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Agostini v. Felton
Citations: 138 L. Ed. 2d 391; 117 S. Ct. 1997; 521 U.S. 203; 1997 U.S. LEXIS 4000Docket: 96-552
Court: Supreme Court of the United States; June 23, 1997; Federal Supreme Court; Federal Appellate Court
In the case of Agostini v. Felton, the Supreme Court addressed the constitutionality of a New York City program that provided public school teachers for remedial education in parochial schools, previously ruled unconstitutional under the Establishment Clause in Aguilar v. Felton. Petitioners sought relief from a permanent injunction based on claims of excessive compliance costs and changes in legal interpretations regarding the Establishment Clause. The District Court and the Second Circuit denied the motion, stating that Aguilar had not been overruled. The Supreme Court held that federally funded programs delivering supplemental education on a neutral basis are permissible under the Establishment Clause, even when conducted on sectarian school premises, provided adequate safeguards are in place. Consequently, Aguilar and associated rulings regarding similar programs were deemed no longer valid. The Court clarified that Rule 60(b)(5) allows for relief from an injunction if there is a significant change in law or fact, but the petitioners failed to demonstrate such a change since the costs of compliance were known at the time of the Aguilar decision, and opinions expressed by Justices in other cases did not constitute a legal change. The Court also reaffirmed the precedent set by the Lemon v. Kurtzman test, noting that while the programs may serve a secular purpose, the potential for advancing religion must be scrutinized. Three key assumptions underlie the conclusion regarding the relationship between public employees and religious schools: (i) public employees working in religious school settings are presumed to promote religion; (ii) their presence creates an unconstitutional symbolic union between church and state; and (iii) any public aid that supports religious schools can be seen as financing religious indoctrination, even if the aid results from private decisions. Additionally, a fourth assumption from Aguilar posits that New York City's Title I program leads to excessive government entanglement with religion, necessitating close oversight of public employees to prevent religious instruction. However, recent court rulings have challenged these assumptions. It is now recognized that placing government employees in parochial schools does not inherently advance religion or promote indoctrination. The Court has rejected the presumption that such employees will inevitably inculcate religion and has clarified that not all government aid to religious schools is unconstitutional. The provision of instructional services in New York City's Title I program is similar to providing a sign-language interpreter, and recent precedents indicate that such programs will not be deemed to advance religion unlawfully. Furthermore, New York City's Title I program does not incentivize recipients to alter their religious beliefs to access services. Unlike previous cases, the criteria for aid allocation are neutral and secular, available to all eligible children regardless of their religious affiliations. This approach reduces the likelihood that the aid will advance religion, as it does not favor or disadvantage any religious group. The Aguilar Court's determination that New York City's Title I program led to excessive church-state entanglement is challenged. The evaluation of entanglement, whether viewed as part of assessing a program's advancement of religion or as a separate factor, relies on examining the institutions benefited, the nature of state aid, and the relationship between government and religious entities. The Aguilar Court identified three grounds for its excessive entanglement finding: (1) the need for extensive monitoring of Title I employees to prevent religious instruction; (2) required administrative cooperation between government and parochial schools; and (3) potential political divisiveness. However, the last two issues are deemed insufficient for finding excessive entanglement, as they would arise regardless of where Title I services are provided. Additionally, the first concern has been mitigated by the Zobrest decision, which eliminated the assumption that public employees will indoctrinate religion in sectarian settings. There is no evidence suggesting that New York City's monitoring system is inadequate. The Court has previously found no excessive entanglement in circumstances with greater burdens on religious institutions. Consequently, NYC's Title I program does not violate the criteria assessing whether government aid advances religion, as it does not lead to governmental indoctrination, does not define recipients by religion, and does not create excessive entanglement. Furthermore, the doctrine of stare decisis allows the Court to recognize changes in the law and overrule Aguilar and conflicting aspects of Ball. Acknowledging that Aguilar would likely be decided differently today, the Court suggests that adhering to it would result in manifest injustice, permitting the petitioners relief under Rule 60(b)(5). The Court typically applies its current rulings to the parties involved, maintaining that lower courts should follow controlling precedents while leaving the overruling of its decisions to the Supreme Court itself. Respondents' objections to granting relief center on several points: the need for a different analysis since the Court is reviewing the District Court's denial of relief for abuse of discretion; concerns that petitioners' unique application of Rule 60(b)(5) to change law rather than recognize it may overwhelm federal courts with motions; the potential erosion of the Court's institutional integrity; and the suggestion that the Court should await a more suitable case to assess the ongoing relevance of Aguilar. These arguments were deemed unpersuasive. The Court, led by Justice O'Connor, reversed and remanded the case, concluding that Aguilar v. Felton, which previously restricted public school teachers from providing education in parochial schools under the Establishment Clause, is inconsistent with modern jurisprudence. Petitioners, bound by a permanent injunction resulting from Aguilar, claim that the ruling no longer aligns with subsequent decisions regarding the Establishment Clause and are entitled to relief under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(5). The excerpt also outlines Title I of the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, which aims to ensure educational opportunities for all children, guiding federal funds to local educational agencies (LEAs) to provide remedial services. LEAs must offer equitable services to students in private schools, subject to specific restrictions not applicable to public schools. The Local Education Agency (LEA) must maintain full control over Title I funds and retain ownership of all materials used for Title I services, which must be delivered by public employees or independent persons, excluding private and religious institutions. Title I services must be secular, neutral, and nonideological, and they must supplement rather than supplant services already provided by private schools. The Board of Education of the City of New York has faced challenges since 1966 in providing Title I services to private school students, with about 10% of eligible students attending private institutions, many of which are sectarian. Initial efforts, such as transporting students to public schools for after-school instruction, were unsuccessful due to low attendance and safety concerns. Subsequently, the Board moved Title I services to private school campuses, aligning with congressional intent. Despite mixed results from this approach, a plan was evaluated in Aguilar v. Felton, which mandated that Title I services be offered on private school premises during school hours exclusively by public employees. These employees received specific guidelines to uphold the secular nature of Title I, including accountability to the Board, responsibility for selecting eligible students, exclusive use of Title I materials, prohibition against collaboration with private school teachers, and avoidance of religious content. Compliance was monitored by field supervisors conducting monthly unannounced classroom visits. In 1978, six federal taxpayers filed a lawsuit against the Board in the Eastern District of New York, alleging that the Board's Title I program violated the Establishment Clause. The court allowed parents of parochial school students receiving Title I services to intervene as codefendants. Initially, the District Court ruled in favor of the Board, but the Second Circuit Court of Appeals reversed this decision, citing precedents that deemed the program unconstitutional despite its benefits. The Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's ruling in a 5-4 decision, emphasizing that the program led to excessive church-state entanglement. Consequently, the District Court issued a permanent injunction preventing the Board from using public funds for Title I programs in sectarian schools. In response, the Board modified its Title I program to provide services off-site, utilizing public schools, leased locations, and mobile units instead of religious school premises. This adjustment included computer-aided instruction, which allowed educational services without public employees being on religious school grounds. Compliance with these changes has incurred significant costs, exceeding $100 million since the 1986-1987 school year, with an average additional cost of around $15 million annually. These "Aguilar costs," mandated by the Supreme Court's decision, must be deducted from federal grants before Title I funds are distributed, consequently reducing the available funds for remedial education and leading to a decline in services for approximately 20,000 economically disadvantaged children in New York City and 183,000 nationwide. In late 1995, the Board and a new group of parents filed motions seeking relief from the permanent injunction established after the Aguilar ruling. Petitioners sought relief under Rule 60(b)(5), referencing the Supreme Court's decision in Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, arguing that changes in law justified revisiting the injunction originally aimed at preventing certain actions. They highlighted comments from five Justices in Board of Ed. of Kiryas Joel Village School Dist. v. Grumet, which called for overruling Aguilar, the case underpinning the injunction. The District Court denied the motion, acknowledging that petitioners were essentially seeking a means to challenge the injunction's propriety before the Supreme Court. While recognizing shifts in Establishment Clause jurisprudence and the potential for Aguilar's overruling, the District Court determined that Aguilar had not yet been officially overruled and thus denied the Rule 60(b) motion based on this premise. The Second Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed this decision. The Supreme Court granted certiorari to determine whether petitioners were entitled to relief under Rule 60(b), which allows for modification if a judgment is no longer equitable due to significant changes in factual or legal circumstances. Petitioners identified three key reasons for modification: the high costs of compliance with the injunction, expressions from a majority of Justices questioning Aguilar, and subsequent legal decisions that have undermined Aguilar's principles. Respondents assert that the District Court correctly denied petitioners' motions since the costs associated with providing Title I services off-site were known at the time of the Aguilar decision, and no changes in relevant law or facts have occurred. The court emphasizes that petitioners did not demonstrate a significant change in factual conditions as required by Rufo, noting that both parties were aware of the additional costs involved in providing services outside of parochial schools when Aguilar was decided. The court further states that the accuracy of predicted costs does not justify relief under Rule 60(b)(5), as modifications should not be granted based on anticipated events. Additionally, the court addresses the implications of statements made by five Justices in Kiryas Joel regarding the Establishment Clause. The case involved the creation of a new public school district for Satmar children to receive special educational services without leaving their village. Although the Justices suggested reconsideration of Aguilar, the court concludes that these opinions do not signify a change in Establishment Clause law. Consequently, to determine if Aguilar remains good law, the court will evaluate whether subsequent Establishment Clause rulings have undermined it, requiring an understanding of the rationale behind Aguilar and its companion case, School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball. The Court examined the School District of Grand Rapids' Shared Time program, which provided public-funded remedial and enrichment classes to students in nonpublic schools, primarily religious institutions. The program utilized public teachers and materials during regular school hours on nonpublic school premises. Of 41 eligible nonpublic schools, 40 were deemed "pervasively sectarian," with the intention to promote specific religious beliefs. Utilizing the Lemon test, the Court found the program had a secular purpose but ultimately concluded it advanced religion impermissibly, violating the Establishment Clause. The Court cited three main reasons for this conclusion: 1. Teachers in the program could inadvertently impart religious beliefs due to the religious environment of the schools, reminiscent of issues raised in Meek v. Pittenger, where secular services in religious settings raised similar concerns. 2. The conduct of classes on religious school grounds created a substantial risk that teachers would conform their instruction to the sectarian context, leading to potential state-sponsored indoctrination. 3. The school district's lack of oversight regarding religious content in the courses heightened the risk of indoctrination. The Court deemed the absence of specific evidence of indoctrination irrelevant, as potential witnesses, primarily from the parochial schools, might lack the means or motivation to report such incidents. The presence of public teachers in parochial schools created a problematic perception of a union between church and state, which could convey government endorsement of religion, violating the Establishment Clause. The Court deemed the Shared Time program unconstitutional as it directly financed religious indoctrination, categorizing it alongside prior cases where state aid substantially advanced religious missions. This program, which provided both teachers and instructional materials, was found to be a form of direct aid that supported the religious educational functions of sectarian schools, similar to the invalidated programs in Meek and Wolman. The Court also noted that the distinction of providing aid to students rather than directly to schools did not mitigate the impermissible effects. In a related case, the New York City Title I program was criticized for requiring a monitoring system to oversee religious content, which the Court believed would lead to excessive entanglement between church and state, echoing concerns from previous rulings. Ultimately, the Title I program was considered to share critical elements of entanglement with the invalidated programs, as it operated within a pervasively sectarian environment and necessitated ongoing oversight to prevent religious messages. Pervasive monitoring by public authorities in sectarian schools violates Establishment Clause values related to excessive government entanglement. The Court identified two additional forms of entanglement in New York City's Title I program: the necessary administrative cooperation to implement Title I services and the potential for political divisiveness arising from public officials' decisions in providing those services. The Shared Time program in Ball was deemed to improperly advance religion based on three key assumptions: (1) public employees in religious schools are presumed to inculcate religion; (2) their presence creates a symbolic union between church and state; and (3) any public aid aiding religious schools' educational functions finances religious indoctrination, regardless of private decision-making influences. Additionally, Aguilar introduced a fourth assumption, asserting that Title I required excessive government entanglement due to the need for monitoring public employees in religious settings. Recent cases have challenged the foundational assumptions of Ball and Aguilar, while the principles for evaluating government aid under the Establishment Clause remain unchanged. The inquiry still examines whether government actions advance or inhibit religion, with relevant cases such as Witters, Bowen, and Mergens affirming secular purposes in government programs. Importantly, the understanding of criteria for assessing the impermissible effect of aid on religion has evolved; notably, the presumption that public employee placement in parochial schools leads to inevitable state-sponsored indoctrination has been abandoned. In Zobrest, the Court upheld the constitutionality of allowing a state-employed sign-language interpreter in a Catholic school, rejecting the notion that the Establishment Clause imposes an absolute bar against public employees in sectarian environments, thereby moving away from outdated notions of "taint" and emphasizing substance over form. In the absence of contrary evidence, it is presumed that the interpreter, as a full-time public employee, fulfilled her duties by accurately translating without introducing religious content. The Zobrest case determined that the provision of an interpreter did not constitute government indoctrination and was thus not prohibited by the Establishment Clause. This case explicitly rejected the assumption from Ball and Aguilar that a public employee's presence in a private school implies a presumption of religious inculcation. Justice Souter argued that Zobrest did not challenge the presumption of inculcation but rather suggested that public employees could only be present in sectarian schools under limited conditions, such as when providing translation services. He distinguished the interpreter’s role from remedial instructors, asserting that translation does not allow for the insertion of religious content. However, the Zobrest decision did not rely on this distinction. It recognized that interpreters have the same potential to influence religious views as other public employees. The dissent in Zobrest acknowledged a significant shift in Establishment Clause interpretation. The ruling in Zobrest is seen as establishing new legal precedents rather than misreading established case law. Additionally, the court moved away from the principle established in Ball that all government aid directly benefiting religious schools is invalid. In Witters, the court permitted a vocational grant for a blind individual attending a Christian college, emphasizing that such grants were available without regard to the religious affiliation of the institution. Grants were provided directly to students for tuition at their chosen educational institutions, akin to a state issuing paychecks with the understanding that part may be donated to religious entities. This arrangement is seen as resulting from individual choices, not state action. In the case of Zobrest, the provision of an interpreter for a sectarian school was upheld because it was determined that the interpreter's presence was due to parental choice under neutral eligibility criteria, rather than state influence. The aid was not considered as indirectly financing religious education, as it did not alleviate the school of costs it would normally incur. Current legal precedents, particularly from Zobrest and Witters, indicate that programs like the Shared Time program in Ball and New York City's Title I program in Aguilar do not advance religion through indoctrination. The assumption that public employees in parochial schools would engage in religious indoctrination is unfounded, and no evidence supports claims of Title I instructors promoting religion. Additionally, Zobrest challenges the idea that having Title I teachers in religious school settings creates a "symbolic union" between church and state. Justice Souter argues that Aguilar's conclusion about this symbolic union goes beyond the mere presence of Title I employees, asserting that the program's nature involves public teachers directly in sectarian instruction. However, he acknowledges that lower courts generally accept that Title I services can be delivered to sectarian students off-campus. The argument asserts that the distinction between constitutional and unconstitutional educational programs is flawed if it relies solely on the location of service provision, such as on-campus versus off-campus. The degree of collaboration between Title I instructors and parochial school faculty remains constant regardless of location, meaning that the perceived "symbolic union" does not diminish if services are offered off-campus. The provision of Title I services does not equate to financing religious indoctrination, as the services are supplementary to the regular curriculum and do not relieve sectarian schools of their educational costs. Justice Souter raises concerns regarding the differences between Title I and IDEA services, claiming Title I services are provided directly to religious schools, relieve schools of expenses, and serve more students. However, these distinctions are deemed insignificant. Title I funds are allocated to a public agency, which provides services to eligible students regardless of their school choice, and do not reach religious schools directly. Additionally, the claim that Title I services replace existing remedial instruction in sectarian schools is contested; there is no evidence that such services displace those already offered by the schools. Claims regarding the violation of Title I regulations by the Board lack evidence and are based on speculation about the distinction between supplemental and general education. The argument does not establish that sectarian schools uniformly provide remedial instruction or that the Board's Title I services supplant those offered by these schools. There is a reluctance to assume that the constitutionality of aid programs hinges on the number of sectarian school students receiving neutral aid. Previous cases, like Zobrest, indicate that the presence of a single student utilizing public services in a sectarian school does not invalidate the program. The Title I program's application, whether on-campus or off-campus, does not inherently subsidize religion, as indicated by Aguilar, which suggests off-campus services align with the Establishment Clause. Justice Souter's concerns about potential curriculum cutbacks in sectarian schools do not provide a clear rationale for differentiating the effects of on-campus versus off-campus services. Consequently, placing full-time employees in parochial schools does not legally constitute an advancement of religion. Additionally, while previous cases have analyzed beneficiary criteria, they primarily focused on whether such criteria could be linked to state-sponsored religious indoctrination. Zobrest upheld the provision of neutral aid under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), emphasizing that such aid does not create a financial incentive for parents to choose religious schools. Aid allocated based on neutral, secular criteria is less likely to advance religion, especially when available to both religious and secular beneficiaries without discrimination. The Court has previously supported programs offering aid to all eligible children regardless of their school affiliation, citing cases like Everson, Allen, Mueller, Witters, and Zobrest itself. In the context of New York City's Title I program, the distribution of services is based on criteria that do not favor or disfavor religion, ensuring that eligibility is determined without regard to religious beliefs, thereby eliminating any incentive for recipients to alter their religious practices to access services. The excerpt further addresses Aguilar's view on excessive church-state entanglement, noting that such entanglement is a critical consideration in Establishment Clause analysis. The assessment of entanglement involves examining the character and purposes of benefited institutions, the nature of state-provided aid, and the relationship between government and religious authority, which parallels the evaluation of a law's effect. Entanglement between church and state raises concerns under the Establishment Clause, particularly regarding the nature and extent of state aid to religious institutions. The Supreme Court has established that not all interactions between church and state constitute excessive entanglement; only those that are deemed "excessive" infringe upon the Clause. The precedent set in *Bowen v. Kendrick* indicated that government monitoring of religiously affiliated programs does not necessarily lead to excessive entanglement, especially when oversight includes reviews and audits without directly promoting religious teachings. The *Aguilar* case identified three grounds for excessive entanglement: the need for pervasive monitoring of Title I employees, administrative cooperation with parochial schools, and potential political divisiveness. However, under current interpretations, the latter two concerns alone do not establish excessive entanglement, as these issues are inherent to any offering of Title I services, whether on or off campus. The assumption that public employees in religious settings would be inclined to promote religious teachings has been challenged, particularly following the *Zobrest* decision. This ruling suggests that qualified public employees can fulfill their duties without necessarily inculcating religion, thereby negating the need for stringent oversight. Records show no evidence that routine supervision is inadequate to prevent religious promotion by public employees. New York City's Title I program complies with the three primary criteria for evaluating government aid related to religion: it does not promote governmental indoctrination, does not define recipients based on religion, and does not create excessive entanglement. The program, which provides supplemental remedial instruction to disadvantaged children, can operate on sectarian school premises without violating the Establishment Clause, as long as safeguards are in place. Utilizing state aid for religious education does not imply state endorsement of religion. Previous cases, such as Aguilar and parts of Ball, are no longer considered valid law due to changes in legal interpretation. The doctrine of stare decisis, while generally important, allows for overruling prior decisions when significant developments in constitutional law occur, as seen in various cited cases. This flexibility is particularly relevant in constitutional interpretation, where changes can only be made through constitutional amendments or by overruling past decisions. The court has determined that its interpretation of the Establishment Clause has evolved significantly since the decisions in Ball and Aguilar, leading to the decision to overrule these cases due to inconsistencies with current legal standards. The "law of the case" doctrine, which typically prevents reopening previously decided issues, does not apply here, as the court believes adhering to Aguilar would result in a manifest injustice. The court emphasizes that its decisions should reflect the most current legal principles and that prior rulings should be reconsidered if they are deemed erroneous. The court cites past cases to support the notion that the law announced in its decisions applies to ongoing matters, even when overruling prior cases. Ultimately, the court concludes that the changes in Establishment Clause law justify relief for the petitioners under Rule 60(b)(5), affirming that lower courts must follow the most relevant and current legal precedents while allowing the Supreme Court the authority to overrule its own decisions. The trial court acted appropriately in considering the motion supported by allegations but correctly denied it pending a reinterpretation of binding precedent by this Court. Respondents and Justice Ginsburg argue for a different analysis, emphasizing that the review focuses on whether the District Court abused its discretion in denying petitioners' Rule 60(b)(5) motion. While the trial court has discretionary power, that discretion cannot be upheld if it is based on outdated legal principles. Respondents argue against granting Rule 60(b)(5) relief, claiming petitioners are improperly using it to effectuate changes in the law rather than acknowledging existing changes. They fear this could lead to an influx of similar motions based merely on claims of legal changes. However, the Court asserts that mere beliefs about overruling a case do not constitute actual changes in the law. The litigation at hand concerns a request to vacate a continuing injunction due to significant changes in law, and Rule 60(b)(5) applies to judgments with prospective effects. Intervening legal developments alone seldom meet the extraordinary circumstances needed for relief under Rule 60(b)(6). The Court's decision will not affect normal civil litigation involving prospective relief and maintains that the application of Rule 60(b)(5) in this case does not distort the Rule into a vehicle for unlimited rehearing. Respondents also claim that petitioners’ use of Rule 60(b)(5) could harm the Court’s integrity, but fail to demonstrate how such an application undermines legitimacy, particularly in light of recognized changes in decisional law. Reliance on the doctrine established in Casey is justified in the current context, and there is no need to await a more suitable case to assess the implications of subsequent rulings on the Aguilar precedent. Addressing the Rule 60(b)(5) motion does not compromise the integrity of procedural rules nor indicate any shift in the Court's non-agenda-setting nature. Delaying action while the city of New York incurs substantial costs due to an ongoing injunction would be inequitable, especially when those funds could support disadvantaged children through compliant programs. Consequently, the judgment of the Court of Appeals is reversed, and the case is remanded to the District Court with directives to vacate its 1985 order. Justice Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg, dissents, arguing that the majority's decision to grant relief from a 12-year-old injunction misapplies Rule 60(b) and misunderstands recent Establishment Clause rulings. The dissent highlights that the majority's ruling undermines the precedent set by Aguilar and its companion case, Ball, which prohibited state aid to religious institutions, affirming that both prior cases established that public school teacher instruction in religious schools during school hours violated the Establishment Clause. The Aguilar case specifically involved New York City’s use of Title I funds for supplemental education in religious schools, while Ball addressed a program providing supplementary classes in similar contexts. Both were deemed to contravene the Establishment Clause by potentially endorsing religious education through public funding. The excerpt outlines key issues regarding the intersection of government funding and religious education, particularly in the context of the Establishment Clause. It emphasizes that the government's provision of secular instruction in religious schools creates a symbolic union of church and state, suggesting state endorsement of religion. The Shared Time program, which subsidizes religious schools by covering secular subjects, is highlighted as an example of this entanglement. The decision in Aguilar is referenced, noting that New York City's monitoring of religious content in Title I classes resulted in excessive church-state entanglement, violating the Establishment Clause. The excerpt asserts that the government is prohibited from directly subsidizing religion or endorsing it, emphasizing the imperative against government-financed indoctrination. It argues that any government support of a particular religion compromises both that religion and the religious freedom of dissenters. The historical context of these prohibitions is stressed, underscoring the dangers of government favoritism toward any religion and the potential for such favoritism to distort religious beliefs. Religion is believed to thrive more effectively without government involvement, as historical examples indicate that state endorsement can lead to exclusion of non-favored beliefs and reinforce dominant religious messages. The Establishment Clause aims to prevent the perceived endorsement of particular religions by the government, which can alienate nonadherents and undermine the principle of equality. The excerpt references several cases illustrating these principles, including Engel v. Vitale, which emphasizes that a government cannot uphold equality while endorsing specific religious beliefs. The discussion critiques educational programs in Aguilar and Ball, which were found to violate these principles. Specifically, Title I and the Grand Rapids Shared Time program provided educational services on religious school premises, covering essential subjects that those schools would typically teach. Despite being labeled as "supplemental," these programs effectively fulfilled the schools' educational obligations. Additionally, public employees involved in these programs exercised significant discretion, further complicating the relationship between church and state. The excerpt highlights that the aid provided under these programs flowed directly to the religious schools, contrasting with indirect aid that results from private choices. Overall, the passage underscores the dangers of governmental partnership with religion and the importance of maintaining a clear separation to prevent potential conflict and discrimination based on religious beliefs. Financial benefits received by parochial schools stem from individual parental choices, as established in cases like Mueller v. Allen and Witters. The central concern in Aguilar and Ball was the placement of state-paid teachers in religious schools, which posed risks of indoctrination and necessitated monitoring. The teaching responsibilities of state-paid teachers closely mirrored those of the religious schools, particularly in remedial education, blurring the line between secular and religious instruction. The principle established in Ball, that states could not constitutionally distinguish between public funding for secular subjects and religious education, was reaffirmed in Aguilar, emphasizing the entanglement issue. Even if remedial education occurs off religious premises, it still benefits religious schools financially, allowing them to allocate resources towards their religious missions. While the argument about off-premises aid exists, it does not effectively challenge the difficulty in delineating between types of instruction provided. Off-premises teaching reduces the likelihood of religious schools avoiding their responsibilities for secular subjects, as these schools are less able to eliminate or significantly reduce such subjects from their curriculum. This separation of aid delivery from the school environment minimizes the potential for state support to replace or subsidize the educational activities occurring within religious schools. The endorsement of the school's religious mission is more pronounced when teaching responsibilities are shared within the school, compared to an arrangement where the state maintains distance. The Court highlighted that a connection between church and state can influence impressionable children, whose beliefs are shaped by their environment. When state aid predominantly benefits one religious denomination, it lessens the grievances of other religions seeking public funding for their initiatives. The Aguilar-Ball line is presented as a sensible boundary for state aid to religious schools, a principle deemed necessary and valid today. However, the Court's recent stance disregards this doctrine, incorrectly asserting that Aguilar's and Ball's foundational assumptions have been rejected. The decision in Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, which allowed a school district to provide a sign-language interpreter in a sectarian school, is misinterpreted as a justification for overturning Aguilar or parts of Ball. The Court noted that the Establishment Clause does not categorically prohibit public employees in religious schools, but this was based on the specific role of the interpreter, which differs fundamentally from the roles of teachers or counselors. Thus, Zobrest does not support a broader rejection of the principles established in Aguilar or Ball. Ethical guidelines mandate that interpreters must convey information exactly as intended, likening interpreters to tools like hearing aids rather than educators, which precludes infusing religious content into secular education. The ruling in Zobrest establishes that when a public employee translates class material for an individual student, their presence in a religious school does not breach the Establishment Clause. In contrast, the Court overlooks the distinction made in Zobrest, asserting that a full-time public teacher in a religious school is akin to an interpreter, without evidence that the teacher will stray from secular duties. This perspective lacks the precedent set by Zobrest and fails to address the concerns raised in Ball and Aguilar, which concluded that having public teachers in religious schools creates a symbolic connection between government and religion, perceived as endorsement by students. The Court's interpretation misrepresents Ball's stance, which emphasized that public aid to religious education is inherently problematic, a notion that Zobrest does not counter. The implications of public employees’ presence in sectarian schools suggest an endorsement of religious aims, contrary to the Court's assertions. Ball did not demonstrate that all forms of assistance to religious schools violate the Establishment Clause. The Court found that the Shared Time program effectively subsidized religious schools by assuming a substantial role in teaching secular subjects. It clarified that merely the possibility of subsidization is insufficient to invalidate an aid program; rather, it assesses the aid's effect as either direct and substantial (unconstitutional) or indirect and incidental (permissible), highlighting that this is a matter of degree. In prior cases like Witters and Zobrest, the Court reiterated that these decisions did not reject the principle of aid to religious institutions but rather emphasized the limited nature of the aid involved, which was not directly received from the State. In Witters, the aid was given to an individual student who chose the educational institution, with no evidence suggesting significant funds would support religious education. Zobrest also involved a single beneficiary and noted that the aid was limited and did not relieve the religious school of expenses it would typically incur. The comparison between the aid programs in Title I and those in Witters and Zobrest is problematic. Title I served around 22,000 private school students, predominantly in religious schools, providing instruction in core subjects and guidance services, thereby relieving religious schools of expenses they would have otherwise incurred. Unlike the individual-centric aid in the previous cases, Title I aid is distributed directly by public educational agencies to religious schools, which significantly alters its nature. Therefore, Title I aid does not merely assist individual students but constitutes systemic support for religious institutions, raising concerns regarding its constitutionality under the Establishment Clause. The excerpt critiques the Court's treatment of precedent in relation to cases Ball and Aguilar, emphasizing that these decisions maintain a clear distinction between "direct and substantial" aid and "indirect and incidental" aid, a distinction the current case threatens to blur. It highlights that aid programs exclusively benefiting religious groups are constitutionally questionable, whereas those applying neutral criteria are less likely to advance religion. Despite the Court's assertion that Ball and Aguilar lack consideration of certain factors, the excerpt argues that mere evenhandedness is insufficient for constitutional compliance. Title I services are accessible to all eligible children, regardless of school type, yet this does not negate the potential for substantial support for religion, which could violate the Establishment Clause. The excerpt further discusses the principle of stare decisis, asserting that the Court's dismissal of it is unconvincing, as no subsequent cases have invalidated the concerns raised by Aguilar and Ball regarding the risks of religious endorsement through publicly funded education. It notes that providing Title I services off religious school premises incurs additional costs and inefficiencies, indicating that conditions have reverted to prior challenges since Aguilar's ruling. The argument concludes that the legal landscape remains consistent with prior decisions and that the realities of educational conditions have not changed, reinforcing the relevance of precedent. Justice Brandeis, dissenting, emphasizes the importance of adhering to constitutional boundaries despite the regrettable facts and high compliance costs associated with Title I. He acknowledges the sympathetic nature of cases that provoke impatience with constitutional lines but asserts that these lines are essential for constitutional governance. Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Breyer, expresses dissent regarding the Court's decision to rehear a legal question previously resolved in favor of respondents 12 years prior in *Aguilar v. Felton*. The majority justifies this rehearing by claiming subsequent decisions have undermined *Aguilar*, but Ginsburg contends that the Court’s Rules do not permit such reconsideration at this time and that proper application of these rules would require deferral until the issue arises in a different case. She notes that Rule 44 permits rehearing only within 25 days of a judgment, and emphasizes that there has been no precedent for extending this period for years. Furthermore, the majority's reliance on Rule 60(b)(5) for relief from judgments is unprecedented and lacks supporting practice. Ginsburg anticipates that this extraordinary ruling will not set a precedent for future cases, stating that Rule 60(b) allows a district court to grant relief from a final judgment if there is a significant change in circumstances that makes continued enforcement of the judgment inequitable. Modification of a consent decree in institutional reform is subject to specific legal standards. In Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County Jail, the Supreme Court established that appellate courts review denials of Rule 60(b) motions for abuse of discretion, as highlighted in prior cases like Browder and Railway Employes. The key question is whether circumstances have changed sufficiently to justify altering the decree. The ruling emphasizes that an appeal from a Rule 60(b) denial does not allow for a review of the original judgment itself, and relitigation of claims underlying that judgment is not permitted. The court is not authorized to reassess the legality of the original decree based on changed conditions unless those changes are substantial. In the case discussed, the majority acknowledged that no significant factual changes had occurred and reaffirmed the validity of the Aguilar decision, which governed the Establishment Clause at that time. Since the District Court adhered to established law without any change in circumstances, it did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rule 60(b) motion. Furthermore, lower courts are bound to follow Supreme Court precedents and cannot deem adherence to such judgments inequitable, as established in Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express. Granting the Rule 60(b) motion would have contradicted this directive. The Shearson/American Express ruling established that Rule 60(b) would not apply in situations where prior decisions of the Court remained unoverruled. Prior to this ruling, lower courts sometimes questioned whether earlier decisions were still valid law, citing cases such as Rowe v. Peyton and Perkins v. Endicott Johnson Corp. However, following Shearson/American Express, lower courts were mandated to adhere to Aguilar, with no discretion to alter its standing. The District Court did not err in its conclusion that Aguilar had not been overruled, and the appellate review is limited to this determination. The Court found that the District Court was correct to consider the Rule 60(b) motion and to ultimately reject it, acknowledging the limitations imposed by Shearson/American Express. The application of Rule 60(b) was criticized as being misapplied, as it was not intended to facilitate a rehearing unrelated to district court proceedings. The Court attempted to frame its decision not as a direct challenge to Aguilar but as an inquiry into its current validity, despite Aguilar having not been overruled until this point. There were ongoing cases, such as Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v. Secretary, U.S. Dept. of Ed., and Helms v. Cody, that could serve as more appropriate vehicles for addressing challenges to Aguilar. The Court noted that the plaintiffs in PEARL II had withdrawn their appeal pending the outcome of the current case, indicating that alternative avenues for legal challenges were available. A call is made to defer a decision on whether Aguilar should remain valid law until the arrival of Helms, PEARL II, or another relevant case. This recommendation is grounded in the necessity to uphold the integrity of procedural rule interpretation, maintain the Court's non-agenda-setting nature, and prevent unnecessary reevaluation of past cases based on speculative changes in the Court's composition. The excerpt references the case Illinois Central R. Co. to support this position. Additionally, it clarifies that the Court's discussion does not connect to the evaluation of the Community Education program as invalidated in School Dist. of Grand Rapids v. Ball. It argues against the Court's view that student participation is irrelevant to the constitutionality of aid programs, citing Witters v. Washington Dept. of Servs. for Blind to highlight the importance of evidence showing whether financing for religious education has been sought through state programs. Furthermore, the attempt to draw an analogy between Title I and IDEA is deemed flawed, as the circumstances surrounding Zobrest's application for interpretative services differ from how Title I services are provided to students.