Neil v. Espinoza

Citations: 747 P.2d 1257; 1987 Colo. LEXIS 669; 1987 WL 2599Docket: 85SC425

Court: Supreme Court of Colorado; December 14, 1987; Colorado; State Supreme Court

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David Neil, a Denver police officer, fatally shot Arthur Espinoza on July 31, 1977. Espinoza's six children subsequently filed a lawsuit against Neil under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that their father's death deprived them of their Fourteenth Amendment rights concerning familial association without due process. After a jury trial in March 1985, the jury awarded each plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages. Neil appealed, citing three main errors: the requirement for plaintiffs to prove not just that he killed Espinoza knowingly, but also with intent to deprive the plaintiffs of their rights; the entry of judgment based on a non-unanimous jury verdict; and the failure to declare a mistrial due to a juror's nondisclosure during voir dire. The court agreed with Neil's second argument, vacated the judgment, and remanded the case for a new trial. During jury polling, one juror revealed that the decision on compensatory damages was made by majority vote, which led the court to conclude that no unanimous verdict had been reached and to discharge the jury, ultimately granting a new trial.

The court established a briefing schedule for post-trial motions but entered a judgment against the defendant and awarded each plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory and $5,000 in punitive damages before any briefs were submitted. Plaintiffs supported the judgment with an affidavit from juror Rector, who expressed discomfort with the majority verdict, suggesting that the compensatory damages should have been higher. The defendant objected to the judgment and sought to strike Rector's affidavit. During oral arguments on post-trial motions, the court denied the defendant's requests, reasoning that the signed verdict by all six jurors necessitated the judgment. The court acknowledged that although Rector indicated he favored a higher award, it believed this did not prejudice the defendant.

Subsequently, the court denied the motion to strike Rector's affidavit, stating it did not violate rules against probing juror deliberations, as it merely clarified his statements during jury polling. However, the court's entry of judgment was deemed improper under procedural rules, which require a new trial if a jury is discharged without a unanimous verdict. The court's choice to discharge the jury instead of seeking further deliberation led to a faulty judgment since it ignored Rector's indication of a non-unanimous verdict during polling. The ruling emphasized that allowing the court to disregard polling results undermines the necessity of ensuring unanimous verdicts. Additionally, the court erred by not striking Rector's affidavit, as established by CRE 606(b), which limits juror testimony to challenge a verdict under specific circumstances.

A juror cannot testify about statements made or thoughts held during jury deliberations when questioning the validity of a verdict or indictment, except regarding extraneous prejudicial information or outside influences affecting jurors. Affidavits or evidence from jurors regarding their deliberative mental processes are also inadmissible for such inquiries. This principle aims to protect jury integrity and prevent harassment or coercion post-verdict, thereby maintaining the finality of verdicts. Previous cases have established that jurors cannot impeach a verdict based on misunderstandings of instructions or beliefs about attorney fees influencing damage awards. However, juror coercion into a verdict can be considered, and affidavits may be admissible in cases of misconduct and external influence but not for revealing jurors' mental processes. 

In a specific case, a juror's affidavit indicating dissent from a damage award due to perceived inadequacy was ruled inadmissible. The court concluded that the defendant suffered no prejudice from a non-unanimous verdict, as the dissenting juror would have only awarded higher damages. The court's actions in polling the jury and discharging them were tantamount to declaring a mistrial, nullifying the need to establish a unanimous verdict on damages. Consequently, the plaintiffs' argument regarding the jury's liability is constrained by the inadmissibility of the juror's affidavit.

Rector's responses to the court indicate a potential disagreement with the jury's awarding of any actual damages, not just the amount. Without clear evidence of unanimous juror agreement on the defendant's liability, the court cannot affirm the ruling. Consequently, the judgment is vacated, and the case is remanded for a new trial on all issues. Justice Mullarkey concurs in part, agreeing to a new trial on damages but dissenting regarding the need for a retrial on liability, asserting that the jurors unanimously found defendant David Neil liable under 42 U.S.C. section 1983, with disagreements only concerning the damages amount. 

The jury's verdict form was structured into three sections: Neil's liability, the City and County of Denver's liability, and the damages awarded to the plaintiffs. The first section reflects unanimous findings of liability against David Neil for all six plaintiffs, while the second section was left blank due to a lack of agreement on the city's liability. The damages section revealed initial confusion, with a question mark for actual damages and a proposed $5,000 in punitive damages for each plaintiff. After the judge's instruction for specific compensatory amounts, the jury revised their verdict to award $150,000 in actual damages and maintained the $5,000 in punitive damages for each plaintiff. However, during polling, juror Rector expressed uncertainty about the unanimity of the actual damages decision, leading the judge to conclude that unanimity had not been achieved.

After the jury was discharged, the trial judge noted that one juror indicated the compensatory damages amount of $150,000 was not decided unanimously, prompting the court to consider a mistrial or new trial. Four days later, without receiving relevant motions or affidavits, the court issued a nunc pro tunc judgment, affirming a unanimous verdict against David Neil but clarifying the damages were determined by majority vote. The court awarded each plaintiff $150,000 in compensatory damages and $5,000 in punitive damages, later confirming this judgment after reviewing post-trial briefs.

According to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 59, a new trial may be granted on all or part of the issues. If liability and damages are distinct, a new trial typically addresses only damages, as seen in past cases. A new trial on all issues is warranted only if a verdict is influenced by bias, prejudice, or passion. In this case, the liability verdict was not questioned, showing the issues were separate. The majority opinion called for a new trial on all issues based on a juror's statement regarding damages, despite no evidence of bias affecting the liability decision. The record indicates unanimous liability, suggesting that the trial court's judgment on liability should be upheld. The omission of formally recording the jury's verdict prior to discharge was deemed a harmless error, as the jury's intent was clear from the record.

Rector's statement during polling does not justify vacating the trial court's judgment on liability. The defendant seeks to modify a previous decision in Espinoza v. O'Dell, arguing that recent Tenth Circuit precedent, Trujillo v. Board of County Comm'rs, requires an allegation of intent to interfere with a protected relationship under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, Espinoza already acknowledged a claim for the deprivation of constitutional liberty in a family relationship, rendering the defendant's argument meritless. Several jurisdictions have criticized Trujillo's intent requirement, with some courts in the Tenth Circuit suggesting that recklessness or deliberate indifference could suffice. The Supreme Court has not defined the necessary conduct or intent for claiming a deprivation of a family relationship interest, and the Trujillo standard represents a minority view. The court concludes that Espinoza aligns with the majority federal rule and, under the law of the case doctrine, there is no compelling reason to reconsider or modify the decision in Espinoza.

A juror's alleged lack of candor during voir dire does not necessitate vacating a jury's verdict unless there is evidence of deliberate misrepresentation or concealment of relevant facts. In this case, the defendant claimed juror Rector failed to disclose prior jail detention and an FBI investigation linked to a communist newspaper subscription. An evidentiary hearing determined that Rector answered all voir dire questions truthfully and did not conceal material facts. The trial court's findings, supported by competent evidence, concluded that no new trial was warranted on these grounds. Although the court affirmed the decision on liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, it agreed to remand for a new trial specifically on damages. There was a concern that requiring a new trial on liability would unjustly extend litigation, as the defendant had already undergone a fair trial resulting in a unanimous verdict against him. The concurrence and dissent noted that the appeal involved only Officer Neil after other defendants were dismissed or resulted in a mistrial.

The court refuses to address the first and third questions because the second issue is decisive. The defendant seeks to overrule Espinoza v. O'Dell and adopt the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Trujillo v. Board of County Commissioners. Trujillo requires that relatives in a section 1983 action must show the defendant not only caused the death but did so with the intent to infringe on their constitutional rights to familial association. The defendant did not object to the jury instructions at trial, and the legal principle he now advocates was not included in the instructions he proposed. This issue was only raised in a supplemental post-trial brief, and the plaintiffs did not respond. The trial court adhered to Espinoza, disregarding the Tenth Circuit's ruling. Since the defendant failed to preserve the objection to the jury instructions, the court views any opinion on Trujillo as advisory and declines to consider the first argument. Additionally, the majority agrees that a post-trial affidavit from Rector is inadmissible for assessing trial court error, relying solely on trial statements and the verdict form. The defendant briefly raised an argument during a March 1985 hearing, claiming the plaintiffs failed to prove their case, but did not cite Trujillo at that time. The trial court dismissed this argument based on Espinoza. Although the issue was raised in a post-trial brief and rejected by the trial court, it has been sufficiently briefed for review, and the plaintiffs have not contested its preservation. The dissenting opinion believes the issue should be decided.