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State v. Tacoma-Pierce County Multiple Listing Service

Citations: 622 P.2d 1190; 95 Wash. 2d 280; 1980 Wash. LEXIS 1453; 1980 Trade Cas. (CCH) 63Docket: 45873, 45874, 45966

Court: Washington Supreme Court; December 31, 1980; Washington; State Supreme Court

Narrative Opinion Summary

The Attorney General of Washington initiated antitrust actions against multiple real estate boards for allegedly violating the Consumer Protection Act by denying MLS access to non-member brokers, thereby suppressing competition. The trial courts dismissed the cases for failure to state a claim, and the Supreme Court of Washington consolidated the cases for review, addressing issues of exhaustion of remedies, primary jurisdiction, and standing. The court held that the exhaustion doctrine was inapplicable, as the relevant agencies lacked authority over Consumer Protection Act violations. Furthermore, the court found that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not apply, as the antitrust issues fell outside the agencies' competence. The Attorney General's standing was upheld, allowing enforcement actions in superior court. The court reversed the trial court's dismissals, emphasizing that the alleged antitrust violations warranted judicial consideration. Justice Brachtanbach dissented, advocating for the application of primary jurisdiction, while the majority underscored the distinct roles of courts and agencies in antitrust matters.

Legal Issues Addressed

Exhaustion of Remedies under Consumer Protection Act

Application: The exhaustion doctrine does not apply because the Real Estate Commission and the Department of Licensing lack the authority to regulate multiple listing associations or impose penalties related to the Consumer Protection Act.

Reasoning: The court emphasizes that these agencies lack authority to regulate multiple listing associations or to impose penalties related to the Consumer Protection Act, thus the exhaustion doctrine does not apply.

Permitted Actions Exception under RCW 19.86.170

Application: Neither the Department of Licensing nor the Real Estate Commission provided overt affirmative action approving the MLS membership restrictions, so the permitted actions exception does not apply.

Reasoning: In the current case, neither the Department of Licensing nor the Real Estate Commission provided such approval for the questioned actions.

Primary Jurisdiction and Antitrust Issues under Consumer Protection Act

Application: The court determined that primary jurisdiction does not apply as the administrative agencies do not have authority or special competence over antitrust issues under the Consumer Protection Act.

Reasoning: The defendants do not satisfy any of these criteria, and no statutory provisions support deferring to the administrative bodies concerning antitrust violations in this context.

Standing of Attorney General in Antitrust Actions

Application: The Attorney General is authorized to bring actions under the Consumer Protection Act in superior court, irrespective of the enforcement restrictions on the Department of Licensing.

Reasoning: This does not affect the Attorney General's standing to bring actions under RCW 19.86, where they are explicitly authorized to do so in superior court.