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Owney v. Owney
Citations: 379 S.E.2d 745; 8 Va. App. 255; 5 Va. Law Rep. 2566; 1989 Va. App. LEXIS 59Docket: Record No. 0068-88-1
Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia; May 16, 1989; Virginia; State Appellate Court
Waverly H. Owney, Jr. appeals a divorce decree mandating him to pay $182 monthly as spousal support, derived from a separation and property settlement agreement with Alice Faye Owney. The key issue on appeal is whether Owney's obligation to make monthly mortgage payments continues after his wife paid off the first deed of trust. The couple's agreement stated that Owney would be responsible for the mortgage payments on their marital home, while the wife would handle a separate debt. After a notice of acceleration from the Farmers Home Administration due to a default, Alice refinanced the debt and paid it off in full, leading Owney to cease his payments. In her divorce complaint, Alice sought confirmation of their agreement and requested reimbursement for the payments made. Owney admitted to the payment but argued it voided his obligation due to lack of consultation. He also denied adultery and counterclaimed for divorce based on constructive desertion. The Court of Appeals of Virginia ultimately reversed the lower court's decree and remanded the case for further proceedings. At an ore tenus hearing, the wife and husband provided testimony regarding their separation agreement. The wife stated she contacted the husband about refinancing a loan, to which he responded she could proceed. The husband affirmed he advised her to handle the refinancing. The trial judge analyzed paragraph 6 of their separation agreement, concluding that the $182.00 payment was intended as spousal support. A decree dated December 17, 1987, mandated the husband to pay the wife $182.00 monthly until a total of $19,055.14 was paid or until she remarried. The court emphasized the authority of a circuit judge to incorporate agreements by reference into divorce decrees, which allows for enforcement through contempt powers. However, the judge has discretion over what parts of the agreement to incorporate. Failure to incorporate an agreement limits the court's enforcement powers, but does not invalidate the agreement itself. The wife's request to enforce a specific provision of the agreement was hindered by the lack of incorporation in the decree. The trial judge ultimately issued a decree interpreting the payment as spousal support, yet did not incorporate the agreement by reference, indicating a decision based on statutory authority rather than the separation agreement itself. This approach was deemed an error due to the failure to incorporate the agreement properly. The trial judge lacked authority to award spousal support due to a specific contractual agreement between the parties, as outlined in Code § 20-109, which mandates adherence to the terms of a filed contract before a final decree. The agreement explicitly releases both parties from claims for alimony or support. The trial court incorrectly interpreted payments outlined in the agreement as spousal support, awarding $182.00 monthly, which conflicted with the contract's language. The dispute involved differing interpretations of the husband's obligation under paragraph six, concerning payments for a deed of trust note. The husband argued that his obligation ended with the deed’s existence, while the wife contended that he remained responsible despite the debt being accelerated and her refinancing actions. The case requires determination of the husband’s ongoing legal obligation under the contract and whether he breached it by failing to make payments since March 1987. The resolution is distinct from spousal support issues. The court remands the case for further proceedings to assess the validity of the agreement, the husband's obligations, and the potential incorporation of the agreement into a decree, reversing the prior decree in the process. The court also determined that the decree was final and thus appealable.