Georgia Farm Buildings, Inc. v. Willard

Citations: 317 S.E.2d 229; 170 Ga. App. 327; 1984 Ga. App. LEXIS 1888Docket: 67775, 67776, 67777

Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 1, 1984; Georgia; State Appellate Court

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Georgia Farm Buildings, Inc. appeals a default judgment of $131,000 entered against it for damages caused by construction-related runoff. The lawsuit was initiated by the appellees on August 19, 1980, with service on the company’s general manager, Jim Beck, completed by August 26, 1980. Despite the appellant's president, Bobby Dumas, acknowledging receipt of the complaint, the documents were not forwarded to the liability insurer until April 1981, leading to a default judgment entered on December 1, 1980, without the appellant's knowledge.

The appellant attempted to vacate the judgment on the grounds that Beck lacked authority to accept service, but this motion was denied on July 24, 1981. A subsequent motion to open the default due to excusable neglect was also denied on January 18, 1982. An equity complaint for relief was dismissed on res judicata grounds, a decision upheld by the court.

On June 20, 1983, the trial court declared the default judgment final. The appellant filed a notice of appeal on June 24, 1983, and another on July 18, 1983, regarding the final order and the default judgment itself. The appellees successfully obtained an order requiring the appellant to post a supersedeas bond pending appeal, which the appellant did not comply with. Subsequently, the appellees sought to take depositions of the appellant’s officers for execution purposes.

Appellees issued a notice to produce corporate records from certain officers during their depositions, which the officers failed to comply with. Subsequently, the trial court ordered the appellant to produce the documents, leading the appellant to file a third notice of appeal. The court dismissed the second appeal as redundant regarding a prior order and untimely concerning a default judgment. The dismissal of the equity complaint was not seen as adjudicating issues related to service of process or the denial of a motion to open the default, allowing the appellant to raise these issues on appeal for the first time. 

The trial court's denial of the appellant's motion to set aside the judgment due to insufficient service of process was upheld, as the return of service was valid, and the appellant failed to provide sufficient evidence to dispute it. The testimony indicated that Jim Beck, who accepted service, had the authority to do so as he was responsible for various managerial tasks and held himself out as the general manager. 

Additionally, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying the appellant's motion to open the default based on excusable neglect, as the evidence did not establish a reasonable excuse for the failure to file a timely answer. The appellant's president claimed he was advised to send the complaint to the insurance agency for handling, but this did not constitute a legally sufficient excuse.

The agency's president acknowledged in an affidavit the receipt of a complaint and summons on September 9, 1980, but failed to forward these documents to the appellant's liability insurer until August 13, 1981. The appellant argues that reliance on the insurer constitutes a reasonable excuse for not filing a timely answer, referencing prior case law. However, unlike those cases where defendants acted quickly to rectify defaults, the appellant waited over nine months to address its default. The trial judge was justified in considering this delay in determining whether the appellant’s neglect was excusable and did not abuse discretion in denying the motion to open the default.

Additionally, the appellant contends that the trial court should have postponed judgment against it until claims against other defendants were resolved. The court's guidelines state that for joint liability, a default judgment should not be entered against a defaulting defendant until all defendants have defaulted or until the liability of non-defaulting defendants is adjudicated. If joint liability is found for the plaintiff, judgment can be rendered against all defendants. Conversely, if found against the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed for all parties.

Determining joint liability relies on analyzing the facts of the case; if separate negligent acts combine to create a single, indivisible injury without a rational basis for apportioning damages, the actors are considered joint tortfeasors, liable for the total damages. This principle is illustrated in a case involving multiple defendants whose negligence caused a ceiling collapse.

An injury to property due to water and silt runoff from neighboring development can be either indivisible or apportionable, depending on the nature of the injury. In the case of Weems v. Freeman, the Supreme Court acknowledged potential joint liability among tortfeasors for flooding caused by runoff, but did not make a definitive ruling. In the current case, the plaintiffs claim damages from pollutants—mud, silt, trash, and debris—from the defendants' land disturbing activities, which harmed several lakes on their property. Such pollution damage is typically apportionable among contributing tortfeasors. An exception exists for cases like a fire spreading from oil on a stream, but since the damage here stemmed directly from pollutants, each defendant could be held liable for their specific contribution. Consequently, the trial court was justified in entering judgment against the appellant without waiting for liability determinations of other defendants. The appellant's motion to open default did not present a comprehensive defense but argued that its construction activities did not cause runoff. Furthermore, the trial court correctly enforced the appellees' notice to produce documents, as the request for document production was validly combined with deposition notices under OCGA. 9-11-69 and 9-11-30 (b). The appellant's additional claims of error were found to lack merit, leading to the affirmation of judgments in Case Nos. 67775 and 67776, while the appeal in Case No. 67777 was dismissed.