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Ieronimo v. Hagerman
Citations: 380 P.2d 1013; 93 Ariz. 357; 1963 Ariz. LEXIS 419Docket: 6854
Court: Arizona Supreme Court; April 17, 1963; Arizona; State Supreme Court
In the case of Joe N. Ieronimo v. Will F. Hagerman, the Arizona Supreme Court addressed an automobile collision involving Ieronimo and Hagerman at an intersection in Phoenix. Ieronimo appealed a lower court verdict favoring Hagerman. The collision occurred when Hagerman, turning left at the intersection, was struck by Ieronimo's vehicle. Ieronimo challenged the trial court's instruction based on A.R.S. 28-772, which mandates that a driver turning left must yield to oncoming traffic that poses an immediate hazard. He argued that the court's instruction allowed Hagerman to ignore the duties of yielding and signaling if he deemed the oncoming traffic not to be an immediate hazard. The court clarified that jury instructions should be considered as a whole. The trial court had provided an instruction consistent with Ieronimo's concerns, emphasizing that a motorist must yield and signal before making a left turn. It also instructed that any violation of these duties constitutes negligence. Additionally, the court noted that drivers making left turns are entitled to assume that oncoming vehicles will reduce speed appropriately when approaching an intersection. The court concluded that the instructions given adequately addressed the legal obligations of both parties, supporting the jury's understanding of the applicable laws. An instruction was found to be reversible error in the context of traffic-controlled highways, specifically noting that it implied that a driver on a favored highway must always reduce speed when approaching an intersection, which is inconsistent with A.R.S. 28-701. This statute mandates driving at a speed that is reasonable and prudent, considering actual and potential hazards. The court clarified that a lawful speed does not necessitate a reduction unless hazards warrant it. The misleading instruction was deemed prejudicial, and the presence of a correct instruction on the same topic did not rectify the error, as it was unclear which instruction the jury followed. Additionally, the objection raised by the appellant regarding the instruction was sufficiently communicated during trial discussions. The court upheld the admission of evidence regarding subsequent accidents, as it suggested that the plaintiff's wrist injury might have occurred elsewhere. Testimony indicated inconsistencies in the plaintiff's claims about the injury. Consequently, the judgment was reversed due to the erroneous instruction. Judges Bernstein, Udall, Jennings, and Lockwood concurred.