's failure to disclose and seal juvenile records of Henry Brown, violating Hawkins' rights to confront, present a defense, due process, and equal protection. The standard of review for the district court's decision on a writ of habeas corpus includes a de novo examination of legal conclusions and a clear error review of factual findings. The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA) applies to Hawkins' petition as it was filed in 1997, limiting federal courts' ability to grant habeas relief on claims previously adjudicated in state courts unless they meet specific criteria related to unreasonable applications of federal law or facts. The statute emphasizes that a state court decision is "contrary" to federal law if it reaches a conclusion opposite to that of the Supreme Court on a legal question or if it makes a different factual determination from a relevant Supreme Court precedent. Additionally, federal habeas courts must deny relief based on legal rules not established at the time of the state conviction's finality. Habeas relief may be granted under the 'unreasonable application' clause if a state court correctly identifies a Supreme Court legal principle but applies it unreasonably to the facts. A federal habeas court cannot issue a writ solely based on its independent judgment that the state court erred in its application of established federal law. The AEDPA standard applies only to claims adjudicated on the merits in state court. If a claim was raised in state court but not reviewed on its merits, AEDPA deference does not apply, and the federal court reviews the issues de novo. In cases where state courts dismiss federal constitutional claims without thorough analysis, a modified AEDPA deference is applied, requiring a careful independent review but limiting reversal to instances where the state court's decision is contrary to or an unreasonable application of federal law. In the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, the State of Ohio appeals the district court's finding that Hawkins's trial counsel was ineffective by failing to investigate mitigating evidence during sentencing. However, because Hawkins could not demonstrate prejudice from this lack of investigation, the district court's judgment is reversed. Hawkins's ineffective assistance claim was first raised on direct review but denied by the Supreme Court of Ohio on procedural and substantive grounds. He did not raise these arguments in the court of appeals, resulting in a waiver of the claims. Even if considered on the merits, Hawkins failed to meet the standard for ineffective assistance established in Strickland v. Washington. Consequently, his claims are rejected. The court will treat the state court judgment as an "adjudication on the merits" under AEDPA § 2254(d) since the merits were addressed, and there was no argument of procedural default by the State. Despite the state court's brief reasoning, a modified AEDPA deference will be applied, allowing for an independent review of the record and applicable law. Relief will only be granted if the Ohio courts' denial of Hawkins's claim was contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. The Supreme Court's pending decision in Bell v. Kelly, concerning AEDPA deference when new evidence is introduced at a federal hearing, is relevant but does not alter the outcome of Hawkins's case, which would remain the same under de novo review. Hawkins alleges his constitutional rights were violated due to trial counsel's inadequate investigation and preparation for the mitigation phase. To prove ineffective assistance, he must demonstrate that his counsel's performance was deficient and that this deficiency prejudiced the defense, rendering the trial unfair. The standard for deficient performance requires showing that counsel's actions fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. The Supreme Court has established that strategic choices made after thorough investigation are nearly unassailable, while those made after less complete investigation are reasonable only if supported by professional judgment. Counsel must conduct reasonable investigations or make decisions justifying the lack of investigation, and any decision not to investigate must be assessed for reasonableness, granting considerable deference to counsel's judgments. A complete failure to investigate mitigating evidence by counsel is generally viewed as unreasonable in this circuit, as established in Carter v. Bell; however, if a counsel's decision not to investigate is reasonable under the circumstances, it may not be considered deficient per Wiggins. In evaluating Hawkins's trial counsel's performance under the first prong of Strickland, it is essential to determine whether the counsel's decision to forgo mitigation investigation was reasonable. Hawkins's counsel testified that they did not believe it was a mitigation case, opting instead for a strategy of residual doubt, which was supported by both the Ohio and U.S. Supreme Courts at the time. While there is a possibility that Hawkins's counsel may have acted unreasonably by dismissing the need for mitigation without knowing what evidence might exist, the claim fails under the second prong of Strickland. To succeed in this prong, Hawkins must demonstrate that his counsel's alleged deficiencies resulted in an unfair trial and an unreliable verdict, specifically showing a reasonable probability that the outcome would have been different absent these errors. Numerous cases highlight situations where failure to investigate mitigating evidence led to prejudice against capital defendants, emphasizing the importance of thorough investigation in such cases. Petitioner Hawkins presents a case for establishing prejudice based on familial circumstances. Several cases are cited where investigations revealed significant childhood trauma, including abuse, neglect, and exposure to violence, which could have influenced the outcomes of those cases. In contrast, Hawkins’ situation, while involving a history of his biologically alcoholic father and parental discord, lacks evidence of physical or sexual abuse directed at him. Affidavits from nine family members indicate that Hawkins experienced favoritism issues, depression following his sister's death, and suicidal attempts, yet these do not equate to the severe mitigating factors seen in other cited cases. Despite the familial challenges, courts in prior cases have determined that without substantial evidence of a difficult upbringing or mental disorders, claims of prejudice do not hold. Hawkins, who declined a plea deal for a crime he maintains he did not commit, seeks to draw from these affidavits to bolster his argument for mitigation, yet faces the hurdle of demonstrating the significance of his background in light of judicial precedents. The district court found sufficient evidence of prejudice in Hawkins's case based on his troubled upbringing, suggesting that at least one juror might view him as less morally culpable due to his background marked by depression and suicide attempts. However, the appellate review determined that the district court erred in its conclusion. The affidavits presented described a less traumatic childhood than those in previous cases where failure to investigate led to a finding of prejudice. Despite the mention of suicide attempts, no evidence of physical or sexual abuse was provided, and the only incident of violence mentioned involved Hawkins's mother. Comparisons were made to other cases where defendants suffered significant mental health issues, which were absent in Hawkins's situation. The appellate court concluded that the affidavits did not sufficiently demonstrate prejudice as per Strickland standards, affirming the Ohio courts' denial of Hawkins's ineffective assistance claim. In addressing Hawkins's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the court noted that he alleged violations of multiple constitutional rights, including the withholding of witness information and the presentation of perjured testimony. The courts that reviewed these claims, including state and district courts, found them to lack merit. Specifically, the third claim concerning a jailhouse confession to inmate Keith Miree was examined. Although the State did not call Miree as a witness due to credibility issues—highlighted by his attempt to extort Hawkins's father—it did cross-examine Hawkins about the alleged confession. Hawkins consistently denied making incriminating statements to Miree. Ultimately, the court instructed the jury to disregard the questioning regarding Miree, concluding that the prosecutorial actions did not violate Hawkins's rights. The court instructed jurors to disregard two questions posed by the prosecutor regarding an alleged conversation between Mr. Hawkins and Keith Miree, as well as Hawkins's responses to those questions. Hawkins contended that the prosecution's reference to an alleged confession during cross-examination violated his constitutional rights and improperly used Miree to elicit this confession. In his Eleventh Claim for Relief, Hawkins cited various instances of prosecutorial misconduct, asserting that their cumulative effect warranted a mistrial. Specific allegations included the State withholding witness names that could have supported an alibi for Henry Brown, misplacing files related to Brown, and the prosecutor suggesting that Hawkins had confessed to Miree despite not intending to call Miree as a witness. Additional claims involved the prosecutor disparaging defense witnesses' credibility, allowing false testimony regarding a gun, misrepresenting identification testimony, and commenting on the defense's failure to present an expert witness. The analysis emphasized that the key question in evaluating prosecutorial misconduct is whether the actions compromised the trial's fairness, referencing Slagle v. Bagley and Darden v. Wainwright. The Supreme Court of Ohio found no significant issues with the trial's fairness or the trial court's findings, asserting that the alleged misconduct did not justify a mistrial. To assess the reasonableness of the Ohio court's decision, a two-part test was employed: first, determining if the prosecution's conduct was improper, and second, evaluating four factors to ascertain the severity of the misconduct. The factors included the strength of the evidence against Hawkins, whether the prosecution misled the jury, the extent of the misconduct, and whether it was deliberate or accidental. The conclusion was that the Ohio courts acted reasonably in denying Hawkins's mistrial request, consistent with established federal law. Hawkins's claims regarding violations of his Confrontation Clause rights due to cross-examination about his alleged confession to Miree were deemed harmless errors. The trial judge promptly instructed the jury to disregard the related questions, mitigating any potential impact. The jury had no corroborating evidence of such a confession, and the overall evidence of Hawkins's guilt was strong. The district court also found that Hawkins did not establish a violation of his Sixth Amendment right to counsel, as he failed to show Miree acted as an agent for the State beyond mere listening. Additionally, Hawkins's Eleventh Claim, alleging prosecutorial misconduct, was rejected. The state courts reasonably determined that potential witnesses Hawkins mentioned would not have significantly undermined Henry Brown's testimony or the forensic evidence against him. Hawkins's assertion that the prosecution's labeling of a witness's testimony as "ridiculous" warranted a mistrial was also dismissed, as the trial court acted to prevent any prejudice. Furthermore, claims regarding the mischaracterization of Kenneth Boehmler's testimony were unfounded; the prosecutor's remarks during closing arguments were deemed acceptable, and the trial court reminded the jury that such arguments do not constitute evidence. Overall, the Ohio courts' decisions on these matters were not found to be objectively unreasonable. Hawkins's assertion that the prosecutor suggested he had a duty to call an expert to counter the State's fingerprint evidence was deemed meritless by the district court. The Ohio courts confirmed that the trial court adequately addressed the prosecutor's insinuation through isolated statements and a curative instruction, reinforcing the presumption of innocence and appropriate burdens in criminal cases, thus ruling out any constitutional error. Furthermore, Hawkins's Eleventh Claim alleged that the State suborned perjury by allowing Shawn Brown to testify about seeing Hawkins with a gun that matched a gun box found in his home. Hawkins contended this was misleading because the police had seized the related gun before Brown's testimony. However, the trial clarified that the gun box was not connected to the murder weapon but was introduced to indicate Hawkins's "weapon of choice." The Supreme Court of Ohio found Hawkins’s claim unsupported by the record, and the review confirmed that this determination was not unreasonable given the evidence. Following an examination of Hawkins's claims of prosecutorial misconduct, the district court concluded these claims were meritless and did not result in an unreasonable application of federal law or facts. Additionally, Claims Four and Seven of Hawkins's habeas petition alleged violations of Brady v. Maryland, asserting the prosecution withheld material exculpatory evidence. Courts addressing these claims found them unpersuasive. In Claim Four, Hawkins argued the prosecution failed to disclose that another agency could not lift a blood print, that there was a break in the print's chain of custody, and other issues affecting the print's reliability. In Claim Seven, he claimed further undisclosed exculpatory evidence, with the district court only granting a Certificate of Appealability on two specific aspects of this argument. Henry Brown confessed to involvement in the killings and was fingerprinted and photographed shortly before his arrest. An assault charge against him was dropped at the State's request. Brown's inconsistent accounts placed him with Tommicka Washington during the time of the murders, but Washington contradicted this. Additionally, Brown's sister, Shawn, provided conflicting testimony about the timing of gunshots she claimed to have heard. The district court also granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) regarding claims that the prosecution withheld evidence, specifically that the police, not Hawkins, possessed the murder weapon, misleading the jury about the connection between Hawkins's gun box and the crime. The Supreme Court's ruling in Brady v. Maryland establishes that suppressed evidence favorable to the accused violates due process if it is material to guilt or punishment, regardless of the prosecution's intent. Evidence is deemed material if its disclosure could have altered the trial's outcome. The duty to disclose includes both impeachment and exculpatory evidence, even if not requested by the defense and regardless of whether known only to police. The district court noted Hawkins did not present his Fourth Claim in Ohio courts, leading to procedural default or failure to exhaust, but both the magistrate and district court denied the claim based on its merits. The State of Ohio did not contest these procedural points on appeal, focusing instead on the merits, which the court found lacking. The district court's conclusion that there was no break in the chain of custody was upheld as not clearly erroneous. The crime scene investigator's testimony during the habeas proceeding included additional techniques for developing fingerprints that were not disclosed during the trial; however, this omission did not amount to a Brady violation since it did not undermine the trial testimony linking the fingerprints to the suspect. Despite discrepancies in the State's records on the number of identifiable points on the prints, all records confirmed sufficient points for an accurate match, rendering the discrepancies immaterial. Regarding Hawkins's Seventh Claim for habeas relief, the district court found no Brady violation, as Hawkins failed to show that statements from Henry Brown contained exculpatory information. Although Brown's file was missing, Hawkins did not prove that the State acted in bad faith in failing to preserve it, as required by due process standards established in Arizona v. Youngblood. Additionally, the court noted that Brown's credibility was thoroughly challenged during cross-examination and that the withheld statements were cumulative, thus not materially impactful. Concerning the testimony about the gun box, the district court ruled that Hawkins had prior knowledge of the police seizing a .25 caliber gun associated with the gun box months before the murders, confirming that the State had not suppressed evidence or violated Hawkins's constitutional rights in this regard. In Hawkins's Twenty-Seventh Claim for Relief, he contended that he was denied access to Henry Brown's juvenile records for impeachment purposes. After an in camera review, the trial court determined the information was either already known to defense counsel or would not assist Hawkins, leading to the refusal to release the records. Hawkins argued this denial infringed his rights to confrontation, due process, equal protection, and effective counsel. The district court agreed with the conclusion that there was no violation of Hawkins's Confrontation Clause rights. The district court determined that the undisclosed juvenile records of Henry Brown did not contain any new or material information relevant to Hawkins's case. Key information presented to Hawkins's jury included Brown's prior charges related to the murders, his police custody during the trial, the immunity deal he received for his testimony, his inconsistent statements about the murders, and his drug involvement. The court found that the nondisclosure of Brown's juvenile records did not infringe upon Hawkins's constitutional rights. Hawkins's due process and equal protection claims were deemed weak, as he failed to substantiate these arguments throughout the litigation. Notably, Hawkins did not raise any constitutional claims regarding Brown's juvenile records in the state trial court, and his counsel acknowledged that the request for those records was merely exploratory. Although Hawkins made a nominal due process argument on appeal to the Supreme Court of Ohio, he did not provide legal support for it, leading the court to deny the claim. Additionally, there was no evidence of Hawkins ever presenting an equal protection argument to the Ohio courts. On appeal, Hawkins failed to articulate how his rights were violated or to cite relevant case law. Consequently, the court found no merit in Hawkins's claims, reversing the district court's grant of habeas corpus for his Second Ground for Relief while affirming the denial of habeas relief on all other grounds. The court noted that the decision in Wiggins, which occurred after Hawkins's conviction, did not establish new law but merely applied the existing Strickland standard.