Jiminez v. All American Rathskeller, Inc.

Citations: 503 F.3d 247; 2007 U.S. App. LEXIS 22517; 2007 WL 2743431Docket: 06-3670

Court: Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit; September 21, 2007; Federal Appellate Court

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Salvador Peter Serrano, a Pennsylvania State University student, died on October 26, 2003, following an incident involving security personnel at the Rathskeller bar in State College. Serrano was with Brooke Morgan, Timothy Padalino, and Alison Bresnahan when Padalino stopped to urinate in a parking lot. An altercation ensued when an unidentified Rathskeller employee allegedly confronted Padalino. Rathskeller security personnel, including Jason and Chris Rosengrant, intervened, with Chris reportedly pulling Serrano to the ground and Jason restraining him. Police Officer Winkelbach arrived and began to handcuff Serrano, who was later found unresponsive and pronounced dead due to asphyxia. 

The cause of death is disputed: the plaintiffs’ expert, Dr. Michael Baden, attributed it to positional asphyxia due to the Rosengrants' weight, while the defendants’ expert, Dr. Gordon Carl Handte, attributed it to accidental asphyxia from vomit aspiration, noting significant alcohol intoxication. Grace Jiminez, as administratrix of Serrano's estate, and Morgan filed complaints in federal court on August 25, 2004, with subsequent amendments, claiming wrongful death and injuries sustained by Morgan during the incident.

On September 27, 2005, the District Court dismissed claims against Bluebird Entertainment Enterprise. Subsequently, on May 2, 2006, the court approved a settlement motion from the Plaintiffs, dismissing claims against Phyllis H. Gentzel and Associated Property Management. On June 2, 2006, the court granted summary judgment favoring the Borough of State College, State College, and the SCPD, dismissing all claims against them. A further settlement approval occurred on July 21, 2006, dismissing claims against remaining defendants. The Plaintiffs appealed in a timely manner. 

The District Court had federal question jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 due to claims made under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Appellate jurisdiction is established under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, with de novo review applied to the summary judgment. The Plaintiffs' claims are based on municipal liability under Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, which stipulates that a municipality is only liable if a government's policy or custom, executed by policymakers, directly causes constitutional injuries. 

For municipal liability to be established, there must be a direct causal link between the municipal policy and the alleged constitutional deprivation. Various scenarios can render a municipality liable, including when a policy is clearly established, when a policymaker violates federal law, or when a policymaker is deliberately indifferent to the need for action to prevent constitutional violations. Plaintiffs can demonstrate a government policy through an official statement from a decisionmaker with authority or by showing a longstanding custom that operates as law, with the burden of proof lying with the Plaintiffs to show policymakers' responsibility through action or acquiescence. Liability requires at least deliberate indifference from the governmental entity regarding constitutional deprivations.

The Plaintiffs' second amended complaint claims that the State College Police Department (SCPD) established a custom or policy allowing employees of local liquor licensees, like the Rathskeller, to detain individuals suspected of legal violations until police arrival. They argue that this constituted an unofficial "auxiliary police-force," as liquor licensee staff would handcuff individuals without SCPD taking action against them. The complaint asserts this conduct was aligned with SCPD policy or had become accepted practice.

However, the District Court found no credible evidence supporting the claim that the SCPD directed liquor licensee employees to detain individuals. Testimonies indicated that liquor licensee employees, including Rathskeller's owner Duke Gastiger, claimed to only restrain individuals for defensive reasons and denied preventing anyone from leaving for police investigation. Gastiger stated he set this policy independently and had not collaborated with SCPD on it. 

Additional testimony from Rathskeller staff and SCPD officers, including Chief Thomas King, confirmed the absence of a written policy or any formal instructions from the SCPD regarding detentions; they only advised on confiscating false identification without detaining individuals. The only contradictory evidence came from Gastiger's later affidavit, which claimed that police had requested assistance in detaining people, but the District Court deemed this affidavit incompetent due to its conflict with his earlier deposition statements.

Federal courts handle contradictory affidavits in summary judgment under the "sham affidavit doctrine," which prevents a party from creating a material issue of fact by submitting an affidavit that contradicts their own prior sworn testimony without a plausible explanation. This principle, established in Baer v. Chase and rooted in earlier cases such as Perma Research Development Co. v. Singer Co., reflects the courts' commitment to maintaining the integrity of the summary judgment process. While the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not explicitly address contradictory affidavits, Rule 56 allows for their consideration and empowers courts to scrutinize them. The current rule indicates that if any affidavit is deemed to be presented in bad faith or solely to delay proceedings, the court may impose sanctions. Despite the lack of explicit guidance in the Rules, the sham affidavit doctrine has been adopted across all federal appellate courts, reinforcing the precedent that contradictory statements from depositions and subsequent affidavits cannot raise genuine issues of material fact, as highlighted in the Perma Research case, where a party's conflicting statements undermined the validity of their claims.

The sham affidavit doctrine remains vital in summary judgment practice, despite critiques from some state courts and commentators. The Supreme Court, in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, clarified that mere existence of minimal evidence is insufficient for a plaintiff to prevail; there must be substantial evidence for a reasonable jury to find in the plaintiff's favor. Some courts incorrectly equate the sham affidavit doctrine with credibility determinations or evidence weighing, which are not permissible at the summary judgment stage. Instead, the role of the trial judge is to identify whether genuine factual issues exist that necessitate a trial.

A sham affidavit is defined as one that contradicts prior deposition testimony or appears solely to defeat summary judgment, lacking the reliability necessary to raise a genuine issue of fact. The Liberty Lobby decision emphasizes that trial judges may disregard contradictory affidavits, as prior depositions are deemed more reliable due to their adversarial nature, allowing for direct cross-examination. Affidavits are often drafted by attorneys, potentially compromising their credibility compared to depositions. The critique extends to attempts to amend deposition testimony with subsequent affidavits, reinforcing the preference for the reliability of depositions over affidavits in litigation.

Federal courts exhibit varying approaches to the sham affidavit doctrine. A strict interpretation holds that any affidavit contradicting prior deposition testimony should be disregarded, as seen in Buckner v. Sam's Club, Inc. This doctrine addresses concerns that a party may later assert recollections that contradict earlier admissions, potentially undermining the integrity of the judicial process. In Adams v. Greenwood and Jones v. General Motors Corp., courts reinforced that affidavits contradicting prior depositions do not create genuine issues of material fact to defeat summary judgment.

Conversely, some courts, including the Third Circuit, adopt a more flexible stance. In Baer v. Chase, it was noted that not all contradictory affidavits are shams if independent evidence supports the affidavit. Courts may overlook contradictions if the affiant provides a satisfactory explanation or if corroborating evidence suggests the affiant was mistaken or confused during earlier testimony.

In the case involving Duke Gastiger, the owner of the Rathskeller, his deposition indicated no connection between the bar's restraint policy and police operations. However, his later affidavit claimed that SCPD officers instructed Rathskeller employees to detain individuals, which the District Court found unsupported by the record and contrary to the testimonies of deposed SCPD officers. The court highlighted the lack of specificity regarding the employees and officers involved in these alleged interactions, questioning the affidavit's credibility. Additionally, it noted that Gastiger's interests conflicted with those of the SCPD, as a ruling favoring the SCPD would increase liability for the Rathskeller. Ultimately, the District Court determined that Gastiger provided no explanation for the contradictions, justifying the disregard of his affidavit in relation to the summary judgment motion.

No reasonable factfinder could determine that a policymaker from the State College Police Department (SCPD) established a policy or condoned a custom of delegating law enforcement duties to liquor licensee staff, leading to the dismissal of the Plaintiffs' municipal liability claim under Monell. The Plaintiffs also alleged liability for the Borough of State College under the state-created danger theory. However, the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee a right to governmental aid or protection, with only two exceptions: "special relationship" and "state-created danger." The "state-created danger" exception, as derived from DeShaney v. Winnebago, stipulates that a state must not have contributed to the danger faced by the plaintiff. The court outlined four necessary elements for a state-created danger claim in Bright v. Westmoreland County: 1) foreseeable and direct harm; 2) state actor's culpability that shocks the conscience; 3) a relationship making the plaintiff a foreseeable victim of the state’s actions; and 4) an affirmative act by a state actor that created or heightened the danger. The Plaintiffs referenced a dissenting opinion in Bright, arguing that no affirmative act is necessary for liability and suggested that the SCPD's inaction constituted an affirmative act. However, they failed to provide evidence that an SCPD policymaker established a policy regarding delegation of power to liquor licensees. While evidence showed SCPD officers handcuffing individuals during confrontations without acting against bar employees, it remained doubtful this conduct could meet the causation or mens rea requirements for a state-created danger claim.

The District Court's dismissal of the Plaintiffs' state-created danger claims was affirmed on summary judgment grounds. Under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine material facts in dispute, allowing the moving party to prevail as a matter of law. The court referenced relevant case law, including Wolski v. Wilson and Webster v. Sill, to support its position. Additionally, a discussion on the sham affidavit doctrine highlighted that the district court has discretion in credibility determinations. Specifically, Gastiger's affidavit submitted by the Plaintiffs was deemed insufficient for establishing that any SCPD official with policymaking authority had implemented a policy or custom supporting the detainment of individuals by liquor licensee personnel until police arrival. The court emphasized the importance of identifying officials with final policymaking authority in cases involving alleged constitutional violations.