Morton v. Skrine

Citations: 252 S.E.2d 408; 242 Ga. 844; 1979 Ga. LEXIS 764Docket: 33858, 33859

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; January 5, 1979; Georgia; State Supreme Court

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The Supreme Court of Georgia case Morton v. Skrine et al. addresses the interpretation of Code Ann. 84-916 (d), which pertains to the confidentiality of investigatory files related to physicians compiled by state examining bodies. Dr. William J. Morton, a physician and board member, contested a decision denying him access to an investigatory file concerning allegations made against him by several complainants, including fellow physicians. The investigation, conducted from August to December 1976, concluded in March 1977 with Dr. Morton being exonerated without a hearing.

Dr. Morton initiated a libel lawsuit against those who made the complaints, along with reporters and the newspaper involved in publishing an article about the investigation. Concurrently, he filed a mandamus action in Fulton Superior Court to compel the release of the investigatory file. The court dismissed his mandamus suit, citing Code Ann. 84-916 (d) as a legal barrier to access and allowed intervention from the newspaper personnel seeking the same access.

Although Dr. Morton had previously obtained and possessed the investigatory file for eight months in his capacity as a board member, he later returned it upon request from the State Law Department. His claim for file access is based on the Georgia Open Records Law, which generally allows public inspection of state records unless legally prohibited.

The Fulton Superior Court ruled that access to investigatory files is prohibited under Code Ann. 84-916 (d), which mandates that investigation results be reported solely to the board, with records retained by the board and not subject to release or subpoena, except for board hearings. The court interpreted this provision as an explicit law exempting these records from the Open Records Law. Dr. Morton contended that this section only restricts investigators from disclosing information to anyone outside the board and does not limit the board’s ability to release information. He referenced the case Houston v. Rutledge, which established a public interest balancing test for access to closed investigative files, arguing for remand to assess public interest in this case. Morton highlighted his position on the board and his willingness to waive privacy rights, suggesting that those who publicly accused him have forfeited their confidentiality rights. He also cited a qualified privilege in subsection (h) for informants, arguing it necessitates access for the subject of the investigation to address potential falsehoods. However, the court concluded that subsection (d) clearly prohibits the release of the entire investigative file, supported by the language of subsections (e) and (f), which indicates legislative intent to protect the confidentiality of the entire file.

The statute mandates that all investigative records related to a physician's practice remain confidential, undermining Dr. Morton's claim for individual assessment of file entries for potential release. The inquiry pertains to patient confidentiality, aligning with Code Ann. 38-418 (b), as a physician's performance is intrinsically linked to patient privacy. The Houston case, which involved sheriff's records, differs significantly from physician investigations due to the inherent doctor-patient confidentiality. Consequently, the legislature's directive prohibits file release except during a "hearing before the board," a term that cannot be broadly interpreted to include media publicity discussions.

The statute emphasizes the confidentiality necessary for information flow to the board, which supports effective investigation and regulation of medical practice. Specific provisions in subsections (e) and (f) highlight that patient-related testimony and evidence are received in camera and remain undisclosed to the public. Moreover, hearings do not imply public access to investigation files, countering Dr. Morton's argument that hearings automatically render files public. The confidentiality emphasized throughout the statute indicates that had the legislature intended to allow information release, it would have explicitly stated so.

Dr. Morton references a Florida case allowing access to certain complaint letters, asserting that the Florida statute is similar to Code Ann. 84-916 (d). However, the Florida law includes an exception for probable cause findings, while the statute at hand strictly prohibits disclosure without exceptions. Additionally, the Florida court considered legislative history that favored a narrow interpretation of "records," a consideration not applicable in this case, where no such implication exists.

Toker v. Pollak is distinguished from the current case due to the absence of a controlling statute, unlike Code Ann. 84-916 (d) applicable here. Landmark Communications, Inc. v. Commonwealth of Virginia highlights the significance of confidentiality in investigations. Dr. Morton's constitutional challenge to the statute was not presented at the trial level and therefore is not considered. His brief’s mention of the Constitution does not suffice to raise a constitutional issue regarding the statute's validity. The superior court correctly ruled that Code Ann. 84-916 (d) prohibits Dr. Morton and the Intervenors from accessing the file.

Dr. Morton also contests the trial court's decision to allow intervention by reporters and a newspaper. Georgia's intervention statute permits intervention when there is an unconditional right or when an applicant has a significant interest in the action's subject matter that may be impaired. The Intervenors seek access to the file, claiming it is relevant to a libel suit, but Dr. Morton argues that he can protect their interests. However, since both parties are denied access to the file, the issue becomes moot.

In Case No. 33859, the Intervenors challenge the superior court’s denial of their motion to intervene for a cross claim against Dr. Morton, asserting his prior unauthorized use of the file gave him an unfair advantage. This claim is best addressed in the ongoing libel suit as a compulsory counterclaim, making it outside the scope of the current action concerning the file's confidentiality. The court's refusal to allow intervention to file this claim was deemed a proper exercise of discretion. The judgment was affirmed with all Justices concurring.