Hoskins v. City of Kirkland

Citations: 503 P.2d 1117; 7 Wash. App. 957; 1972 Wash. App. LEXIS 1075Docket: 1204-1

Court: Court of Appeals of Washington; December 4, 1972; Washington; State Appellate Court

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The case involves an appeal by Robert G. Hoskins and others against the City of Kirkland regarding the standing to challenge an ordinance that vacated a portion of N.E. 57th Street, impacting plaintiffs' access to their property. The plaintiffs own a 10-acre tract adjacent to the Bridlewood Circle plat, separated by 124th Avenue N.E., an undeveloped road. They previously had access to N.E. 57th Street via a trail permit issued by King County, which allowed them to reach N.E. 60th Street. The residents of Bridlewood Circle sought to vacate N.E. 57th Street to limit access to a single entrance on N.E. 60th Street, but their request was initially denied. Following the annexation of Bridlewood Circle to Kirkland, the City Council enacted ordinance No. 2100 to vacate N.E. 57th Street, with the residents subsequently transferring the vacated land to the city. The city offered plaintiffs a revocable easement for access, which they refused. Plaintiffs filed suit claiming the ordinance was invalid, but the court granted summary judgment in favor of the city, dismissing the plaintiffs' claims. The appellate court affirmed this judgment, highlighting that a city can vacate public streets via ordinance for public use under RCW 35.79, even when private benefits may arise. The key issues addressed include the plaintiffs' standing to sue and the validity of the ordinance.

The authority to vacate a public street remains intact despite potential inconvenience to individuals losing access. Those who experience damage that is similar in kind to, yet different in degree from, that of the general public lack legal grounds for complaint, as their rights are not infringed, and their damage is classified as damnum absque injuria. Compensation for injury in such cases does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment or state constitutional provisions. Only landowners directly affected by a street vacation or those who incur special injuries have standing to contest its legality. Special injury is defined in Washington as a landowner's access being significantly impaired or land being rendered landlocked, whereas mere inconvenience does not constitute special damage. A landowner must demonstrate that their access is substantially obstructed to have standing to sue. 

In the current case, plaintiffs argue that summary judgment is inappropriate due to questions regarding their standing and the public use of ordinance No. 2100. Summary judgment could be warranted if plaintiffs lack standing or if the ordinance serves a public purpose without genuine factual disputes. It is established that plaintiffs have not incurred special damages as they do not own property abutting N.E. 57th Street. Additionally, their preannexation trail permit was invalidated by the City of Kirkland’s annexation, with the permit having characteristics of a revocable license rather than a protected franchise. The statutory requirement for a minimum 5-year extension for public utility franchises does not apply to revocable permits. Plaintiffs assert that the street vacation is entirely invalid and have rejected a proposed revocable easement from the city, which offers more favorable terms than the canceled trail permit.

Plaintiffs lack a cause of action for special damages because they have not experienced harm that is distinct from that of the general public. Their property remains accessible via 124th Avenue N.E. and N.E. 60th Street, despite a decrease in convenience due to the street vacation. They have the option to mitigate this inconvenience by constructing a new roadway to N.E. 60th Street, rendering their complaint a case of damnum absque injuria. There is no genuine issue of fact regarding the plaintiffs' standing to sue.

Even if standing were assumed, the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to challenge the presumption that ordinance No. 2100 was enacted for public use. The burden lies with the plaintiffs to present prima facie evidence to overcome this presumption upon the defendant's motion for summary judgment. The city council, as the legislative body, has the authority to determine public benefit, and judicial review is limited to cases where no public benefit is evident.

The plaintiffs reference a letter from Bridlewood Circle residents attempting to limit access to their tract, but this does not negate the presumption of validity. Additionally, the Kirkland City Planning Commission's recommendation against the street vacation reflects a difference of opinion rather than compelling evidence of bad faith or arbitrary action by the city council. The council's decision, stating the street vacation serves the city's best interests, indicates some private benefit while not demonstrating a complete lack of public benefit. Consequently, there is no genuine issue of material fact regarding the ordinance's validity, and the judgment is affirmed.