Madden-Tyler v. Maricopa County

Citations: 943 P.2d 822; 189 Ariz. 462; 238 Ariz. Adv. Rep. 12; 1997 Ariz. App. LEXIS 31Docket: 1 CA-CV 96-0162

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; March 6, 1997; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Bonnie Madden-Tyler, the plaintiff-appellant, filed a lawsuit against Maricopa County and several officials, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), the Rehabilitation Act, wrongful constructive discharge, and civil rights violations under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, among other claims. The case arose after Madden-Tyler, employed as director of information services, was required to perform physically demanding work despite her prior medical condition, which resulted in back injury and subsequent surgery. Following her resignation due to her inability to manage her workload and pain, she filed a workers' compensation claim, received benefits, and later sought a waiver from the U.S. Department of Justice to extend the filing deadline with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The court determined that no specific federal statutes of limitations existed for the claims under the mentioned acts; instead, the Arizona Revised Statutes Annotated § 12-542, which sets a two-year limit for personal injury actions, was deemed the most appropriate. The trial court's dismissal of Madden-Tyler's claims based on the application of different statutes of limitations was found to be erroneous, leading to the reversal of the judgment.

Appellees sought the dismissal of appellant's wrongful discharge and tortious interference claims, arguing that she did not present these claims to the Maricopa County Merit Commission and that her exclusive remedy for tort claims related to her work injury was workers' compensation. The trial court granted the dismissal of these claims. Appellees then moved for summary judgment on the remaining claims, asserting they were filed beyond the applicable statutes of limitations. They also claimed, as a matter of law, that appellant was not disabled at the time of her injury. The court found a factual dispute regarding appellant's disability under the ADA and denied that summary judgment motion. However, it ruled that appellant's Title I ADA claim was barred by the 180-day federal claim statute, and that her Title II ADA and Rehabilitation Act claims were also subject to a 180-day limitation under Arizona's Civil Rights Act, concluding that her claims were filed too late. Summary judgment was granted on these claims. The court requested further memoranda on the limitations for appellant's 1983 claim and ultimately ruled that a one-year statute of limitations applied, granting summary judgment for appellees on that claim as well. Appellant appealed the final judgment, and the case falls under A.R.S. 12-2101(B).

In the appeal, appellant contended that her 1983 claim should be governed by a two-year statute of limitations for personal injury actions under A.R.S. 12-542(1). Appellees countered that the one-year statute in A.R.S. 12-821 should apply because the action was against public employees, which they argued controlled such cases. There is no specific federal statute of limitations for civil rights claims under 42 U.S.C. 1983, so a local statute applies unless it conflicts with federal law. The Supreme Court case Wilson v. Garcia established that 1983 claims are treated as personal injury actions, thus applying the general personal injury statute of limitations of the forum state. While appellees acknowledged that a personal injury statute applies, they maintained that A.R.S. 12-821 should govern instead of A.R.S. 12-542(1).

Section 12-821 mandates that claims against public entities or employees must be filed within one year of the cause of action arising. The appellees' argument is weakened by precedents set in Wilson and Owens v. Okure. In Wilson, despite the defendants' claims that the New Mexico Tort Claims Act's two-year statute of limitations applied, the Supreme Court opted for New Mexico's three-year general statute for personal injury. Owens reinforced this by stating that for § 1983 claims, courts should adopt the general statute for personal injury actions where multiple statutes exist. Consequently, the applicable statute for the appellant's § 1983 claim is the two-year limit of A.R.S. 12-542(1), as her complaint was filed within that period following her claim's accrual on October 22, 1992, leading to a reversal of the trial court's judgment favoring the appellees.

Regarding the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, which lacks a specific statute of limitations, the appellant argues for the application of A.R.S. 12-542's two-year limit as the most analogous state statute. The appellees suggest that ACRA's 180-day statute should apply instead. Courts typically select the most analogous state statute when determining limitations for federal claims, as established in various case law. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act aims to prevent discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities and shares broad remedial goals similar to those of § 1981 and § 1983, thereby encompassing a diverse array of claims.

Discrimination claims under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981 and 1983 are classified as personal injury claims, leading federal courts to apply state statutes of limitations for personal injury actions to Rehabilitation Act cases. The Morse court emphasized the need for consistency in applying a single state statute of limitations to 504 actions, as criticized in prior cases. Appellees argue that Arizona's A.R.S. 41-1463, which prohibits employment discrimination against disabled individuals, is analogous to the Rehabilitation Act, suggesting its statute of limitations should apply. They reference court opinions indicating that the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) aligns with the purposes of the Rehabilitation Act. 

Support for this assertion comes from federal cases where courts applied state statutes prohibiting disability discrimination. In Wolsky v. Medical College of Hampton Roads, the Fourth Circuit favored Virginia's act over the general personal injury statute due to its similarity to the Rehabilitation Act. Similarly, in McCullough v. Branch Banking, Trust Co., the court applied North Carolina's act's 180-day filing requirement instead of the general personal injury statute. 

However, the current case differs from Wolsky and McCullough because the Virginia and North Carolina statutes do not require filing an administrative charge before litigation, and they provide specific rights enforceable only in courts. Conversely, ACRA necessitates an administrative charge filed within 180 days of the alleged discrimination, which is a critical procedural difference.

ACRA mandates that filed charges remain confidential and allows for conciliation or other settlement methods, but these procedures conflict with federal policies under Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. A state law is deemed inappropriate if it overlooks the practicalities of litigating federal civil rights claims. ACRA does not impose a statute of limitations for court actions if no administrative charge is filed. Once a charge is filed with the ACRD or EEOC, the ACRD has ninety days to notify the charging party of a dismissal or failure to settle, after which the party has one year to initiate a civil action. Filing a charge is a prerequisite for a lawsuit under ACRA; however, actions under Section 504 can be filed without exhausting administrative remedies. Regulations under Section 504 follow enforcement procedures similar to those of Title VI and Title IX of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, which do not require exhausting administrative remedies before filing suit. Consequently, the limitations associated with ACRA's administrative charge do not apply to Section 504 claims, which instead fall under Arizona's general personal injury statute of limitations (A.R.S. 12-542), allowing a two-year period. Therefore, the appellant's Rehabilitation Act claim was timely filed, leading to the reversal of the summary judgment against the appellant. The appellant also raised claims under Title I and Title II of the ADA, with distinct procedures applicable to each, starting with Title II, which aligns closely with the Rehabilitation Act.

Title II of the ADA does not have a statute of limitations and aligns with the Rehabilitation Act's rights and remedies. In Tyler v. City of Manhattan, the court confirmed jurisdiction under Title II despite the plaintiff's failure to exhaust administrative remedies, citing 28 C.F.R. Part 35, which grants a private right of action without prior exhaustion. Similarly, Ethridge v. State of Alabama indicated that filing with the EEOC is unnecessary under Title II. Therefore, the statute of limitations from A.R.S. 12-542 applies to Title II claims, leading to the reversal of summary judgment against the appellant on this basis.

In contrast, Title I of the ADA adheres to Title VII's procedures, requiring plaintiffs to file a discrimination charge with the EEOC within 180 days before initiating a lawsuit. Although this filing is not jurisdictional, it serves as a statute of limitations that can be waived or tolled. The appellees argue for dismissal of the appellant's Title I action due to her failure to file within the required timeframe. The appellant contends that the DOJ waived this requirement, as their correspondence addressed Title II and indicated that she could file a suit without exhausting administrative remedies. The DOJ's letter does not reference Title I, leaving unresolved whether the 180-day filing requirement was waived for the appellant's Title I claim.

The DOJ granted a waiver of the 180-day filing requirement but did not address the appellant's Title I claim, indicating that the waiver likely pertains to other matters since Title II actions do not require administrative exhaustion. Consequently, the court reversed the summary judgment on the ADA Title I claim and remanded for further proceedings. The appellant sought attorneys' fees and costs under various statutes, but the court denied the request because the appellant had not yet won on the merits of her federal claims. The conclusion reversed the prior judgment that barred the appellant's federal claims based on statutes of limitations and remanded for further proceedings.

The concurring and dissenting opinions expressed differing views on applying the statute of limitations for the Rehabilitation Act and ADA claims, with one judge advocating for a 360-day period instead of the majority's stance. The dissent highlighted that the appellant's argument related to the statute of limitations was only raised in the appeal's reply brief, limiting the appellee's ability to respond. It also questioned the majority's interpretation of federal law concerning state statutes of limitations in Section 1983 actions, arguing for the application of the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) limitations, which allows 180 days for filing discrimination charges.

Claimants have 360 days from the act complained of to file a lawsuit unless there is an agency delay, which allows for a one-year extension from the date of filing with the agency, per A.R.S. 41-1481(D). The majority opinion holds that the Arizona Civil Rights Act (ACRA) limitations period does not apply to federal claims under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA because of differing filing requirements. However, the dissent argues that the appellant's failure to file within 360 days was not due to agency delay since no agency action was sought. It contends that the ACRA limitations period should apply, affirming the dismissal of claims under the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. The dissent also notes that the amended A.R.S. 12-821, effective after the action accrued, does not retroactively apply and has changed the language regarding the timeliness of claims. The Rehabilitation Act prohibits discrimination based on disability in federally funded programs. ACRA prohibits employment discrimination based on various factors, including disability.