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State v. Reed
Citations: 992 P.2d 1132; 196 Ariz. 37; 293 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 20; 1999 Ariz. App. LEXIS 55Docket: 2 CA-CR 98-0106
Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; April 13, 1999; Arizona; State Appellate Court
In the case of State of Arizona v. Russell Norman Reed, the appellant was convicted of fraudulent scheme and theft by control after a two-day jury trial, receiving a sentence of 15.75 years. On the second day of trial, Reed was absent due to a suicide attempt, which led to his hospitalization. His defense counsel waived his presence for jury instructions and did not object to the trial proceeding without him. Following his conviction, Reed filed a motion for a new trial, arguing his absence was involuntary. The trial court determined that Reed's absence was voluntary, as he had prior notice of the trial and did not inform the court about his situation that day. The court reviewed testimonies from two expert witnesses regarding Reed’s mental state. Dr. Geffen stated Reed was incompetent to waive his presence, while Dr. LaWall argued that Reed made a rational decision to terminate his trial by attempting suicide. Ultimately, the court sided with Dr. LaWall's assessment, concluding that Reed's suicide attempt did not automatically render his absence involuntary, and denied the motion for a new trial. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision, emphasizing the established legal standards regarding a defendant's right to be present at trial and the burden on the defendant to prove involuntary absence. This case establishes that an attempted suicide leading to hospitalization can be interpreted as a voluntary waiver of a defendant's right to be present at trial, as seen in precedents such as United States v. Davis and Bottom v. State. In these cases, defendants who attempted suicide were deemed to have voluntarily chosen to forgo their right to attend their trials. The court found that the appellant, despite being depressed but not psychotic, made a conscious decision to attempt to end his life to avoid the trial, which constituted a voluntary waiver of his presence. Additionally, the appellant argued that the trial court erred by not providing a jury instruction on duress. The court explained that for duress to apply, there must be evidence of immediate physical threats. Here, the evidence only suggested that the appellant faced gambling debts, which did not meet the threshold for duress under A.R.S. 13-412. Consequently, the trial court correctly refused the jury instruction on duress. The appellant's conviction and the imposed sentence were affirmed by the court.