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Watkins v. Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc.
Citations: 358 S.E.2d 477; 183 Ga. App. 172; 1987 Ga. App. LEXIS 1917Docket: 74120, 74121
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 2, 1987; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Charles L. Watkins, III sued his former employer, Laser/Print-Atlanta, Inc., and three employees (initially including David Pinney, later replaced by President Rene Cote) for libel, slander, malicious prosecution, and malicious arrest following his resignation in 1984 and subsequent arrest on charges of theft and terroristic threats related to missing computer programs. The trial court granted partial summary judgment to Laser/Print on the malicious prosecution and malicious arrest claims while denying summary judgment on the libel and slander counts. Watkins contended that the criminal cases against him were abandoned, thus favoring his claims; however, the court found that the warrants were merely placed on the "dead docket," allowing for future prosecution, as no formal dismissal had occurred. Therefore, the court upheld the summary judgment for Laser/Print on the malicious claims. In the cross-appeal, Laser/Print argued that the trial court erred in not granting summary judgment on the libel claim, asserting that the only alleged defamatory statement—a warrant signed by Graves—was absolutely privileged under OCGA 51-5-8. The court noted that an affidavit made to procure an arrest cannot support a libel claim, and any claims regarding a separation notice filed with the Georgia Department of Labor were similarly protected. Consequently, the court concluded that all alleged instances of libel were absolutely privileged, and Laser/Print was entitled to summary judgment on that count as well. Laser/Print contested the trial court’s denial of its summary judgment motion regarding the slander claim made by Watkins. Three instances of alleged slander were identified: (1) Graves informed co-worker Pam Davis that Watkins had been arrested; (2) during a call to Watkins' new employer, Graves labeled Watkins a thief; and (3) a conversation between Laser/Print and a prospective employer, which allegedly led to a job interview cancellation. The court found no slander in the first instance, as Graves' statement about the arrest was true, thus constituting a valid defense under OCGA 51-5-6. However, it rejected Laser/Print’s claim that the second instance was protected by privilege, noting that such privilege is conditional and requires a jury to determine the speaker's intent. This reasoning also applied to the third instance, contingent on Watkins proving its occurrence. Consequently, the trial court did not err in denying the summary judgment on the slander count. Additionally, Laser/Print argued against the trial court's decision to allow the addition of Rene Cote as a defendant, claiming it circumvented the statute of limitations. According to OCGA 9-11-15 (c), amendments adding parties can relate back to the original complaint if they arise from the same conduct and if the new party received notice of the action that would not prejudice their defense. The court noted that Watkins demonstrated Cote's awareness of the lawsuit and the connection to the original complaint, concluding that there was no abuse of discretion by the trial court in permitting Cote's addition. The judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part, with concurrence from McMurray, P. J. and Beasley, J.