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Higgs v. DIST. COURT IN AND FOR DOUGLAS CO.
Citation: 713 P.2d 840Docket: 83SA493, 84SA19
Court: Supreme Court of Colorado; January 26, 1986; Colorado; State Supreme Court
In the case Ronald J. Higgs v. The District Court In and For the County of Douglas, the Colorado Supreme Court addressed multiple consolidated proceedings under C.A.R. 21 stemming from Higgs’ civil rights lawsuit against deputy district attorneys James R. Florey, Jr. and Michael Miller. Higgs, acquitted of serious criminal charges, claimed his civil rights were violated during the investigation of the accusations against him. A jury initially awarded him $770,000 in compensatory damages and $351,000 in exemplary damages. However, the district court later granted a new trial on damages and ruled that Florey and Miller were absolutely immune from liability for their roles in preparing arrest warrants and search affidavits. The Supreme Court granted Higgs' petition to compel the district court to vacate its immunity ruling, set aside the new trial order, and reinstate the jury's verdict. Conversely, at Florey and Miller's request, the Court also ordered the district court to justify its new trial on damages and consider dismissing Higgs' complaint or ordering a new trial limited to events prior to his arrest. Ultimately, the Court affirmed Higgs' position and discharged the order concerning Florey and Miller's immunity while addressing the various claims, including a malicious prosecution claim against the complainant and civil rights violations against law enforcement officials, that were part of Higgs' original complaint. Higgs' malicious prosecution claim centers on Sandra Price's initiation and persistence of criminal charges against him without probable cause and driven by malice. His claims under Section 1983 assert that deputy sheriffs and district attorneys, acting under state law, violated his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by conducting an illegal and suggestive photo identification process to wrongfully identify him as the perpetrator, and by creating false affidavits related to identification and arrest warrants. On April 12, 1978, Price reported that a man, later identified as Higgs, had broken into her home. Investigating officers found no forced entry, and evidence later indicated Higgs was 20 miles away at the time. On April 15, Price alleged she was sexually assaulted by the same man, describing him with specific physical characteristics. However, Higgs’ features significantly differed from her description, and he had an alibi for the time of the assault. The investigation yielded no physical evidence of the crime, and forensic tests conducted did not support Price's claims. Price later claimed to have seen Higgs driving his truck, but his vehicle had a different registration status at the time. On May 5, Price reported a brutal assault and rape by the same man who had previously assaulted her on April 12 and 15. In her account to the sheriff's office, she described being attacked in her kitchen, where the assailant physically overpowered her, causing her to strike her head and pinning her to the floor before raping her twice. Following the incident, Price underwent a rape examination at Swedish Medical Center, which found no physical evidence of the assault, such as bruises or vaginal trauma. The sheriff's investigation found no fingerprints, signs of forced entry, or footprints around her home despite recent snowfall. On May 8, Higgs went to the sheriff's office for fingerprinting related to a security license and was recognized as a potential suspect due to his proximity to Price and his vehicle description. Although Officer Rozycki took Higgs' fingerprints, he did not report seeing any rings on his fingers. To obtain photographs of Higgs, Rozycki misleadingly claimed that all fingerprinted individuals were photographed. On May 9, Price was taken to Higgs' residence to identify his truck, which she confirmed was not the one used by her assailant. Later that day, sheriff's officers stopped Higgs without cause, during which one officer observed a silver ring on his finger. On May 19, Price identified Higgs as her assailant from a photo lineup but expressed uncertainty about her identification due to the photo's poor quality. Following this, Officer Rossmeisl, who had been in communication with the district attorney's office, was informed that there was insufficient evidence to act against Higgs. However, after learning about the observation of the ring during the May 9 stop, the district attorney's office reconsidered and approved seeking a warrant for Higgs' bodily fluids and hair samples for comparison. Rossmeisl testified that Deputy District Attorney Florey and another attorney prepared the affidavit for the warrant, which omitted information indicating that Price had stated Higgs' truck was not the assailant's vehicle, along with other exculpatory evidence. Florey and Miller provided conflicting testimonies regarding their involvement with an affidavit related to nontestimonial identification evidence, with Florey stating he neither drafted nor reviewed it, while Miller acknowledged a limited review for grammar but not for factual content. On May 19, 1978, a judge issued an order based on this affidavit, leading to the collection of blood and hair samples from Higgs, which did not match those found at the crime scene. On June 6, Officer Rossmeisl contacted Florey, obtaining permission to show Sandra Price two photographs of Higgs, leading to her positive identification. Rossmeisl later collaborated with Florey and Miller to prepare affidavits for Higgs' arrest and a search of his home, despite both prosecutors denying they drafted these documents. Notably, the affidavits omitted significant details, including Price's statement that Higgs' truck did not match the assailant's and the hair sample discrepancies, which Florey and Miller were aware of. Higgs was arrested that same day, publicly, and his home was searched while his young children were present. The arrest garnered extensive media attention, and subsequent to his acquittal in 1983, Higgs faced significant personal and financial repercussions, leading him to file a civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983. He alleged violations of his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights due to the actions of Florey and Miller. The court denied their motion to dismiss on the grounds of absolute immunity, stating that investigative activities do not qualify for such protection under 42 U.S.C. 1983. Florey and Miller filed an in limine motion to exclude evidence of events related to Higgs' prosecution post-arrest, arguing it was prejudicial and irrelevant due to their absolute immunity for post-arrest conduct. Higgs contended that such evidence was relevant to damages. The court denied the motion, determining that the evidence was admissible for certain purposes and that a jury limiting instruction would mitigate potential prejudice. Subsequently, the jury was presented with Higgs' claims of malicious prosecution against Price and 1983 claims against Sheriff's Officers and Deputy District Attorneys, with extensive jury instructions provided on the relevant legal standards and duties of law enforcement. The jury found Florey, Miller, Price, Rossmeisl, and Rozycki liable for $770,000 in compensatory damages, with additional exemplary damages assigned to each individual defendant. After the verdict, Rossmeisl, Rozycki, and Price settled with Higgs, while Florey and Miller sought judgment notwithstanding the verdict and a new trial, asserting absolute immunity, arguing the admission of post-charging events was an abuse of discretion, and claiming the damages awarded were excessive and influenced by bias. The court ruled Florey and Miller enjoyed absolute immunity regarding the warrant preparation but not for the affidavit supporting the identification warrant or the photo identification procedure, ultimately ordering a new trial on damages due to the compensatory award being deemed excessively high. Florey and Miller subsequently filed an original proceeding, claiming the court abused its discretion by not dismissing Higgs' 1983 claim based on their asserted absolute immunity related to the photo identification and nontestimonial identification processes. A new trial was ordered solely on the issue of damages, as the jury might have based their decision on conduct that is immune under the judge's post-trial ruling. There were objections regarding the scope of evidence allowed in the new trial, specifically concerning events before Higgs' arrest. Higgs contends that the court improperly limited his damage claim to specific actions by Florey and Miller and erred in granting a new trial for both compensatory and exemplary damages. The court’s exercise of original jurisdiction, rooted in the Colorado Constitution, is discretionary and aims to address significant public issues, particularly regarding prosecutorial immunity under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court deemed it appropriate to resolve these issues to promote judicial economy and avoid unnecessary retrials. The primary inquiry is the extent of prosecutorial immunity for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court found that Florey and Miller were absolutely immune for drafting certain arrest and search warrant affidavits but not for preparing affidavits for a nontestimonial identification order or for approving the photo identification procedure. Florey and Miller argued for extended immunity based on specific conduct, whereas Higgs contended that these actions are investigatory and typically performed by police, thus not qualifying for absolute immunity. Ultimately, the court ruled that, given the facts of the case, Florey and Miller are not entitled to absolute immunity for the contested actions. The statute in question emphasizes the principle of absolute immunity for prosecutors, grounded in common law, particularly regarding their quasi-judicial functions. This immunity is akin to that enjoyed by judges, who are not liable for their judicial actions even if those actions exceed their jurisdiction or are alleged to be malicious, as established in Bradley v. Fischer. The rationale behind this immunity is to ensure that judicial and prosecutorial officials can make decisions based on their convictions without fearing personal repercussions, which is essential for maintaining an independent judiciary. The Supreme Court's ruling in Imbler v. Pachtman affirmed that prosecutors are absolutely immune when initiating criminal prosecutions and presenting cases at trial, as these actions are integral to their prosecutorial duties linked to the judicial process. The Court did not clearly define the boundary between absolutely immune actions and those that are not and left open the question of whether this immunity extends to prosecutors' administrative and investigative functions. Subsequent rulings, such as Butz v. Economou, extended this absolute immunity to federal administrative officials involved in agency adjudications, citing similar functions to those of prosecutors and referencing the judicial safeguards that reduce the need for private damages claims as a means of controlling unconstitutional conduct. However, the Court in Butz underscored that absolute immunity should be narrowly defined, emphasizing the importance of the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 damages remedy for individuals whose constitutional rights have been violated, especially considering the challenges posed by sovereign immunity. Absolute immunity is limited to officials whose unique roles necessitate complete protection from lawsuits, while qualified immunity is more commonly applicable, particularly for executive officials. Qualified immunity protects government officials performing discretionary functions from liability, provided their actions do not breach clearly established statutory or constitutional rights that a reasonable person would recognize. The determination of qualified immunity hinges on the objective reasonableness of the official's conduct in relation to established law, balancing the need to deter abuse of rights and the importance of allowing officials to act independently without fear of repercussions. In analyzing whether a prosecutor's actions qualify for absolute or qualified immunity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, a functional analysis is employed. This approach differentiates between a prosecutor's "advocatory" functions, which are strongly tied to the judicial process and warrant absolute immunity, and "investigative" or "administrative" functions, which are less connected and only receive qualified immunity. The key inquiry is whether the prosecutor's conduct is closely associated with the initiation or conduct of a formal criminal prosecution. Three factors assist in this determination: (1) the timing of the conduct in relation to the filing of charges, (2) the presence of safeguards against prosecutorial abuse, and (3) the nature of the conduct in comparison to traditional police actions. Each of these factors will be examined in relation to the specific facts of the case. The first factor specifically considers whether the conduct occurred before or after formal charges were filed. The filing of charges serves as a critical threshold separating investigative activities from advocatory actions within the prosecutorial process. The Supreme Court's ruling in Imbler grants prosecutors absolute immunity for initiating prosecutions and conducting cases, emphasizing the need to maintain the trial process's integrity. This immunity is primarily linked to the importance of the prosecutor's actions in supporting the advocacy function during criminal prosecutions. The Fifth Circuit noted that when a prosecutor steps outside their quasi-judicial role, their decisions do not parallel those of judges or grand jurors, thus reducing the potential interference with the judicial system if they are held liable. Absolute immunity is reserved for discretion that is essential to the truth-finding process, balancing the need for governmental accountability in civil rights violations. In the District of Columbia Circuit, it was clarified that absolute immunity under Imbler is limited to decisions directly related to the initiation and conduct of specific cases, and does not extend to broader law enforcement activities. The formal act of filing criminal charges marks a transition from an investigative to an accusatory phase, establishing a framework for assessing conduct deserving of absolute immunity. This distinction is not absolute but provides a foundation for evaluating the nature of a prosecutor's actions. The decision to charge carries significant practical implications, particularly the potential for resentment from the accused, which can lead to retaliatory action against the prosecutor if the accused is ultimately exonerated. While preliminary investigative acts may provoke some level of resentment, they do not equate to the formal accusation inherent in charging, which poses a greater risk of inciting retaliatory litigation. The Supreme Court in Imbler acknowledged that certain prosecutorial actions prior to initiating prosecution, conducted outside of the courtroom, may involve advocatory conduct. The Third Circuit in Forsyth expanded on this by asserting that a prosecutor's actions deemed "necessary" for deciding whether to pursue a criminal case should receive the same absolute immunity as the decision to prosecute itself. However, the court emphasized that "necessary" investigative activities should be interpreted narrowly to avoid broadly applying immunity to all prosecutorial actions. Specific cases like Cook v. Houston Post affirmed prosecutors’ absolute immunity for interviewing witnesses and reviewing documents, while Wilkinson v. Ellis left the question of immunity open pending further investigation into potential illegal actions by the prosecutor. The text cautions against an overly broad interpretation of absolute immunity, suggesting that it could undermine civil rights protections and blur the distinction between prosecutorial and law enforcement roles. The Ninth Circuit's Robichaud case highlighted that when a prosecutor acts outside their quasi-judicial capacity, the rationale for immunity diminishes, raising the question of why they should be immune for actions that would render a police officer liable. The document also discusses the importance of contemporaneous safeguards, referencing Butz, which noted that built-in protections within the judicial process—such as adversarial proceedings, cross-examination, and impartial fact-finders—are key factors supporting absolute immunity for prosecutors. Safeguards against prosecutorial abuse include both criminal and professional sanctions, but these are often ineffective compared to the protections available within judicial proceedings. Unlike judges, who provide oversight, there is no equivalent scrutiny of prosecutors when they make statements or engage in investigative activities outside the courtroom. Unconstitutional behavior by prosecutors lacks the remedies available in judicial contexts, where opposing counsel and juries can immediately address false allegations. In contrast, when misconduct occurs outside the courtroom, there are no self-correcting mechanisms, underscoring the need for private actions to protect constitutional rights. The effectiveness of sanctions has been questioned, with previous cases indicating that professional discipline may remain largely theoretical, lacking timely inquiries into prosecutorial misconduct. The analysis of safeguards is linked to the stage of proceedings, with post-charging actions receiving closer scrutiny. Additionally, whether a prosecutor's actions align with traditional police functions affects their immunity; prosecutors only receive absolute immunity for conduct directly tied to the judicial process. Acts typically performed by police, even if executed by a prosecutor, do not warrant absolute immunity, as highlighted by the Supreme Court's emphasis on limiting this protection. A prosecutor's decision-making in investigative matters, such as search and seizure, parallels that of a police officer, suggesting that prosecutors should not receive greater protection than law enforcement for similar actions. In the case analyzed, Florey is not entitled to absolute immunity for his role in the photo identification procedure or for preparing affidavits for the Crim. P. 41.1 order and associated warrants. Specifically, Florey is granted only qualified immunity regarding the photo identification procedure, which was limited to two photos of Higgs shown to Price prior to filing criminal charges. This occurred without adversarial safeguards, indicating potential prosecutorial abuse. The characterization of Florey's actions as either legal advice or directive to police suggests they resemble investigative functions, thus qualifying him for only limited immunity. Similarly, Florey and Miller's drafting of the affidavit for the Crim. P. 41.1 order also only qualifies for limited immunity, as this occurred before any criminal charges were filed and lacked probable cause against Higgs. The affidavit's purpose was to gather evidence for an ongoing investigation, further reinforcing its investigative nature. The ex parte nature of the Crim. P. 41.1 proceedings means that the judge only reviews the information provided by the affiant, which does not adequately safeguard against potential abuses during the investigative process. The argument presented by Florey and Miller regarding the motion to suppress evidence as a remedy for abuse is deemed ineffective. This is because such a motion typically arises post-arrest, after the accused has already faced distress and reputational damage. At a suppression hearing, the accused may lack knowledge of any favorable evidence that the prosecution or police may have withheld from the affidavit related to nontestimonial identification evidence. Furthermore, preparing an affidavit for nontestimonial identification is comparable to drafting an affidavit for a search warrant, a standard police function, as acknowledged by Florey and Miller in their testimony. Evidence from the 1983 trial suggested that Florey and Miller were not merely advising on the sufficiency of Rossmeisl's affidavit but played a significant role in writing it and determining its contents. Consequently, the preparation of the affidavit for the Crim. P. 41.1 nontestimonial identification order lacked sufficient ties to the judicial phase of formal prosecution to justify absolute immunity. The drafting of affidavits for Higgs's arrest warrant and search warrant occurred before charges were filed against him. Although the purpose of the arrest warrant is ambiguous since Higgs was charged two weeks post-arrest, Officer Rossmeisl indicated that it is standard procedure to execute both warrants simultaneously to prevent evidence destruction. This context supports the view that the arrest warrant served an investigative function. Despite the affidavits being presented to a judge, the ex parte nature of the warrant proceedings lacks the adversarial safeguards found in the judicial phase of criminal proceedings. Therefore, Florey and Miller are not entitled to absolute immunity for drafting these affidavits, but may claim qualified immunity concerning the photo identification procedure, the Crim. P. 41.1 nontestimonial identification order, and the affidavits for the arrest and search warrants. Lastly, the document addresses challenges by both parties related to the respondent court's order for a new trial on damages. Normally, such an order is not reviewed in an original proceeding; however, due to the ongoing review of prosecutorial immunity, it is deemed prudent to consider the issues surrounding the new trial. Prohibitory relief under C.A.R. 21 is warranted when a trial court clearly abuses its discretion in granting a new trial. Florey and Miller contend that the trial court erred by limiting the new trial to damages only, arguing that the jury's verdict could have been influenced by irrelevant and prejudicial evidence related to Higgs' prosecution post-arrest. They further assert that, even if the new trial order was not a gross abuse, the court still erred by not restricting evidence to events prior to Higgs' arrest. Conversely, Higgs claims the court abused its discretion by ordering a new trial based on excessive damages, suggesting it improperly substituted its judgment for that of the jury. Florey and Miller's argument revolves around the admission of evidence related to events after Higgs' arrest, which they believe could have misled the jury regarding the district attorneys' knowledge, thus tainting the liability verdict and rendering the new trial order an abuse of discretion. However, their reliance on the denial of a pretrial in limine motion to exclude this evidence is deemed misplaced, as they failed to make a contemporaneous objection during the trial. The relevance of the evidence is affirmed, particularly regarding Higgs' damages, which under both federal and Colorado law can encompass nonpecuniary injuries such as emotional distress and loss of reputation. Federal law allows recovery for these damages resulting from constitutional rights violations. Actions under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are cited in several cases, including *Flores v. Pierce*, *Baskin*, and *Foster v. MCI Telecommunications Corp.*, indicating a legal context for civil rights claims. Colorado law also recognizes recovery for losses under general tort principles, referencing multiple cases such as *Rugg v. McCarty* and *Guerrero v. Bailey*. The admissibility of evidence is addressed, emphasizing that evidence valid for one purpose does not become inadmissible for being irrelevant for another, supported by *Spencer v. People*. The court concludes that the admission of the contested evidence did not constitute a gross abuse of discretion and did not prejudice the jury's liability determination. Regarding claims of excessive jury awards, the court looks to federal and state precedents. A jury's award is considered inviolate unless found to be excessively shocking to the judicial conscience, indicating improper influences like passion or prejudice. When a trial judge finds that a jury's verdict was tainted by bias or corruption, a new trial is mandated. However, if the verdict is merely excessive, the court may order a remittitur or a new trial on damages alone if the plaintiff declines the remittitur. Malandris and related cases emphasize that a jury's award should not be deemed excessive unless based on passion, prejudice, or corruption. In the current case, the court found no such basis but determined that the evidence did not support the jury's award, focusing only on Higgs' specific pecuniary losses while ignoring his nonpecuniary losses and the violation of his constitutional rights. The jury's findings included a $20,000 loss from criminal defense costs and a loss of earnings due to the prosecution's impact on his insurance business. Higgs experienced significant emotional distress, leading to a transformation from a respected community member to a reclusive individual contemplating suicide, compounded by public humiliation. The court acknowledged that compensation for violations of constitutional rights should be generous to ensure personal rights are not disregarded. Consequently, given the evidence, the jury's assessment of compensatory damages was justified, and the award should be reinstated, along with exemplary damages. The respondent court erred in linking the compensatory and exemplary damages, stating that exemplary damages must be established beyond a reasonable doubt and must have a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages. Exemplary damages must have a reasonable relationship to compensatory damages, but no strict formula exists for this calculation. The determination of reasonableness involves examining the case facts to ensure the jury was not influenced by prejudice and was appropriately guided by the objectives of exemplary damages. Key factors include: 1) the nature of the act causing injury, 2) the deterrent effect of the award on others, and 3) the defendant's economic status. Past cases have upheld high ratios of exemplary to compensatory damages when juries were properly guided, with examples of ratios such as 10:1, 20:1, and 24:1 being upheld. In this case, the punitive damages awarded were ten times the compensatory damages. Evidence indicated that Florey and Miller acted with "wanton and reckless disregard" for Higgs’ rights. There was no indication that the jury acted out of passion or prejudice, and the exemplary damages were less than a third of the compensatory award. The verdict reflected a conscientious jury decision to punish wrongdoing proportionate to the misconduct's seriousness and the offenders' financial capacity, while also aiming to deter future misconduct. The court concluded that Deputy District Attorney Florey was not absolutely immune from liability under section 1983 regarding his involvement in the identification procedure, nor were Florey and Miller immune for their actions related to affidavits and warrants. The jury's damages were not excessive, and the court found that it erred in overturning the jury's verdict and ordering a new trial. The rule was made absolute in one case and discharged in another, with a dissent from Justice Erickson. The majority opinion has limited the absolute immunity typically accorded to prosecutors under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. However, it is argued that deputy district attorneys Florey and Miller should retain absolute immunity for their actions, which included approving a photo identification procedure, drafting affidavits for a nontestimonial identification order, and assisting in the preparation of arrest and search warrants. The investigation initially focused on Ronald Higgs, who was identified by Sandra Price as her assailant based on specific details, including a distinct silver ring and the ownership of a blue and white pickup truck. The American Bar Association's Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function outline that prosecutors are responsible for providing legal advice to police and must approve warrant requests. Prosecutors are granted broad discretion in charging decisions and are absolutely immune from civil liability for actions related to initiating and trying a criminal case, as established in Imbler v. Pachtman. The rationale for this immunity extends to actions preceding formal charges. Previous cases support that investigative efforts by prosecutors to gather information for charging decisions also fall under absolute immunity. The dissenting opinion argues against the majority's strict requirement for the filing of charges as a condition for immunity, citing cases where prosecutors were protected for actions taken before any charges were filed. The majority's claim that filing charges poses a greater risk of inciting retaliatory litigation than precharging decisions lacks factual support in Higgs' case, where all damage claims under section 1983 stem from alleged prosecutorial misconduct occurring before charges were filed. The majority's interpretation of the "functional test" for prosecutorial immunity diverges from established precedent, suggesting absolute immunity for prosecutorial actions in an "advocatory" role but only qualified immunity in an "investigative" capacity. This distinction could hinder cooperation between prosecutors and police, potentially necessitating independent counsel for police actions. The majority's reliance on a "traditional police function" test is criticized for erroneously categorizing prosecutorial conduct, such as criminal investigations integral to case preparation, as non-quasi-judicial and undeserving of absolute immunity as defined by Imbler. Prior cases support that such prosecutorial investigations should receive absolute immunity under section 1983. Alternative remedies for prosecutorial misconduct exist, including the adversarial trial process and professional disciplinary measures, which should factor into the determination of immunity. Consequently, Florey and Miller should be granted absolute immunity for the actions alleged by Higgs, including the approval of a photo lineup and the drafting of an affidavit supporting criminal charges. The order for nontestimonial identification evidence and the drafting of affidavits for arrest and search warrants related to Ronald Higgs were investigative measures aimed at determining the appropriateness of prosecution against him. The legal principle established in Sandoval v. Farish emphasizes that prosecutors should not face barriers that inhibit their ability to make independent charging decisions, as undue litigation could distract them from their public duties and compromise their judgment. The dissenting opinion advocates for affirming the district court's decision to set aside verdicts against Deputy District Attorneys Florey and Miller based on absolute immunity. Higgs initially filed a complaint alleging various claims, including malicious mistaken identification and conspiracy against several parties, including Sandra and Richard Price, law enforcement officers, and Deputy District Attorneys. The trial court dismissed most claims against Sandra Price, and her liability for malicious prosecution was ultimately established. Claims against Richard Price were largely dismissed, with only a conspiracy claim proceeding. Claims against officers Rossmeisl, Rozycki, and Smith were mostly dismissed, with Rossmeisl and Rozycki found liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, while Smith was exonerated. The trial court dismissed many claims against Miller and Florey, with liability established under the same civil rights statute. Claims against Deputy District Attorney Peters were dismissed by mutual agreement prior to trial. Additionally, it was noted that there were no snow accumulations on the property relevant to the case, and Higgs retained his old vehicle’s license plates when he acquired a new one. Higgs presented a work order from the dealership confirming the installation of his truck's license plates on May 5, 1978. The Douglas County Sheriff's Office focused its investigation on residents of the Acres Green subdivision following a report of a suspicious vehicle that matched the description of the assailant’s truck. A neighbor reported seeing the vehicle, which left the subdivision and turned onto Colorado Highway 470. The sheriff's officers followed the neighbor but then turned back. Upon re-entering the subdivision, they encountered Higgs and his wife in his truck. Knowing the subdivision had only one exit, the officers realized Higgs' truck couldn't be the reported suspicious vehicle but still decided to stop him. According to Crim. P. 41.1, a nontestimonial identification order requires probable cause that an offense occurred, reasonable grounds to suspect the individual named committed the offense, and that nontestimonial procedures would materially aid in the investigation. The sheriff's office sought body fluid samples from Higgs to analyze whether he could have deposited semen found on Price's panties after a rape. Analysis indicated Higgs was in the 88th percentile of males who could theoretically have deposited such semen; however, he had undergone a successful vasectomy in 1970, rendering him incapable of depositing fertile semen. The affidavit submitted for the nontestimonial identification order did not disclose that Price's rape examination revealed no physical evidence of assault, nor did it mention that no corroborative evidence supported Price’s claims. Additionally, although Officer Rossmeisl indicated that Price's identification was tentative, the affidavit stated she was certain Higgs was the assailant. Hospital staff at Swedish Medical Center requested hair samples from Price's husband for comparison, but these were never analyzed due to instructions from the district attorney's office. Furthermore, prior to a hearing on Higgs' motion to suppress Price's identification, Officer Rossmeisl reportedly informed Deputy District Attorney Florey that the underwear found at Price's home had not been worn by her after the alleged assault. Comparison of Higgs' body fluids with the semen found on the panties is deemed irrelevant, as the semen was likely deposited prior to the alleged rape on April 15. The initial belief by law enforcement that Price wore the panties after the first incident remains unclear. During the hearing, the prosecution requested the removal of references to the underwear and semen from all affidavits to reassess probable cause. The trial judge determined that the remaining statements still supported probable cause. Florey and Miller argue several points: their actions were adversarial and could lead to retaliatory lawsuits, they gathered essential information for prosecution, their conduct was part of a focused investigation, adequate safeguards were in place against prosecutorial abuse, and any harm Higgs experienced arose from the trial process and is thus protected by immunity. The excerpt also references the Supreme Court case Stump v. Sparkman, which clarifies the concept of "clear absence of all jurisdiction." It explains that a judge acting outside their jurisdiction can be liable, while a judge exceeding their jurisdiction still retains immunity. The discussion continues with Pierson v. Ray, affirming that Congress did not intend to eliminate common-law judicial immunity under 42 U.S.C. 1983, thus protecting judges in actions alleging violation of constitutional rights. Furthermore, it notes that a prosecutor's role as an advocate places them at risk of retaliatory lawsuits, which could hinder their decision-making and the functioning of the criminal justice system. Concerns about personal liability may deter prosecutors from pursuing cases with uncertain evidence, negatively impacting the truth-seeking process of trials and appellate reviews. Absolute immunity for prosecutors performing quasi-judicial acts does not exempt them from accountability for misconduct, as criminal penalties and professional discipline remain applicable. Under 18 U.S.C. § 242, it is a criminal offense to willfully deprive individuals of their constitutional rights under color of law. When evaluating qualified immunity, allegations of malice are insufficient to impose litigation costs on governmental officials. The objective reasonableness standard allows courts to dismiss insubstantial claims via summary judgment, which is not feasible under a subjective good faith standard. Courts can determine if the law was clearly established at the time of the alleged misconduct; if it was not, officials cannot be expected to have known it was unlawful. Discovery should be paused until the immunity question is settled. If the law was clear, the immunity defense typically fails, as public officials should be aware of the governing standards. However, if officials claim extraordinary circumstances and demonstrate ignorance of the legal standard, the defense may be upheld, largely based on objective factors. The dissenting opinion suggests a strict rule based on the timing of criminal charge filings; however, the majority decision acknowledges that no definitive test exists for resolving immunity issues and that the timing of prosecutorial actions relative to charge filings is just one factor to consider. Additionally, extending absolute immunity to prosecutors in investigatory roles would unjustly equate their protections with those of police officers, who typically receive only qualified immunity for similar conduct. Rossmeisl testified that he sought guidance from Florey regarding the appropriateness of a photo lineup, felt compelled to follow Florey’s advice, and acted accordingly. The defendants referenced Lerwill v. Joslin to assert that obtaining an arrest warrant grants a prosecutor absolute immunity as an advocate before a judge. However, the case at hand differs, as Higgs was arrested approximately two weeks prior to formal charges, making it difficult to categorize the arrest as part of the prosecution initiation. The court referenced Rex v. Teeples, where a deputy district attorney’s involvement in pre-charging interrogations was deemed non-advocatory and entitled to only qualified immunity. The decision emphasizes that qualified immunity should not deter prosecutors from providing reasonable legal advice to law enforcement in investigative contexts, as supported by ABA Standards. The dissent’s call for absolute immunity in cases of misconduct, such as obtaining warrants based on known false information, is criticized as overly expansive and inconsistent with the purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983, which aims to allow redress for violations of constitutional rights. Furthermore, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 outlines the jurisdiction of district courts in civil rights matters, indicating that common law may supplement federal laws where necessary. Lastly, the rule of multiple admissibility is constrained by CRE 403, allowing exclusion of evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the risk of unfair prejudice. The respondent court provided the jury with guidance on assessing the actions of Florey and Miller as potential violations of Higgs' civil rights, emphasizing that evaluations should be based on the circumstances at the time rather than hindsight. The jury was instructed that Higgs' acquittal did not necessarily imply that Sandra Price lacked probable cause for her complaint to the sheriff's office, indicating that the jury should not be influenced by the outcome of the criminal trial regarding the claims against Florey and Miller. These instructions collectively minimized any potential bias from the evidence presented. In cases where damages awarded are deemed excessive but liability is established, a new trial on damages alone may be warranted, as supported by Colorado case law. The court’s instructions regarding exemplary damages stated that if the jury found in favor of Higgs and awarded actual damages, they should then consider whether exemplary damages apply. To award such damages, the jury must find, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the defendant's actions involved fraud, malice, insult, or a reckless disregard for Higgs' rights. Exemplary damages are meant to punish the defendant and serve as a warning to others, rather than to compensate the plaintiff for their injuries.