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Swingle v. Myerson

Citations: 509 P.2d 738; 19 Ariz. App. 607; 1973 Ariz. App. LEXIS 608Docket: 2 CA-CIV 1313

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; May 9, 1973; Arizona; State Appellate Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

In the case of Swingle v. Myerson, the appellant, Roy C. Swingle, contested a $6,000 judgment awarded to Joseph Myerson for a finder's fee based on quantum meruit. The dispute arose after Swingle acquired a controlling interest in a savings and loan association, facilitated by Myerson, who had arranged meetings and negotiations essential for the acquisition. Despite the absence of an express contract, the trial court found that Myerson had a reasonable expectation of compensation for his services, which benefitted Swingle, thereby establishing an implied contract. The court ruled that quantum meruit was the appropriate measure of the services' value, affirming that the oral agreement for the finder's fee did not fall under the Statute of Frauds. The judgment was upheld on appeal, with the court concluding that Myerson's role in identifying and facilitating the business opportunity was sufficient to warrant the fee, even though he was not the direct cause of the stock transfer and branch establishment. The decision clarified the enforceability of implied contracts through conduct and silence in the absence of an express rejection of services.

Legal Issues Addressed

Acceptance by Conduct and Silence

Application: Swingle's acceptance of Myerson's services without rejection, despite Myerson's reminder of the fee, constituted acceptance by conduct, supporting the implied contract.

Reasoning: Myerson's initial communication to Swingle created a duty for Swingle to reject the services if he did not want to pay. Instead, he accepted Myerson's services, which included facilitating meetings and negotiations necessary for the stock acquisition, further solidifying Myerson's claim to the fee.

Efficient, Proximate and Procuring Cause

Application: The court found that Myerson's role was to identify a business opportunity and facilitate the transaction, which was sufficient for awarding the finder's fee without being the proximate cause of the stock transfer and branch establishment.

Reasoning: The appellant further argued that Myerson must be the 'efficient, proximate and procuring cause' for the stock transfer and Tucson branch establishment. However, the court disagreed, stating Myerson's sole role was to identify a business opportunity and that he expected compensation for facilitating the transaction.

Quantum Meruit and Implied Contracts

Application: The court determined that Myerson had a reasonable expectation of compensation for services rendered, which benefited Swingle, resulting in an implied contract based on the principle of quantum meruit.

Reasoning: The trial court determined that while no express contract existed, Myerson had a reasonable expectation of compensation for his services, which benefited Swingle by enabling him to acquire over 51% of the stock in Security Savings and Loan Association.

Statute of Frauds and Oral Contracts

Application: The court affirmed that oral agreements for finder's fees not involving real property or mines do not fall under the Statute of Frauds, supporting the enforceability of the implied contract.

Reasoning: Although the appellant argued that oral agreements for finder's fees pose risks for unfounded claims, he acknowledged that such contracts, not involving real property or mines, fall outside the Statute of Frauds (A.R.S. 44-101).