Tobias v. South Jordan City Recorder

Citations: 972 P.2d 373; 342 Utah Adv. Rep. 47; 1998 Utah LEXIS 25; 1998 WL 237648Docket: 980092

Court: Utah Supreme Court; May 5, 1998; Utah; State Supreme Court

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Petitioners Janalee S. Tobias, Judy A. Feld, and Brent Foutz sought extraordinary relief from the Utah Supreme Court to compel the South Jordan City Recorder to accept their application for copies of a referendum petition concerning ordinance 97-20, which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 1997. This ordinance extended the timeline for a developer to meet conditions related to a previous ordinance that changed the zoning of certain land from agricultural to office service. The petitioners argue that the land should remain undeveloped for recreational and wildlife purposes. 

On January 20, 1998, the petitioners applied to the City Recorder for copies of the referendum petition to gather signatures for placing ordinance 97-20 on the ballot. Their application was denied on multiple grounds, including a claim of untimeliness. The court focused solely on the timeliness issue, referencing Article W, section 1(2) of the Utah Constitution, which allows for local laws to be submitted to voters for approval. 

Utah Code Ann. 20A-7-601 to -612 outlines the process for local referenda, requiring sponsors to file an application with the local clerk, who must provide copies of the petition and signature sheets. Although the statutes do not specify a time limit for filing the application, section 20A-7-601(2)(a) mandates that the referendum petition itself must be filed within thirty-five days following the passage of the ordinance. The petitioners contended that only the application needed to be filed within this timeframe, but the court concluded that the statute explicitly requires the timely filing of the referendum petition as well, rejecting the petitioners' argument that "referendum petition" was synonymous with "referendum application."

Section 20A-7-602 establishes that a referendum petition and its application are distinct documents, requiring petitioners to file an application with the local clerk. The court clarifies that the petition is considered filed when it is submitted to the local clerk, who can then process any requests to remove signatures before sending it to the county clerk for verification of registered voters. Petitioners must gather signatures within thirty-five days post-ordinance passage, and the application for the petition must also be submitted within this timeframe. The current statutory timeline is deemed more flexible compared to previous requirements highlighted in Riverton Citizens for Constitutional Government v. Beckstead, which necessitated both signature collection and name verification within a thirty-day window. Although petitioners argue that the urgency to complete the referendum process has lessened since the ordinance remains effective until repealed by voters, the court maintains that such legislative concerns are not within its purview to alter. The timeline for local referenda aligns closely with statewide referendum statutes that also impose prompt action on sponsors. Although petitioners filed their application on time, they failed to submit the completed petitions on the same day. Consequently, their petition for extraordinary relief is denied, and the court does not comment on additional legal arguments regarding the nature of ordinance 97-20. The decision is concurred by Associate Chief Justice Durham and Justices Stewart and Russon.

Justice Zimmerman concurs with Chief Justice Howe's opinion but emphasizes that the city council's action—extending the deadline for compliance with zoning conditions—should be challengeable by referendum. The original ordinance allowed zoning changes contingent upon certain conditions, and if these conditions were not met by the specified date, the zoning would revert. The extension effectively alters the zoning status, mirroring the original ordinance's impact. If the original ordinance was subject to referendum, the extension should be as well; otherwise, municipalities could circumvent referendum processes through successive ordinances with staggered expiration dates.

Additionally, Zimmerman addresses the authority of a city recorder in issuing referendum petitions. He argues that the statute mandates the clerk to provide the petition copies without independent assessment of its suitability for a referendum. The recorder's consultation with the city attorney and subsequent delay in issuing the petition are deemed inappropriate. Such delays could hinder the already challenging referendum process. Finally, although no other justices joined this opinion, the majority's decision to leave these issues unresolved signals their significance for future cases.