Freitas v. Peerless Stages, Inc.

Citations: 239 P.2d 671; 108 Cal. App. 2d 749; 33 A.L.R. 2d 778; 1952 Cal. App. LEXIS 1738Docket: Docket Nos. 14756, 14959

Court: California Court of Appeal; January 18, 1952; California; State Appellate Court

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In the case of Dorothy Freitas v. Peerless Stages, Inc., consolidated appeals address a negligence judgment in favor of Freitas and an order to correct jury instructions. The incident occurred on September 5, 1947, when Freitas, a regular passenger, was riding the bus from Milpitas to San Jose. The bus arrived late at both Centerville and Milpitas. Freitas typically disembarked at the intersection of First and Santa Clara Streets in San Jose, where the bus was traveling west.

The bus driver, following a long-standing practice, would stop either in front of Roos Bros. or J.C. Penney depending on the traffic signal. Freitas was seated near the aisle and, as the bus approached the intersection, stood to move toward the front after another passenger signaled the driver to stop. As she walked, the bus made an abrupt stop, causing her to fall and sustain injuries by hitting her knee on the floor and her head on the coin box. She estimated the bus was traveling at 20 to 25 mph before this stop and could not see the traffic light. Her husband corroborated her account, noting the light was yellow as the bus entered the intersection, and that the driver halted suddenly to avoid colliding with a car that had appeared ahead. The testimony revealed critical timing and conditions regarding the traffic signal and the bus's speed, which are central to the negligence claim.

Testimony revealed that Mrs. Freitas was injured when the bus, driven by Alvin Still, stopped suddenly as it entered an intersection. Still recounted that he followed three cars that had stopped for a red light; upon the light turning green, these cars proceeded safely. However, as he approached the crosswalk, a car made a left turn in front of him, forcing him to stop abruptly, approximately 6 feet into the intersection and at a speed of no more than 9 miles per hour. He had no recollection of the turning vehicle's details or whether he was on time. Still stated the bus was new, equipped with air brakes, and could stop within 6 to 8 inches at that speed. 

He did not notice Mrs. Freitas’s fall but acknowledged that another passenger, Mrs. Bell, fell near the front exit. Both Mr. and Mrs. Freitas claimed that Mrs. Freitas was thrown forward and hit her head on the coin box next to the driver. Mr. Freitas assisted both his wife and Mrs. Bell after the incident. Although Mrs. Freitas did not report her injury to Still at the time of disembarking, she later informed the bus company of her injuries, which included a head contusion and exacerbated arthritis.

The appeal raised the issue of whether the specific allegations of negligence in the complaint precluded the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. The trial court instructed the jury on this doctrine. Appellant argued that the specific allegation of negligence—implying the bus jerked violently—limited the inference of negligence solely to that incident, thus preventing reliance on other inferred acts of negligence. The document notes conflicting California case law regarding the distinction between general and specific allegations of negligence.

Pleading negligence in California does not bar a plaintiff from invoking the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as established by case law. The allegations can be viewed as general or a combination of general and specific, both of which permit the application of the doctrine. In *Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co.*, the court supported this interpretation. The appellant's reliance on *Pellegrino v. Los Angeles Transit Lines* is misplaced, as that case deemed specific allegations of negligence—specifically, the careless operation of a streetcar—as not allowing res ipsa loquitur, a ruling not supported by precedent and lacking a Supreme Court review. Conversely, in *Davidson v. American Liquid Gas Corp.*, the court found that a general allegation of negligence concerning gas escaping and igniting did not preclude the doctrine's application. The court emphasized that no detailed description of negligence was required. In another case, *Gish v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp.*, the court ruled that an allegation of a streetcar stopping abruptly, causing injury, was similarly general, as it described the effect rather than the specifics of the negligent act. The lack of detailed facts regarding the operation of the streetcar did not prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur.

Plaintiffs failed to explain the cause of a sudden stop, only presenting the outcome without identifying the underlying reason, which should not preclude them from benefiting from the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur despite alleging general and special negligence. The appellant argues that evidence regarding the bus's speed and traffic conditions provided specific proof of negligence that should negate the application of res ipsa loquitur. However, California case law indicates that specific acts of negligence do not prevent the application of this doctrine unless they conclusively dispel the inference of negligence. In this instance, the specific proof did not eliminate the inference as a matter of law. The precedent set in Leet v. Union Pac. R. Co. supports this position, affirming that plaintiffs can still invoke res ipsa loquitur even when specific negligence is demonstrated, unless the evidence completely negates the inference of negligence. Regarding jury instructions, the appellant contends that the trial court improperly assumed that an accident occurred involving the respondent without allowing the jury to determine that fact, as the instruction suggested that an injury resulted from the incident in question.

The appellant contends that the court should have instructed the jury to draw an inference of negligence only if they first found that an accident occurred to the plaintiff. Although the instructions in question could have been clearer, the appellant did not request the specific instruction they now assert was necessary, which limits their ability to complain. The court's instructions on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were challenged because they allowed the jury to infer negligence solely based on the plaintiff's injury while using the appellant's vehicle. However, the court clarified that the instructions were based on special circumstances where the instrumentality causing harm was under the defendant's exclusive control, aligning with precedent from the Mudrick case. 

The appellant also argued that the instructions should have specified that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only if the jury finds no contributory negligence on the plaintiff's part. The jury had already received clear instructions on contributory negligence, rendering further qualification unnecessary. Additionally, the court's instruction regarding the inference of negligence appropriately allowed the jury to weigh the evidence, placing the onus on the defendant to prove they exercised due care or that the accident was not caused by their negligence. In the context of a carrier-passenger relationship, the inference of negligence is particularly robust, though the burden of proof does not shift to the carrier.

The instruction regarding the inference drawn from the evidence was criticized for its lack of clarity, as it could be misinterpreted to imply that the jury was required to accept it without question. However, the jury had been properly informed about the burden of proof and that the defendant could refute the inference, rendering the instruction acceptable despite its shortcomings. 

The appellant raised concerns about prejudicial misconduct by the respondent's counsel, who suggested that the appellant had willfully suppressed evidence by not producing a witness, Mrs. Bell. During closing arguments, the respondent’s counsel emphasized the absence of Mrs. Bell and implied that her testimony would have supported the respondent's case. The appellant's counsel objected to these remarks post-argument, asserting that there was no evidence Mrs. Bell was available to testify, and sought to clarify her absence, explaining she was in the Philippines. This request was denied by the court, which ruled the matter should have been addressed before the case concluded.

Despite the ruling, the appellant's counsel made references to Mrs. Bell's absence during his argument. No immediate request was made to instruct the jury to disregard these comments, but the court had previously instructed the jury to disregard any statements made by counsel unless they constituted an admission of fact. The appellant contended that the counsel's arguments were erroneous and prejudicial, but it was noted that the bus driver testified to having seen Mrs. Bell fall and had taken her name and address, which was a key point in the case.

The appellant did not explain the absence of Mrs. Bell during the trial, leading to a reasonable inference, supported by statutory presumption under Section 1963, subdivision 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, that her testimony would have been unfavorable. This presumption allows for comment by the respondent's counsel regarding the failure to produce her as a witness, as established by various legal precedents. The court also acted within its discretion in not permitting the appellant's counsel to assert knowledge about Mrs. Bell's current residence without proper evidence introduced during the trial.

Following the appeal, the appellant sought to stipulate the instructions given at trial, which the respondent refused unless the language in the transcript was corrected. After the appeal, the respondent requested a trial court order to amend the transcript to reflect what was actually stated in court, supported by affidavits. The trial court granted this motion. The respondent subsequently moved to augment the appellate record based on the trial court's order. The appellant argued that the appeal process barred the trial court from correcting the transcript, claiming the order was void. Ultimately, the appellate court decided to return the record to the trial court to verify the accuracy of the challenged instruction transcription.

On February 1, 1951, the trial judge, who originally presided over the case, reviewed a stipulation from the parties to submit the matter based on the record from the prior hearing. The court issued an order correcting an instruction given to the jury by replacing the word "event" with "absence." The original instruction, which stated that negligence could support a verdict for the plaintiff "in the event of a showing by the defendant," was deemed confusing and incorrect. The respondent argued that the reporter's transcription was erroneous, asserting that the actual instruction included the word "absence."

Evidence presented included testimony from the trial judge, who affirmed the correction, and from counsel who noted that the word "absence" was used during the trial. Although the court reporter was unavailable, it was agreed that he would have testified that his notes reflected the word "event." Other testimonies, including that of the court clerk, supported the trial court’s finding that "absence" was the correct word. The appellant contended that the trial court acted arbitrarily, but the appellate court found substantial evidence supporting the trial court's decision. Consequently, the judgment and order were affirmed.