Murdock v. Balle

Citations: 696 P.2d 230; 144 Ariz. 136; 1985 Ariz. App. LEXIS 459Docket: 1 CA-CIV 6877

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; February 21, 1985; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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The Court of Appeals of Arizona addressed whether the statute of limitations for a dog bite claim under A.R.S. 24-521 is governed by the one-year limitation of A.R.S. 12-541(3) or the two-year limitation of A.R.S. 12-542. Larry Murdock filed a lawsuit against A.K. and Jane Doe Balle for injuries from a dog bite that occurred on January 8, 1979, but the claim was brought on October 6, 1980. Murdock's complaint included a claim under the dog bite statute and a common law negligence claim, the latter of which was dismissed by stipulation. The trial court granted the Balles' motion for summary judgment based on the one-year statute, finding the claim barred by A.R.S. 12-541(3). 

The court clarified that A.R.S. 24-521 imposes strict liability on dog owners for injuries caused by their dogs, irrespective of the owner's knowledge of the dog's viciousness. The only defense available is if the injured party provoked the dog. Murdock contended that the dog bite statute did not create a new liability since common law liability existed, arguing for the applicability of A.R.S. 12-542 instead. The court disagreed, emphasizing that A.R.S. 12-541(3) applies to liabilities created solely by statute and does not extend to common law actions. The court rejected Murdock's reliance on a California case that had ruled differently, finding it unpersuasive. Ultimately, the court concluded that Murdock's claim was correctly governed by the one-year statute of limitations under A.R.S. 12-541(3).

Arizona courts have interpreted the state's "dog bite statute," A.R.S. 24-521, to maintain that it does not replace common law liability and allows for concurrent claims under both statutory and common law theories. The statute is subject to strict, literal construction and has been determined to create a new cause of action, reflecting a substantive change in law rather than merely altering pleading requirements. 

In relation to the statute of limitations, the courts have drawn parallels to the Consumer Fraud Act, A.R.S. 44-1521 et seq., where it was established that claims under the Act have different elements than common law fraud actions, with a one-year statute of limitations applicable under A.R.S. 12-541. This was upheld in cases such as Murry v. Western American Mortgage Co., where it was concluded that the Consumer Fraud Act establishes a separate cause of action. 

Furthermore, the court referenced Rogers v. Smith Kline, which indicated that if a limitations statute specifically addresses liabilities created by another statute, that statute's limitation period should apply. In this case, A.R.S. 12-542(2) applies to wrongful death actions, indicating a two-year limitation for injuries leading to death. The reasoning from Peery and Murry is applied to the dog bite statute, suggesting it similarly establishes a new cause of action with its own limitations.

The Rogers court's conclusion centered on the legislative history of Arizona's wrongful death statutes and their limitations. Subsection (2) of A.R.S. 12-542 specifically pertains to wrongful death, making it controlling in such cases, unlike the broader language in A.R.S. 12-543 regarding "liability created by statute." Subsection (1) of A.R.S. 12-542 imposes a two-year limitation on various personal injury claims but does not explicitly include dog bites. Consequently, the rule derived by Murdock from the Rogers case is deemed inapplicable. The court noted that references in limitation statutes to specific situations do not dictate the limitations period for statutory claims unknown at common law. In Day v. Schenectady Discount Corp., the court differentiated between common law conversion and a claim under the Uniform Commercial Code, applying different statutes of limitations for each. The court concluded that Murdock's claim arose solely from A.R.S. 24-521, thus affirming the trial court's determination that A.R.S. 12-541(3) applied, which barred Murdock's claim. Summary judgment in favor of the Balles was upheld, with justices Froeb and Ogg concurring.