Long v. Garrett

Citations: 527 P.2d 1240; 22 Ariz. App. 397; 1974 Ariz. App. LEXIS 494Docket: 2 CA-CIV 1726

Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona; November 13, 1974; Arizona; State Appellate Court

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Petitioner Donna Long challenges the constitutionality of A.R.S. 13-1424, claiming it infringes upon her Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights, as well as those of the Arizona Constitution. The case arose after a refund check, sent to Jan Dee Summers, was allegedly endorsed and deposited by Long without Summers' permission. The Tucson Police sought a handwriting sample from Long, leading to temporary detention orders issued by Judges Lee Garrett and Robert Buchanan. Long contends that her detention lacked probable cause and was therefore unlawful. 

The Court of Appeals of Arizona, however, finds the statute constitutional, asserting that the detention, authorized by a magistrate, is reasonable under the circumstances. The statute limits detention to three hours and requires that it be conducted at a convenient time for the individual, emphasizing the importance of detaining individuals only in relation to felony offenses. Citing precedents, the court notes that reasonable detentions can occur without probable cause, particularly in contexts where society has a significant interest in preventing serious crimes. The court ultimately denies the petition, affirming the statute's compliance with constitutional standards.

The excerpt addresses the requirements outlined in A.R.S. 13-1424(A)(3), which mandates that evidence sought by law enforcement must not be obtainable from other sources. Officer Hathaway asserted that a handwriting exemplar from Miss Long was not available elsewhere. The petitioner contends that while the statute necessitates showing reasonable cause to believe a felony has been committed, it does not require demonstrating a connection between the detained individual and the crime. However, subsection (B)(3) stipulates that orders under this statute must detail the relevance of the evidence to the investigation, necessitating the officer to establish a nexus between the suspect and the crime. Officer Hathaway met this requirement satisfactorily. The court acknowledges the statute's ambiguous language but emphasizes its obligation to uphold it if permissible, allowing for temporary detention without infringing on the petitioner’s rights. Relief was denied, with Judge Krucker concurring and Judge Howard dissenting. Judge Howard references the Supreme Court case Davis v. Mississippi, which highlighted the constitutional implications of warrantless detentions for fingerprinting, suggesting that the legislature's intent in enacting A.R.S. 13-1424 was to align with constitutional standards. He also notes that while certain detentions might comply with the Fourth Amendment under specific circumstances, the traditional probable cause requirement remains intact.

In Camara, the court establishes that when the Fourth Amendment mandates a warrant for searches, probable cause is the standard used to evaluate the search's alignment with constitutional reasonableness. The court emphasizes that the public interest justifying the search must be weighed against the intrusion into private citizens' rights. Key considerations in this balancing act include: the primary purpose of the search (whether it seeks criminal evidence), the necessity of the type of search conducted, the possibility of conducting the search in a less intrusive manner, and the extent of privacy invasion. Under certain conditions, probable cause and reasonableness may be deemed synonymous.

Terry v. Ohio exemplifies this theory, as the search there was justified by the need to protect police officers' lives. Conversely, Witt v. United States, which deals with border searches, is distinguished from other search types, and the court suggests that citing it is inappropriate in this context. The current case involves an arrest aimed at advancing a criminal investigation, lacking the necessity or emergency that would typically justify a departure from established probable cause standards. 

The Arizona statute allows police to detain individuals one-by-one to potentially identify a criminal, contrasting with a broader dragnet approach. This standard raises concerns about Fourth Amendment protections, as it permits arrests based on minimal connections to ongoing investigations. The majority's defense of the statute's constitutionality is deemed insufficient due to the lack of probable cause linkage, leading to a conclusion that the statute is unconstitutional. 

The notes detail the procedural requirements for a peace officer to seek a magistrate's order for temporary detention to obtain identifying physical characteristics from an identified individual, highlighting the necessity of demonstrating reasonable cause linked to a specific criminal offense and the inability to obtain the evidence through other means.

Orders issued under this section must include specific details: the alleged criminal offense, the type of identifying physical characteristic evidence sought, the relevance of the evidence to the investigation, the identity or description of the individual to be detained, the name and official status of the investigative officer authorized to carry out the detention, the location for obtaining the evidence, and the time frame for collection, which cannot exceed three hours. The order remains valid for a maximum of fifteen days. If not executed within this period, a new order can be issued. Additionally, the order must be returned to the court within thirty days, accompanied by a sworn statement detailing the evidence collected. The court is required to provide a copy of the order and the sworn statement to the individual from whom the evidence was taken. Identifying physical characteristics encompass various forms of evidence, including fingerprints, footprints, blood samples, and photographs.