Orcutt v. Tucson Warehouse & Transfer Company

Citations: 318 P.2d 671; 83 Ariz. 200; 1957 Ariz. LEXIS 173Docket: 6326

Court: Arizona Supreme Court; November 26, 1957; Arizona; State Supreme Court

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Appellants Brent G. Orcutt and Ethel B. Orcutt, owners of a home near Tucson, Arizona, stored valuable personal belongings with Tucson Warehouse Transfer Company in Spring 1952. Upon their return in December, they requested the delivery of their stored items. During transit on December 8, 1952, the property caught fire, resulting in nearly total loss. The appellants sued for damages, recovering $3,492.50 for personal effects and an additional $735.90 based on a valuation of 30 cents per pound for household goods. However, the trial court denied recovery for certain items deemed to have "extraordinary value." 

The appeal challenges the trial court's valuation method for household goods and the denial of extraordinary value claims. The court ruled that the case falls under common carrier law, determining that no formal contract was necessary for transportation, and that the carrier assumed a high degree of liability. Common carriers in Arizona are considered insurers of goods unless specific exceptions apply, none of which were relevant here. The ruling emphasized that the carrier's liability for lost goods is based on market value, and any limitations on liability must be clearly stated and made known to the shipper.

Appellee holds a certificate of convenience and necessity as a common motor carrier for transporting property, specifically classified for freight and baggage in Tucson and household goods across Arizona. Effective September 15, 1951, Local Freight Tariff No. 2-D was established, encompassing 42 pages and applicable to six common motor carriers, including appellee. Within this tariff, classifications deviate from those in the certificate, focusing on three categories—only category 3, "Commodity Rates," is relevant. 

This category has two sections: the first (Items 600-630) pertains to Household Goods, defined broadly to include personal effects, furniture, and specialized items requiring careful handling. Charges are based on weight and distance in cents per hundred pounds, aligning with classification 2 of the certificate. The second section (Items 780-810) outlines "Hourly Rates for Special Service," where rates depend on the equipment and labor used rather than weight or distance. 

Item 780 includes a limitation of the carrier's liability to a declared value of 10 cents per pound per article for household goods. Conversely, Item 600 allows for a release valuation of 30 cents per pound, with options for higher valuations at increased rates. Item 620 states that the carrier is not liable for items of extraordinary value unless a special agreement exists. Appellants argue that the 10 cents per pound limitation in Item 780 is void due to the absence of an alternative rate to increase liability to the full value of shipments, contending they should recover full loss under common law liability. The trial court ruled that appellants were estopped from denying the availability of an alternative rate for full liability due to their awareness of the tariff conditions in Items 600 and 620, a decision deemed erroneous.

Appellee's liability is determined by the actual contract of carriage rather than any alternative methods available to appellants. The trial court improperly applied conditions not part of the original contract, effectively creating a new contract by estoppel, which is not permissible. Estoppel can protect rights but cannot create them or form contracts. The shipment in question was a mixed shipment, but under appellee's certificate, it could only be transported as "Freight and baggage" and not as "Household Goods." Consequently, transportation charges could only be based on Tariff Item 780, which allowed for an hourly rate of $4.50 plus $2.25 for a helper, despite the Bill of Lading specifying a rate of $6.75. Evidence shows that the shipment was indeed charged according to Item 780, confirming that this item governed the contract's terms. The trial court's conclusion that the defendant's liability for personal effects was unlimited was incorrect, as Item 780 stipulates a limited liability of 10 cents per pound per article and does not offer an alternative rate for increased liability.

The appellee's argument regarding the validity of the 10 cents per pound per article stipulation is disregarded due to the absence of a cross appeal or cross assignments of error. Established precedent dictates that an appellee's claims of lower court error cannot be considered without these procedural steps. The trial court incorrectly applied the stipulations of Items 780 and 790, as the 10 cents per pound stipulation is deemed void. Consequently, the court should have awarded the appellants the total value of the shipped articles as of the delivery date. Limitations on liability for specific valuations do not apply, and the appellee’s contention regarding insufficient testimony for valuing personal effects is also not considered without a cross appeal. The judgment is reversed, directing the trial court to grant the appellants $3,492.50 for personal effects, along with the full value of household goods and other destroyed articles. The trial court may take further testimony if necessary to determine precise valuations. The judgment is reversed with directions.