Court: Court of Appeals of Georgia; March 15, 1996; Georgia; State Appellate Court
Wright was hired as the president and CEO of Metlife's consumer finance subsidiary, MFAC, in 1987, but was terminated in August 1989 following a management change. He entered a settlement agreement that included mutual releases of claims. In March 1993, Wright filed a lawsuit against Metlife and its affiliates, alleging breach of contract, defamation, trespass, invasion of privacy, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. The state court granted partial summary judgment in favor of the individual defendants on the breach of contract claim but denied summary judgment on the remaining issues.
Defendants sought interlocutory appeals, with Fowler appealing separately. The court held that the state court erred by not granting summary judgment on the defamation claims, noting that the statute of limitations for defamation is one year. Wright's argument for tolling the statute of limitations based on ignorance of the facts was rejected, as was his reliance on the discovery rule, which is limited to bodily injury cases. There was no evidence of fraudulent concealment to toll the statute, and mere silence was insufficient to establish the necessary conditions for tolling. Additionally, Wright failed to provide evidence of actionable defamation within the limitations period; instances he cited were found to be either privileged statements or not attributable to the defendants.
The state court erred by not granting summary judgment for the corporate defendants on the plaintiff's breach of contract claim. The settlement agreement explicitly included a release clause that discharged Mr. Wright from all potential claims related to his employment, including those based on negligence or intentional misconduct. The court found that the phrase "release, acquit, and forever discharge" did not impose any obligation on the defendants to refrain from making statements about the plaintiff's management of MFAC. The plaintiff's interpretation of the contract to imply a prohibition on disparagement was deemed unreasonable. Additionally, the parol evidence cited by the plaintiff was inadmissible according to existing case law. As there was no contractual obligation for the defendants to avoid comments regarding the plaintiff as long as those comments were truthful, any potential claim based on disparaging statements was invalid. If any untruthful statements were made, they would constitute defamation, subject to a one-year statute of limitations. After reviewing the record, the court found no factual basis for the plaintiff's remaining claims, leading to the conclusion that summary judgment should have been granted to the defendants on all issues. The judgment was reversed, with Judges Andrews and Blackburn concurring.
