State v. Porras

Citations: 610 P.2d 1051; 125 Ariz. 490; 1980 Ariz. App. LEXIS 436Docket: 1 CA-CR 3967

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; February 28, 1980; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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In the case of State of Arizona v. Guadalupe Najera Porras, the Court of Appeals addressed whether the prosecution must show that the defendant knew an injury occurred in a "hit and run" case under A.R.S. 28-661. Porras was convicted for leaving the scene of an accident that resulted in injury. She appealed, arguing that the trial court did not consider her defense that she lacked knowledge of any injuries caused by the accident. 

The incident occurred on April 20, 1978, when motorcyclist Anthony Ottaviano, Jr. was struck from behind while attempting to lift his disabled motorcycle. Evidence included parts traced to Porras' vehicle and her own admission of driving under the influence, hearing a collision, but not knowing what she hit. The state argued it only needed to prove that Porras knew a collision occurred, while she contended that proof of her knowledge of resulting injuries was also necessary for a conviction. The trial court found that while the state proved she was aware of the collision, it did not establish beyond a reasonable doubt that she knew it caused injury to a person.

The Court concludes that the State has proven beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant, while driving in the left lane, hit something in the roadway and was aware of that impact. However, the State has not demonstrated that the defendant knew she struck and injured a person, which the Court views as a pivotal issue but resolves in the defendant's favor. The Court notes that it did not examine whether the State established the defendant's knowledge that would indicate a reasonable expectation of personal injury. 

According to A.R.S. 28-661, enacted in 1950, a driver involved in an accident causing injury or death must stop at the scene and provide necessary information and assistance. Failure to stop can result in imprisonment for 30 days to one year, fines ranging from $100 to $5,000, or both, along with revocation of driving privileges. 

The defendant argues that to impose the harsher penalties under A.R.S. 28-661, the State must prove she had knowledge of the injuries, contrasting it with A.R.S. 28-662, which deals only with property damage and imposes lighter penalties. While the State acknowledges the need to prove the defendant’s awareness of the collision, it contends that once this is established, she is absolutely liable for not stopping to investigate. The legal principles surrounding knowledge in "hit and run" cases are extensively discussed in 23 A.L.R.3d 497 (1969), highlighting that many statutes do not explicitly require knowledge for conviction, and where knowledge is referenced, it may not clarify whether it pertains solely to the accident or also includes awareness of resulting injuries or damages.

Knowledge of a collision is deemed essential for establishing the offense in hit-and-run cases, which must be alleged and proven by the state. Many courts additionally require proof that the defendant knew or should have reasonably anticipated that injury or damage resulted from the collision. In Arizona, the extent to which knowledge of injury is required remains uncertain. Existing case law suggests that while actual knowledge of injury is not necessary for conviction, it is important that the defendant knew the accident was likely to result in injury. Circumstantial evidence can suffice to demonstrate this knowledge. The California Supreme Court's reasoning is adopted, emphasizing that requiring actual knowledge could undermine the statute’s effectiveness, as drivers often leave the scene without acquiring such knowledge. The court concludes that liability attaches if a driver knowingly leaves the scene of an accident, either with actual knowledge of injury or awareness that the accident likely resulted in injury. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction and remanded the case for further proceedings due to the failure to adequately address this key issue.