Redd v. State

Citations: 252 S.E.2d 383; 242 Ga. 876; 1979 Ga. LEXIS 769Docket: 34020

Court: Supreme Court of Georgia; January 4, 1979; Georgia; State Supreme Court

SummaryOriginalCytator Case TreatmentBackward CitatorAnalysis

EnglishEspañolSimplified EnglishEspañol Fácil

Bob Redd was indicted for the kidnapping and murder of Paul D. Eskew, Sr. on January 26, 1976, and was found guilty by a jury. The jury imposed the death penalty, citing that the murder occurred during the commission of another capital felony, alongside a life sentence for kidnapping. Redd's convictions were affirmed in a prior case, but his death sentence was reversed due to violations of precedents set in Hawes v. State and Fleming v. State, necessitating a new sentencing trial. During resentencing, the jury again determined that the murder occurred in the course of kidnapping and further characterized it as "outrageously and wantonly vile," resulting in a renewed death sentence by electrocution.

The case is currently under direct appeal and mandatory review of the death sentence. Redd's first argument on appeal contends that the trial court improperly questioned the jury panel about their views on capital punishment, asserting that since the guilt phase had concluded, the jury should not need to be qualified under Witherspoon v. Illinois. The court clarified that qualifying jurors is essential to prevent bias in both trial phases; jurors opposed to the death penalty must be excluded to ensure impartiality in sentencing decisions. Thus, the trial court's actions regarding jury qualification were deemed appropriate and Redd's claim was dismissed as meritless.

Appellant argues that a prospective juror was wrongfully excused due to his opposition to capital punishment. During voir dire, Juror Phillips indicated that his beliefs would prevent him from making an impartial decision regarding the imposition of the death penalty. His responses confirmed that he was irrevocably committed against capital punishment, aligning with the standards set by *Witherspoon v. Illinois* and *Davis v. Georgia*. Consequently, the trial court's decision to excuse him for cause was deemed appropriate.

Additionally, appellant challenges the trial court's refusal to allow a written report to be introduced for impeachment purposes against the state's chief witness, John Morris. Morris testified about his involvement in the victim's murder but denied a prior inconsistent statement made during an interrogation. While the court allowed questioning regarding the inconsistency, it barred the introduction of the written report on the grounds that it was not authored or signed by Morris. The court's ruling adhered to precedent, noting that documents must be created or endorsed by the witness to be valid for impeachment. Therefore, the trial court's exclusion of the report was justified.

The appellant argues that the trial court wrongly denied a motion for mistrial after the district attorney's closing remarks suggested that a life sentence would give the defendant, Bob Redd, "another chance" to commit harm. The appellant claims this violated Code Ann. 27-2206, which prohibits suggesting that a defendant may escape the full penalty due to parole considerations. The district attorney defended his statement by asserting that a life sentence would allow the defendant to harm others, even in prison. The trial court overruled the motion but instructed the district attorney to stick to the evidence, determining the remarks did not reference parole and were aimed at justifying a death sentence. 

Additionally, the appellant claims error in the trial court's refusal to provide a jury instruction regarding the consideration of a co-defendant whose charges were dismissed as a mitigating circumstance. While the court did not grant this specific request, it instructed the jury to consider all evidence and circumstances, including mitigating factors, without defining them. Citing precedents, the court noted that Georgia law does not require specific identification of mitigating circumstances, allowing the jury to consider any factors they deem mitigating. The appellant references the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Lockett v. Ohio, arguing that it mandates individualized consideration of mitigating circumstances in capital cases, which challenges the adequacy of the jury instructions provided.

A death penalty statute must allow for the consideration of relevant mitigating factors to satisfy constitutional requirements. Individualized consideration should focus on the defendant rather than requiring each potential mitigating circumstance to be assessed separately. The sentencer must consider any aspect of the defendant's character, record, and circumstances of the offense that might justify a lesser sentence. Individualized decisions are particularly crucial in capital cases due to the unique nature of each defendant.

In the current case, the trial court instructed the jury broadly to consider all relevant facts and properly defined mitigating circumstances, providing a fair charge without error. The appellant argues that the trial court erred by permitting the jury, during resentencing, to consider statutory aggravating circumstances that were previously available but not utilized by the first jury. At the initial trial, the jury was presented with three aggravating circumstances but recognized only one when recommending the death sentence. Upon resentencing, the court allowed the jury to consider all three aggravating circumstances again. The jury ultimately cited two, including one that was not previously acknowledged by the first jury.

The appellant contends that this situation constitutes double jeopardy, as the first jury's finding of one aggravating circumstance should be viewed as an acquittal on the others not selected.

In Ward v. State, the court established that if a defendant is sentenced to life in a capital case during the first trial, they cannot receive a death sentence upon retrial. This decision was based on the disproportionate nature of imposing the death penalty after a life sentence had been previously rendered. However, in the current case, the appellant was sentenced to death during the first trial, allowing the second jury to consider the death penalty during retrial. The double jeopardy clauses of both Federal and State Constitutions prevent a person from being tried twice for the same offense, but not from being sentenced differently after a conviction. The appellant's murder conviction was upheld on appeal, with the retrial solely addressing the sentence. The aggravating circumstances presented to the jury, which guide the sentencing decision, do not constitute offenses under double jeopardy protections. The court found no merit in the appellant's claims of error. 

In reviewing the death sentence, the court examined the aggravating circumstances established by the jury, confirming that the murder was committed during another capital felony (kidnapping with bodily injury) and that it was particularly heinous. The evidence supported these findings, and the court concluded that the death sentence was not influenced by arbitrary factors. Additionally, the instructions given to the jury during the sentencing phase did not contain defects found in previous cases.

Bob Redd has been assessed as having borderline intelligence and a passive-aggressive personality with underlying hostility. He has a criminal history spanning fifteen years, including four theft convictions. In reviewing his death penalty sentence for murder, the court evaluated similar cases since January 1, 1970, concluding that Redd's sentence is neither excessive nor disproportionate when compared to those cases. The verdict is factually supported, leading to the affirmation of the judgment by the court, with all Justices concurring except for Justice Hall, who has a special concurrence regarding the application of statutory aggravating circumstances. Justice Hall questions the majority's interpretation of the statute concerning the jury's findings on aggravating circumstances, suggesting that the statute implies that a failure to find an aggravating circumstance constitutes an implicit acquittal for that circumstance, thus raising concerns about the double jeopardy protections in capital cases.

The trial court incorrectly submitted two aggravating circumstances to the jury that the first jury had implicitly acquitted. However, the author believes this error was harmless, as the second jury also found the defendant guilty of a third aggravating circumstance, which was consistent with the first jury's finding. The author references Price v. Georgia, where a similar issue arose, and the Supreme Court concluded that submitting a murder charge inappropriately influenced the jury's decision in the second trial. In that case, the jury had multiple options, potentially leading to a compromise verdict, which prejudiced their deliberations. In contrast, the jury in Redd's sentencing phase faced only two options: death or life imprisonment, eliminating the possibility of a compromise. Therefore, the harmful error rationale from Price does not apply here. The author concurs with the judgment but notes a separate opinion regarding previously omitted aggravating circumstances, stating the trial court's decision to include an additional statutory aggravating circumstance related to the motive for financial gain was not contested by the appellant.