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State v. Shabazz
Citations: 662 S.E.2d 828; 291 Ga. App. 751; 2008 Fulton County D. Rep. 1958; 2008 Ga. App. LEXIS 635Docket: A08A0965
Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; June 3, 2008; Georgia; State Appellate Court
The Court of Appeals of Georgia reversed the State Court of DeKalb County's decision to sustain Yasmin Shabazz's demurrer regarding charges of failing to obey a traffic control device and failing to yield the right of way while turning left. The State appealed, arguing that the trial court erred by concluding the accusation was fatally defective. Shabazz contended that the ruling effectively functioned as a directed verdict of acquittal due to insufficient evidence, which the State cannot appeal. However, the court clarified that the ruling was a dismissal based on the wording of the accusation, which allowed for the appeal under OCGA § 5-7-1(a)(1). Additionally, the State argued that Shabazz's demurrer was filed late, more than ten days after waiver of arraignment, which typically precludes consideration on the merits. Nevertheless, if an accusation is fundamentally defective and charges no offense, it can be challenged at any time during the trial. The court agreed that the trial court did not err in considering the demurrer because Shabazz claimed the accusation failed to charge any offense. Ultimately, the court found that the accusation was not fatally defective as it adequately referenced the relevant penal statutes, thereby allowing the appeal to proceed. An accusation against an individual for violating a specific Code section is not considered fatally defective, even if it omits an essential element of the offense. In this case, Yasmin Shabazz was charged with failure to yield the right of way, which occurred on March 7, 2007, while attempting to turn left at an intersection regulated by traffic lights. The accusation cited OCGA 40-6-20 and 40-6-71, the latter requiring drivers intending to turn left to yield to oncoming vehicles that pose an immediate hazard. Although the accusation did not explicitly state that the other vehicle was approaching from the opposite direction, it was deemed sufficient because it referenced the relevant Code section. Consequently, the trial court incorrectly upheld Shabazz's demurrer regarding the charge under OCGA 40-6-71. Additionally, while the accusation did not specify which traffic control device instruction Shabazz allegedly disobeyed under OCGA 40-6-20, she could not deny failure to yield without admitting to the offense of not obeying a traffic control device. The judgment was reversed, with concurrence from Blackburn, P.J., and Miller, J.