Cockerham-Ellerbee v. Town of Jonesville

Citations: 626 S.E.2d 685; 176 N.C. App. 372; 2006 N.C. App. LEXIS 533Docket: COA05-576

Court: Court of Appeals of North Carolina; March 7, 2006; North Carolina; State Appellate Court

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Plaintiff Vernetta Marie Cockerham-Ellerbee, both individually and as administratrix of her daughter Candice's estate, filed a lawsuit against the Town of Jonesville and two police officers, Scott Vestal and Lee Gwyn, for negligence following a series of events that led to her daughter's death. The case stems from a Domestic Violence Protective Order issued to Cockerham-Ellerbee against her estranged husband, Richard Ellerbee, which prohibited him from threatening or approaching her and her children. Despite numerous violations of this order by Ellerbee, including threats and stalking, the police failed to arrest him after being informed of these violations. 

On November 19, 2002, Ellerbee broke into the plaintiff's home, ultimately stabbing and suffocating Candice, and seriously injuring Cockerham-Ellerbee. The plaintiff's complaint alleges negligence by the officers for not enforcing the protective order, failing to warn her that Ellerbee had not been arrested, and not adequately protecting her and her daughter despite their knowledge of the risks. The trial court denied the defendants' motion to dismiss, leading to the appeal, which was affirmed by the Court of Appeals of North Carolina, emphasizing that the factual allegations in the complaint must be taken as true during this review.

Defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiff's action, citing the public duty doctrine as a defense. The trial court denied this motion on March 2, 2005, leading to the defendants' appeal. They argue that the trial court erred in its decision, claiming that the public duty doctrine precludes the plaintiff's negligence claims. However, the appellate court disagrees, noting that while the denial of a motion to dismiss is typically not immediately appealable, the case involves a substantial right due to the public duty doctrine, justifying immediate review.

In evaluating the motion to dismiss, the court must assess whether the plaintiff's allegations can support a legal claim, treating the allegations as true. The public duty doctrine requires that a plaintiff must demonstrate that the defendant owed a specific duty of care to them, rather than to the public at large. This doctrine generally protects municipalities and their agents from negligence claims based on failure to protect individuals from third-party criminal acts, recognizing the limitations of law enforcement resources and their broader duty to the public.

The court confirms that the public duty doctrine applies since the plaintiff's claim arises from the defendants' alleged failure to protect her from a third party's actions, rather than any direct misconduct. The court also explores whether the claim involves discretionary governmental actions that are typically shielded by the doctrine. Citing North Carolina General Statutes, the plaintiff argues that the use of "shall" in the statutes indicates a mandatory duty, challenging the applicability of the public duty doctrine. However, precedent suggests that law enforcement officers must exercise discretion in their duties, implying that the public duty doctrine may still apply.

The United States Supreme Court, in Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, acknowledged that although state statutes often suggest a mandatory duty for police to enforce protective orders, such statutes cannot be interpreted literally due to practical limitations, including resource constraints and legislative intent. The Court distinguished between a mandatory duty to arrest violators present at the scene and a duty to investigate absent violators. It concluded that the use of "shall" in the statutes does not eliminate police discretion, as various factors, including public safety, influence an officer's decision to arrest. Therefore, the Court determined that the enforcement of protective orders is discretionary, making the public duty doctrine applicable.

The public duty doctrine does not provide blanket immunity to law enforcement actions; exceptions exist to address potential injustices. One such exception involves a "special duty" to an individual, which can arise in three ways: (1) through a promise of protection by police that is not fulfilled, causing injury; (2) through a special relationship, as seen between informants and law enforcement; and (3) via statutes that create individual rights to sue for violations. To invoke the first exception, a plaintiff must allege that officers promised protection, failed to deliver it, and that this reliance resulted in injury.

Determining whether defendants made a promise of protection, thereby establishing a special duty, requires examining not only their statements but also the surrounding circumstances. In Hobbs v. N.C. Dep't of Human Res., the court found that assurances given by agencies, along with the nature of their interactions, could create a "special duty." In the current case, the plaintiff obtained a protective order against Ellerbee, mandating police arrest him for violations. The police were aware of the order and the plaintiff's reports of violations and threats. On November 13, 2002, the Chief of Police witnessed threats made by Ellerbee. On November 18, the police had multiple opportunities to arrest Ellerbee after being informed of his stalking behavior, but failed to do so despite promising the plaintiff and her daughter immediate protection. The officers’ inaction culminated in a tragic outcome, with Ellerbee killing Candice and attacking the plaintiff. The plaintiff's allegations support her position within the special duty exception to the public duty doctrine, as she claims reliance on the officers' promises of protection, which were not fulfilled. The defendants argue that this case is similar to Braswell, where a sheriff's general reassurances were found insufficient to establish a specific duty. However, the circumstances in the current case, including the explicit promise of protection that was not honored, suggest a significant distinction from Braswell.

The Court recognized that the sheriff's commitment to protect the wife while commuting could establish a special duty exception to the public duty doctrine. However, since the wife's death occurred during a lunchtime errand, it was deemed outside the protective scope promised by the sheriff. The case differs from Braswell due to more specific assurances from police officers and the presence of a protective order for the plaintiff, unlike the wife in Braswell. Additionally, while Braswell was reviewed under a Rule 50 motion post-trial, this case is evaluated under a Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Court found that the plaintiff's allegations, accepted as true, sufficiently stated a claim under the special duty exception, allowing her to survive the motion to dismiss. Consequently, the trial court's ruling is affirmed. Chief Judge MARTIN and Judge McGEE concur.